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Abstract 
 
The advancement in technology makes it easy and effective to transmit and spread ransomware to 
different devices. The result is increased ransomware threats to different sectors of the World 
Economy. The reason for the spread of these threats is that Ransomware developers are trying to 
increase their revenue by infecting victims of specific (industry) sectors of the world economy with 
targeted ransomware to breach their security and steal valuable data. To counter these threats, 
industries employ different security measures to prevent ransomware-related losses, yet losses 
continue to occur because of the ever-changing dynamics of ransomware. Consequently, industries 
are continuously, searching for effective measures to control ransomware attacks. Forensic and 
security experts and law enforcement operatives also have limitations in the control of such security 
threats.  
The study of cluster analysis in none ransomware domains (e.g. complex social networks links and 
contents) has proved invaluable for the detection of cluster hubs, authorities, and communities in 
complex social networks. This has helped in targeted marketing activities and in the detection, 
identification, and prediction of terrorist and criminal hubs (gangs) within a network. That 
ransomware distribution and spread have similar complex network configuration to the social 
network, application of cluster analysis on the ransomware becomes a possible area of interest in the 
fight against ransomware threats. Compared to the social network, ransomware structure comprises 
of a set of links and contents, whose nodes (vertices) represent ransomware families, IP Addresses, 
URLs, Host, Registrar, ASNs, Countries, status or other entities embedded in the distribution. Real-
time Active Cluster Overlap Profiling and Tracking (ACOPT) of ransomware network overlapping 
cluster trends presents an opportunity to prevent a successful attack. The study reveals there is active 
threat when the network events activity peaks at 53.53% with a prior gradual increase from 10.19% 
through 27.38%. The threat happens when the number of overlapping clusters reaches the highest 
maximum threshold preceded by the lowest minimum threshold. At the onset of threat, the clustering 
elements and the percentage values between the active cluster node and terminal cluster node are 
equal (29.11%); and the difference between them and the highest percentage cluster node (41.77%) 
is -12.11% and 12.11%. In addition, the onset is characterized when the percentages of the cluster 
intensity of the active cluster node and terminal cluster node reaches respective values of 31.03% 
and 24.89% and the difference between them and the cluster node with the highest value (44.08%) 
becomes equal to -13.05% and 14.19%. The active threat therefore, occurs when the active cluster 
node and terminal cluster node records respective 27.38% and 39.29% in the number of clustering 
objects, while other cluster nodes record equal values of 11.11%. The active overlapping cluster, 
therefore, is identified to be the cluster that has the most regular, consistent and closely distributed 
number of clustering objects, measures of centrality and intensity values in all the cumulative periods 
of the time series of the ransomware network. 
Therefore, the present investigation by exploring temporal events and overlapping cluster formation 
in a Ransomware network identified an active cluster-overlap, which could be removed to timely 
dislodge potential Ransomware threat. The active cluster-overlap was tracked through cluster 
profiling in a time-series and periodic network clustering analysis of Ransomware Network to 
establish pattern consistency. The consistency tracking and validation were achieved using the key 
performance parameters of the network, cluster intensities, and the frequencies of clustering objects. 
The removal of the active Cluster Overlap (node 1) was proved effective in dislodging the 
ransomware network and controlling threat before it attacks. Hence, the study proposes a real-time 
Exploratory Machine-learning Cluster Overlap System (EMCOS) for links and contents cluster 
analysis in a complex ransom-ware network as a tool to control threat. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Industries and organizations take many security measures to prevent ransomware threats. 
Despite the huge capital investments to protect products and properties, organizations still 
face the risk of ransomware-related thefts and breaches. Ransomware threats do not seem to 
have terminal solutions as the cyber-space experience development in infrastructure, 
technology, and cyber-intelligence services rapidly expand and evolve. Considering the cost 
of ransomware threat, this study seeks an exploratory machine-learning platform to help 
industries to make quick decisions to counter and control the threat. Therefore, the self-
healing approach (cycle) to ransomware control aims to identify the active cluster overlap, 
which is the originating source (node) of ransomware traffic, that can be removed in a 
ransomware network to prevent an attack. The desired system (Figure 1) imports network 
data and conducts network analysis to identify the key performance parameters that 
influence the formation and development of the network clusters.  
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Figure 1: Self-healing Ransomware Cluster Overlap Control Cycle,  
Showing the cycle from data import to performance evaluation 
 
The above understanding helps to detect cluster overlaps and identify the active node to 
remove to dislodge the network and control threat.  
 
To appreciate the urgent need for this study, an understanding of the menace of modern 
malware, namely ransom-ware is imperative. The emergence of ransomware dates to 2005. 
Ransomware has so much grown in popularity that 2015 recorded an estimated average of 
407,000 attempted ransom-ware attacks [1,2]. The  consequent estimated value of 325 
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million (USD) was extorted from victims [1,3,4]. The year 2017 recorded an annual average 
cost of 11.7 million (USD) [5], while the predicted cost for the end of 2019 is 11.5 billion 
(USD) [6].  
Ransom-ware consists of two words namely ransom, and ware deriving from software.  
• Ransom, as the name implies, is money paid to release a person or thing that is 
forcefully held [7]; conversely,  
• Ware simply stands for software or malware application used to execute restriction 
for collecting ransom.  
Specifically, ransom-ware is a type of malware developed to infect computing systems with 
the criminal intent to encrypt the files in such a system; consequently, denying legitimate 
access to them by retaining the decryption key until the victim pays the required ransom 
amount [1,8,9]. Ransom-ware has its root and origin from malware (malicious software), 
and in most cases are the variants of malware. Basic among the ransom-ware includes crypto 
and locker ransom-ware that have emerged as one of the most troublesome categories of 
malware in modern history. While crypto encrypts files in a victim’s device, locker locks 
the victims completely out of their devices [10]. Ransom-ware targets a variety of economic, 
industrial, social, financial and banking sectors of the World economy. Other sectors 
targeted include educational, public, and hospital, etc. [11]. In recent years, the most often 
preferred mode of ransom payment includes Bit-coin, the cryptographic digital currency 
based on Block-chain distributed ledger technology, which offers a secure, anonymous, and 
untraceable method of making and receiving payments [1,12–16]. The ransom was 
estimated to cost about one Bit-coin, approximately 450 (USD), per infected machine at the 
time of record [1,4,10,14,17,18]. Technological development in media devices and network 
connectivity (Figure 2), enhance the spread and effectiveness of ransom-ware attacks.  
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Figure 2: The effect of advances in modern technology on the Spread and cost of Ransom-ware 
 
Analysis has been conducted on ransom-ware (malware) distribution, aiming to provide an 
insight into the activities of malware, origin, and distribution [19–22]. Studies have focused 
on analysing types of malware such as smartphone malware, worms, viruses and other 
propagating malware (e.g. spyware, keystroke loggers, information theft malware; botnet 
attacks, detection/tracking and defence; and rootkit and virtualization techniques) [19].  
 
The primary target of this research was the creation and distribution of malware. Some 
malware trend analyses were conducted using APK Auditor that uses static analysis to 
characterize and classify android applications to target Android platform [23]. A study of 
malware (virus) propagation research proposed a delayed computer virus propagation model 
and studied the dynamic behaviours of malware [24]. One of the threats to network security 
is malware propagation, and topological scanning seen as a type of malware that spreads 
based on topology information [25]. The focus was on modelling the spread of topological 
malware to understand the potential damages they cause, and to develop countermeasures 
for protecting the network infrastructure. Assessing the suitability of internet provider’s 
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countermeasures against malware, a study [26] used an agent-based model, called ASIM, to 
investigate the impact of policy interventions at the Autonomous System level of the Internet 
[27].  
 
A further study [28,29] developed an automatic malware detection model by training an 
SVM classifier based on behavioural signatures to overcome the problem of classification 
accuracy regarding unspecified malware detection when using signature-based analyses [29]. 
In 2008, a study presented an approach that enabled economic modelling of information 
security risk management in contemporary businesses and organizations [20]. The work 
focused on the prevention of heavy losses that may happen due to cyber-attacks and other 
information system failures in an organization. The prevention of such losses, the study 
observed, is associated with continuous investment in different security management 
measures and purchase of data protection systems [30–32], including: 
• Identification of business assets 
• Identification of threats 
• Assessment of damages that result from a successful attack 
• Identification of security vulnerabilities that could be exploited in the system 
• Assessment of security risks 
• Measures to minimize the risk and implementation of appropriate controls 
• Evaluating the performance of the implemented controls 
The study [30–32] introduced methods to identify the assets, the threats, the vulnerabilities 
of the ICT systems and proposed a model that enables the selection of the optimal investment 
of the necessary security technology based on the quantification of the values of the 
protected systems. This study also provided the model for external insurance-use based on 
quantified risk analyses [20]. Cyberark Labs classified some set of ransom-ware by their 
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behaviour to determine the strategies that could be more effective in mitigating damages 
caused by ransom-ware attacks. The mitigating strategies discussed, include application 
whitelisting, application blacklisting, application grey-listing, least privilege, and backup 
and recovery [1]. This study did not specify the use of any classification or machine learning 
technique; however, they simulated the experiment in a controlled environment. Equally, 
this research did not provide any feature-selection classification model to compare the trend 
of the static features between benign-ware and ransom-ware and to identify the features that 
have more impact on the trend of the ransom-ware. Furthermore, this work did not provide 
a comparison of the trend of static features among different ransom-ware families, 
notwithstanding the huge and growing cost of successful attacks by different families of 
ransom-ware on the respective victims. These studies also did not model the degree to which 
the static features of ransom-ware contrast with benign-ware that makes them evade 
different security measures that result in successful attacks. The consequence of this gap is 
that security industries are caught unprepared to prevent malware attacks. These industries 
are not aware of the trend of the impacts of the attacks of each malware features because 
there are no known framework (models) on malware and ransom-ware trend and 
classification prediction. The lack of such frameworks, therefore, make it difficult to have 
effective control mechanisms to prevent malware attacks resulting in high economic 
consequences to different economic sectors affected. 
 
From the above background, this research focuses on Clustering in Complex ransom-ware 
families Network Based on Content Relevance and Link Structures. This study employs the 
Clustering machine-learning algorithm to build cluster maps and analyse different cluster 
profiles. The study uses Machine-learning algorithms to "learn" information directly from 
the ransomware data without relying on a predetermined equation as a model. The 
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algorithms adaptively improve their performance as the number of samples available for 
learning increases [33]. Two techniques are identifiable in machine learning as depicted in 
Figure 3. These include unsupervised and supervised machine learning techniques. 
 
 
Figure 3: Supervised and Unsupervised Machine Learning Approaches 
 
Unsupervised machine learning finds hidden patterns or intrinsic structures in the input data. 
Subsequently, it groups and interprets the data based only on input data. This means that 
unsupervised learning finds hidden patterns or intrinsic structures in a dataset and uses it to 
draw inferences from data sets consisting of input data without labelled responses. 
Clustering is the most common unsupervised learning technique. It is used for exploratory 
data analysis to find hidden patterns or groupings in a data set. Applications for clustering 
include gene sequence analysis, market research, and object recognition [33]. Conversely, 
supervised machine learning technique trains a model on known input and output data so 
that it can predict future outputs [33]. Supervised learning typically uses two techniques, 
classification, and regression, to develop predictive models. Classification techniques 
UNSUPERVISED MACHINE 
LEARNING
(Groups and interprets data based 
only on input data)
Clustering
SUPERVISED MACHINE 
LEARNING
(Develops predictive model based 
on both input and output data)
Classification
Regression
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predict categorical responses; while, regression techniques predict continuous responses 
[33]. Considering the dataset (ransom-ware) used in this research, which has input data only, 
the focus of this research is on the use of unsupervised machine learning technique for 
clustering and supervised machine learning for classification. The unsupervised machine 
learning clustering algorithm maps the overlapping clusters that are required for analysis in 
this study. The decision to use an unsupervised machine learning technique for cluster 
exploration is demonstrated in Figure 4 adapted from Scikit-Learn [34]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Process of Selecting Machine Learning Technique (Scikit-Learn) 
Previous research has applied machine-learning techniques to clustering in complex social 
networks based on content relevance and link structures. Fuzzy Clustering Algorithm for 
Complex Networks was proposed in some of the studies [35]. Unlike the hard clustering 
algorithm (Exclusive Clustering) that allows objects to belong to one cluster, the Fuzzy 
clustering, Soft Clustering (Overlapping Clustering), allows objects to belong to more than 
one cluster with different degrees of membership [35,36]. The graphical representation of 
clusters is important to reveal very important topological information about sub-clusters or 
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sub-graphs in a given network [37]. The graphical representation is needed to develop 
understanding of the complex nature of the data system. The main target for ransom-ware 
cluster analysis, like social networks, is to understand the topology, clustering formation and 
the dynamics of the network by visualizing the community structure of ransomware families, 
https://ransomwaretracker.abuse.ch/feeds/csv/ (Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5: Ransomware Communities Network: 
Showing cluster nodes of different ransomware families in the wild 
 
Cluster visualization helps to visually identify hubs, authorities or overlaps and outliers in 
the network [37–39]. Therefore, it would be helpful to adopt a good method or algorithm to 
detect the modules (nodes) of a network connection with high sensitivity, accuracy, and 
reliability [40]. Considering the menace of malware, especially ransom-ware, research need 
Country IPv4 Address
URL Malware
Host ASN
Registrar Status
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to investigate the complex nature of the ransom-ware network in order to explore content 
relevance and link structures in the detection and termination of threats [1]. An 
understanding of the links and content relevance of the Network is vital to develop effective 
counter-measures to potential attacks as poor understanding would result to ineffectiveness 
in the control of threats. Therefore, the exploration of temporal events and formation of 
clusters and cluster overlaps gives an insight on the dynamics of ransomware threats. To 
achieve this objective, this investigation collects real-time ransom-ware data and passes this 
to machine learning algorithms for analysis. Clustering algorithm identifies overlaps within 
the clusters for the determination of links association and content relevance. The identified 
active overlap cluster node becomes the preferred node to remove to dislodge a potential 
ransomware threat. 
 
1.1 The Motivation for this Investigation 
 
Events Networks have existed from the very start of internet invention. Perhaps the 
prominence of Networks was not predominant then as it has been today, potentially because 
internet services were limited due to limited access to enabling technology. As technologies 
developed, internet activities gradually evolved into different visible communities and 
networks. The development of Social Networks in early 1990 does not negate the existence 
of malware and ransomware. Just like the Social Networks, it took several years for the 
malware and ransom-ware network communities to become prominent in the modern 
internet platform as a hub to distribute dangerous applications with the intent to steal private 
and valuable data from individuals and organizations. The leap in adoption of the internet, 
resulting from modern technology, has led to new paradigms in Social Network 
Communities. Following these paradigm shifts in Social Network Communities, efforts are 
made to understand and analyse the various dynamics and topologies of the communities 
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and sub-communities. The structures of these social Network Communities, referred to as 
clusters and sub-clusters, and their links and contents, describe the activities of the networks. 
Links and contents explain both the social, economic, religious, political, and criminal 
cleavages of associating memberships.  Many types of research have been conducted in the 
social network communities especially with the leap in the development of internet 
technology [41–45].  
 
Unlike social networks, research in the field of complex ransom-ware networks is still 
developing. In Social Networks, people of different background have the freedom of 
association. This means they both have the freedom to join a social network community 
platform or to leave it. Such freedom does not apply to ransom-ware networks. Instead, the 
threats they pose are imposed on various categories of users. The implication is that each 
user will either spend resources to force them out from the ransom-ware attacking network 
or risk losing valuable data and money. However, with an increasing amount of ransom-
ware network traffic (attacks), there is an urgent demand on effective and efficient 
approaches to handling large and dynamic ransom-ware connected networks. Therefore, an 
effort is made to seek machine-learning approaches that would learn patterns, behavioural 
characteristics or community associations to identify threats and take immediate actions 
against them. This research seeks to propose the real-time Exploratory and Machine-learning 
Cluster Overlapping System (EMCOS) to links and contents cluster analysis of the complex 
ransom-ware network. Thus, this investigation seeks to focus on finding the best ransom-
ware network cluster overlaps and outliers to detect and terminate, in real-time, the threats 
of ransom-ware. To this end, clustering is one method to discover hidden values 
(knowledge) in a complex network, hence as a preliminary study of the ransom-ware 
network, partitioning algorithm such as k-means and fuzzy c-means, which are known for 
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their dependence on distance measures are used to recognize clusters in the ransom-ware 
dataset [46]. Subsequently, random (decision) forest algorithm is used to build independent 
k-d trees of the forest to determine the similarity degree and overlap between sub-clusters, 
and clustering unordered sub-clusters thereby discarding singles elements [47]. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Cybercrime against different industrial sectors of the World economy has been identified to 
result in huge loss of revenue – estimated at an average of £266 billion per year. Ransom-
ware contributes a large percentage of such losses. It is among the various malware designed 
purposely to gain access, steal valuable information or cause damage to the host device 
without the knowledge of the victim, subsequently demanding ransom from the host victims. 
Advancement in technologies makes it easier and more effective to transmit malware and 
infect devices more rapidly and consequently, to commit cybercrime. Transactions are done, 
mostly, online via digital devices thereby providing a ready conveyor through unprotected 
machines. Different sectors of the World economy make huge investments to secure their 
assets, yet they incur losses through malware attacks – especially those sectors with high-
risk attack value. The worldwide attack of WannaCry ransom-ware of May 2017 
corroborates the destructive nature of ransom-ware. In the United Kingdom, WannaCry 
attacked the systems of National Health Service (NHS) [48]. There is a widespread 
speculation that WannaCry was among the huge leak of NSA hacking tools [49]. The 
severity of the attack prompted Microsoft to release an emergency security update to counter 
WannaCry Ransom-ware [50]. The general level of impact of ransom-ware on different 
industries could depend on the lack of adequate security measures and lack of good 
knowledge of the trend and static and network properties of ransom-ware.  
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Previous researchers have conducted several analyses on malware properties, aiming to 
provide insight into the behaviour of different malware. The primary target of most research, 
among others, was to analyse the malware properties using the various features to create 
detection models. To develop an automatic malware detection model by training some 
classifiers based on the clusters, links, and contents of the ransom-ware network. This helps 
to overcome the problem of classification accuracy regarding unspecified malware detection 
when using signature-based analyses. However, these did not provide any analysis of the 
cluster, links, and contents among different families of ransom-ware in the network. 
Consequently, these previous works, among others, lack the frameworks to differentiate 
between different families of ransom-ware. They equally lack the capability to detect the 
best active cluster nodes to remove to dislodge a potential ransomware threat. In other words, 
they lack a tool for real-time detection and termination of potential ransom-ware threats. 
 
The major problem statement of this investigation is to evaluate the possibility or otherwise 
of developing a system for real-time detection of overlaps and outliers in a dynamic network 
cluster. Such a system will help to detect the best network cluster nodes to remove, to 
dislodge a real-time potential ransom-ware threat. The development of such system will help 
forensic and security experts in the timely determination and control of ransom-ware threats. 
The results will help to inform the conclusions drawn from this investigation and its 
consequent recommendations. This research will choose to apply K-means, and Random 
Forest based clustering algorithm, which builds patterns of intrusion (cluster objects and 
outliers) over training data, thereafter matching the intrusion against network activities [43], 
to determine the degree of association of a node with the cluster that it belongs, to better 
identify clusters in complex networks. Consequently, this will help to identify overlapping 
clusters. 
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1.3 Research Aim and Objectives  
 
The aim is to develop an understanding and knowledge of the formation of ransomware 
threat for a future development of a system to automate the detection and removal of active 
overlapping cluster node to control ransomware threat at the time of emergence, thereby 
efficiently and effectively reducing the impact of developing threats within a continuous and 
proactive monitoring approach. This will be achieved through the application of data science 
techniques to analyse evolving network cluster overlaps and pattern recognition to identify 
the threat profiles.  
 
The objectives undertaken to achieve the aim are progressively structured and cumulatively 
address the aim (Figure 6) through progressively building understanding of the network 
clustering process and approaches to analysing and identifying the emergence of threats. 
 
 
Figure 6: Schematic Representation of Research Aims to detect cluster overlap using link relationships 
and content relevance in ransomware (families) network  
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Ransomware 
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1) To explore and identify the topology (structure) and Cluster (Nodes) of Ransom-
ware Community (Family) Networks to develop an understanding of the patterns 
exhibited by developing ransomware attacks (threats). 
2) To detect Ransomware Cluster Network overlaps (hubs) and outliers. 
3) To explore the use of machine learning approaches to identify, detect and analyse 
the key parameters affecting cluster evolution in Ransomware Networks. 
4) To compare different network key performance parameters to identify the 
active cluster overlap for the real-time detection and termination of Ransom-
ware (Network) threats. 
5) To identify the most impactful parameters (links and contents) to consider 
when analysing a Ransomware Network for the detection of Ransomware 
threat. 
6) To make recommendations on the key characteristics of developing threats for 
future approaches to control ransomware threats. 
 
The objectives are expected to help in gaining an understanding into the topology of the 
Network clusters (nodes), links (vertices) and contents of different consisting ransom-ware 
families with network topology, meaning the arrangement of the various elements such as 
links (vertices), nodes, and contents of the communication network. This step helps to gain 
an insight into the basic concepts behind Ransom-ware Networks and the formation and 
developments of clusters and cluster overlaps with the intention to identify key performance 
parameters, clustering objects intensities and active cluster overlaps. This is to detect the 
central communication hubs termed overlaps connecting the various sub-communities 
(clusters). Without the overlaps or association, the Ransom-ware community network has 
no connection and is bound to disintegrate, isolated or go into extinction. The detection of 
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these overlaps would give insight on how forensic and security experts can use them to 
investigate and prevent Ransom-ware attacks. 
 
The steps defined by these objectives seek to investigate the applicability of machine 
learning algorithms to analyse ransom-ware Networks based on the overlaps, outliers, 
content relevance and link structures for developing a platform suitable for the real-time 
detection and prevention of ransom-ware threats.  
 
In these research steps, the focus is on the development of a dynamic machine-learning 
detection system that can analyse Ransom-ware Network for real-time detection and 
prevention of threat. The system explores the topological configuration of different families 
of ransomware network to map out the subgraphs (clusters). The determination of the key 
performance parameters of the clusters of the network becomes needful to detect the active 
cluster overlap node that originates and distributes the ransomware traffic to other cluster 
overlap nodes. The detection and removal of this active cluster overlap node helps to 
dislodge the ransomware threat and control attack. The tool is expected to be self-healing 
and runs in cycle. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Investigation 
The achievement of the aim of this investigation depends largely on pursuing a concise and 
objective plan of action. The plan of action outlines and explains the procedures to execute 
to achieve the desired results to satisfy the set aims. The schematic of these procedures is 
presented in Figure 7 with further explanations in sections 1.4.1 – 1.4.3. 
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Figure 7: Schematic Representation of Research Objectives, namely to map network clusters (overlaps) 
using link distribution and content relevance to identify active cluster node, and develop a tool to 
remove the active cluster node 
 
1. To analyse link structures of ransomware networks and their effects on cluster 
overlaps and distribution of threats 
 
This objective seeks to analyse the link structures of ransomware Networks. The focus is to 
understand the communication mechanism between the link structures of different families 
of ransomware and the distribution of ransom-ware threats through the internet ecosystem. 
In addition, an understanding is sought on how these communication relationships affect the 
formation of different clusters and cluster overlaps. The understanding will help (to develop 
a system) to track ransom-ware threats and remove them before their actual attack. 
 
2. To analyse content relevance in cluster formation and spread of ransomware 
threat 
 
The knowledge of the degree of importance and relevance of the contribution of network 
contents in the topology and clustering of network community helps to understand the 
contents to give critical attention in developing a counter system to ransomware threats. In 
other words, there could be contents that are more consistent in the network clustering 
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formation of overlaps. These contents could be identified by the degree of variable 
importance associated with them. Variable selection processes in machine learning 
algorithm can equally identify such contents. 
 
3. To develop an understanding for a real-time detection of overlaps to identify 
active nodes to remove to dislodge ransom-ware threats 
 
The end objective to achieve the set aim of this investigation is to develop a knowledge and 
understanding that could help in real-time to make quick decision to dislodge and undermine 
the ransomware threats even before a potential attack. The system will utilize the different 
information or clustering patterns and overlap behaviours learned from the exploration of 
temporal events and formation of cluster overlaps in a given ransomware network. 
 
Summarily, the pursuit of these objectives is to use the understanding of the topological 
dynamics of the network to identify the key performance parameters in the formation and 
development of ransomware network and cluster overlaps, and their role in the distribution 
and spread of ransomware threats across the network devices of different sectors of the 
World Economy. Subsequently, the understanding is used to create a tool for management 
decision to prevent and control threats before they attack. 
 
1.5 Research Contributions 
 
Every investigation contributes to produce new knowledge or to improve upon an existing 
one. Therefore, the completion of this research is expected to produce the contributions 
depicted in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Schematic Representation of Research Contributions showing the contributions of: a 
dynamic machine learning detection tool for the detection of threat; a tool suitable for implementation 
in social and other networks; and a platform that provides reference point for comparisons of future 
studies 
 
The contributions of this current research investigation are: 
a) The development of an understanding of machine-learning detection approach that can 
analyse Ransom-ware Network for real-time detection and removal of active overlaps nodes 
for the prevention of ransom-ware threats. 
b) The successful application of the platform to ransom-ware makes it a contribution and 
suitable tool for use in social networks and networks in other sectors of the economy for the 
detection of cluster overlaps, criminal hubs, economic/operational links, and content clusters 
c) The study creates recommendations on the impactful network key parameters to consider in 
the future development of tools for the control and prevention ransomware threats.  
 
1.6 Research Limitations and Scope 
 
This research currently applies to unidirectional network link where the structure allows a 
given node to receive an incoming connection (communication) but cannot connect 
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(communicate) back to the same originating node. However, it can connect (communicate) 
to different nodes in the network. This means there is no inward and outward connection 
between two nodes. The data used in this research is limited to the feeds imported from 
https://ransomwaretracker.abuse.ch/feeds/csv/. Data from other sources have not been 
applied yet, but there is hope that other sources of data would be applied in the future.  
 
However, the effectiveness of the practical application of any system that is developed based 
on this principle is beyond the scope of the present study because of social, ethical, and need 
for moral network, etc.; and is left for future studies to characterize. In addition, a more 
detailed understanding of how the ransomware events join a given cluster overlap node or 
leave it to form a new one would be the focus of a future study.  
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1.7 Structure of Thesis 
 
 
Figure 9: General Project Plan and Structure of Thesis: showing data input, pre-processing/dataset, 
and project arrangement and documentation merging into methodology; then machine learning of 
dataset and exploration of machine-learned network parameters merging into design and 
implementation and continuing unto summary, recommendations and future work 
 
General Project Plan and Structure of Thesis are shown in Figure 9. The investigation 
introduces the research in Chapter 1 to describe the focus of the study. It gives a broad 
overview of Social Networks and Ransomware Networks, as well as the motivation of the 
study, statement of the problem, research aim and objectives, research contributions, and 
limitations. It highlights the prevalent level of Ransomware threat in different sectors of the 
global economy. Further to this, is differentiation between Ransom-ware Network and social 
Network vis-à-vis the links, contents, and topology of the two platforms. This highlights the 
differences and evaluates the prospects of using Ransom-ware Network features to control 
internet security threats.  
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Chapter 2 undertakes a historical review into the historical context of ransomware and gives 
an in-depth evaluation of existing works (literature review) on the emergence of ransomware 
threat and control; and compares existing tools, which allow users to (join and exit a given 
Social Network) detect and terminate ransom-ware attacks. In this chapter, these features 
will be defined to give an understanding of the parameters used by various tools in their 
Network Cluster graphs and analysis. 
 
The methodology applied in the execution of the research aim and objectives are presented 
in Chapter 3, while the design and implementation of the project are presented in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the investigation. Chapter 6 deals with the analysis, 
interpretation, and discussions of the results. Chapter 7 is dedicated to summary, conclusions 
and recommendations and a preview of a possible future work (see Figure 9). 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.0 Background of the Study  
 
The May 2017 attack of WannaCry ransomware became the latest worldwide cyber-crime 
incident reported to have affected many key infrastructures and services. It spread 
spontaneously but was short-lived as a killer key was purportedly triggered accidentally by 
an IT professional [50]; fear of it still remains [51]. Figure 10 shows how different sectors 
of the economy are infected by ransomware for a short period, January 2015 – April 2016 
[4]. The figure shows that the most infected sector is the services sector, while the least 
infected are the Mining, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing sectors [4]. 
 
 
Figure 10: Infection of Ransomware by different Sectors of the Economy showing the services sector at 
the highest risk and infection level while the mining, agriculture, forestry, and fishing are least 
infected sectors 
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The returns to cyber criminals are great, and besides prosecution, the risks are low. It is 
estimated that the likely annual cost to the global economy from cybercrime is more than 
$400 billion. A conservative estimate would be $375 billion in losses, while the maximum 
could be as much as $575 billion [52–54]. Even the smallest of these figures is more than 
the national income of most countries. Unfortunately, governments and companies 
underestimate how much risk they face from cybercrime and how quickly this risk can grow 
[52,55–57]. This literature review will attempt to cover the classification techniques of 
malware and especially different ransomware families using their static and dynamic 
features in comparison with the features of “good” ware. In addition, there will be a review 
on the Performance of Android Forensics Data Recovery Tools (Published Book Chapter, 
2016) [58]; to gain an understanding of works already done on the subject of classification 
techniques as a tool for determining the trend of ransomware attacks. 
 
Generally, the growing menace of cyber-crime is facilitated through particular media. 
Therefore, smart mobile devices, particularly smartphones, are seen to be increasingly 
popular in today's Internet-connected society and present the potentials for the spread of 
cybercrime [59–61]. In 2010, shipments of smartphones grew by 74% to 295 million units 
[61]. Unsurprisingly, sales of smartphones have been increasing since [62,63], and it has 
been estimated that 1.5 billion smartphones will be sold by 2017 with 1 billion mobile 
subscribers by 2022 [64–72]. Such devices are generally used to make phone calls, send 
SMS messages, web browsing, locate places of interests, map navigation, image and video 
capture, entertainment (e.g., gaming and lifestyle), business and economic transactions (e.g., 
internet banking), take notes, create and view documents, etc. [63,73–75]. Due to their 
widespread adoption in corporate businesses, these devices are a rich source of information 
(e.g., corporate data and intellectual property) [76–79]. The potential to target such devices 
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for criminal activities (e.g., malware such as banking Trojans) or to be used as an attack 
launch pad (e.g. used to gain unauthorized access to corporate data) [80–87], makes it 
important to ensure there is the capability to conduct a thorough investigation of such 
devices [75,79,88–93].  
 
While there are a small number of forensic tools that can be used in the forensic investigation 
of smart mobile devices [94], the extent to which data can be recovered varies, particularly 
given the wide range of mobile devices and the constant evolution of mobile operating 
systems and hardware [95,96]. For example, recovering data from the internal memory of a 
smartphone remains a challenge. Further to these challenges is the requirement to create 
forensically sound and effective tools and procedures [77,92,94]. Therefore, it is essential 
that the forensic community keeps pace with forensic solutions for smart mobile devices 
[60,61,97,98]. This is the focus of this chapter. Specifically, the effectiveness of five popular 
mobile forensics tools is studied, namely: Phone Image Carver, AccessData FTK (Forensic 
Tools Kit), Foremost, Recover My Files, and DiskDigger, in recovering evidential data from 
a factory-restored Samsung Galaxy Note 3 running Android Jelly Bean version 4.3. The 
need to conduct a literature survey of Regression Techniques for (Malicious) software 
prediction is more urgent now to give security managers an insight into the future trend of 
malware attacks. The emergence of malicious software (malware) as an attack and valuable-
information-stealing tool has added new dimensions to the subject of digital cybercrime. 
The menace of malware was not given a thought when Charles Babbage invented the first 
computing machine in 1832, the consequent arrival of modern computers in the 1950s [99] 
and subsequently the development of other media devices. The software has been developed 
since the 1960 but the emergence and spread of malware through the internet was never 
imagined when the internet came to life in 1969 [100,101]. However, computer and media 
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device users became aware of malware through the widespread infections caused by Melissa 
and LoveLetter in 1999 and 2000 respectively [102]. From the sudden attack of Melissa and 
LoveLetter, different types of other malware have taken turns to cause economic havoc in 
the World of internet computing, media communication, and business transactions. Over the 
years, different sectors of the economy have experienced different types of malware attacks, 
which make this survey imperative.  
 
The urgency to develop a malware prediction and control model comes from the increase in 
targeted malware attacks, especially with the advancement of technology. Most industrial 
sectors of the world economy are more at risk for these targeted attacks than other sectors 
because of the value of the resources they hold in digital form. Hence, these high-risk 
industrial sectors suffer huge economic losses. In targeted attacks, there is evidence that the 
attacker has specifically selected the recipients of the attack. It might be that the attacker 
suspects that the intended victim holds or has access to high-value information that the 
attacker wishes to compromise, or the compromised systems can be used to launch further 
attacks against other high-value systems or individuals that could be of economic value 
[103]. Therefore, modelling the trend and economic impact control of malicious software 
(malware) attacks in the industries demands immediate attention. Malware developers are 
exploiting the opportunity of the advancement in technology to spread malware attacks on 
their victims. Malware is found to be responsible for attacks affecting computer users. These 
are very dangerous as they take advantage of security vulnerabilities, errors in applied 
programming interfaces (API), memory corruption-based vulnerabilities to execute on the 
host device [104]. The growing incidence of malware attacks has become a great challenge 
to different sectors of the world economy. The sectors are affected by malware threats at 
different risk levels ranging from high to low risk levels depending on the value of the 
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resource they hold. The immediate effect of Malware threats is the breach of Confidentiality, 
Integrity, and Availability of private information. Such breaches consequently translate to 
real economic costs within the various sectors that are subjects of attack. Malware threats 
thrive most when there are transmitting medium. The advancement in internet technology 
provides this medium and brings with it an increasing rise in digital crimes. An estimated 
annual cost of cybercrime on the global Economy is £266 billion ($445 billion) [105–107]. 
Stealing of individual’s personal information and cyber espionage affected more than 800 
million people in 2013 [52,108]. In estimating the consequent global financial cost of 
cybercrime, these losses could result in the loss of an estimated 150,000 jobs in Europe [52]. 
In this context, the race to protect valuable and sensitive information, overcome the digital 
crimes and cyber criminals and possibly prosecute them pose very great research challenges. 
Information security and media forensics as an emerging research area not only seek to 
provide security for valuable and sensitive data but also applies computer investigation and 
analysis techniques to detect these crimes and gather digital evidence that could be used for 
prosecution in courts. However, the use of the internet and other information technologies 
had grown rapidly all over the world in the 21st century. Directly correlated to this growth 
is the increased momentum of criminal activities involving digital crimes or e-crimes 
worldwide [109]. These digital crimes impose new challenges on the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of personal information, hence increasing the task of prevention, 
detection, investigation, and prosecution of corresponding breaches.  
 
2.1 Malware Evolution and Timeline 
 
The evolution of malware reviewed in the context of the background study of this project is 
captured in a Ransomware Timeline (Figure 11). The Ransomware Timeline covered the 
28 
 
malware evolutionary period from 1970 – 2008; the evolutionary timeline for the period 
1980 – 2017 is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Figure 11: Ransomware Timeline showing the names of malware against their dates of release, the 
dotted blue curve shows the annual frequency of malware occurrence, while the dotted red line is the 
trend showing an increasing number for the period 1970 - 2008  
 
The subject of malware attack was not known until computer and media device users became 
aware of malware through the widespread infections caused by Melissa virus and LoveLetter 
worms in 1999 and 2000 respectively [102]. The sudden attack of Melissa in Aberdeen 
Township, New Jersey, and LoveLetter in the Philippines resulted in different types of other 
malware taking turns to cause economic havoc in the World of internet computing, media 
communication and transactions [90,110,111]. Prior to the Melissa and LoveLetter attacks, 
the “Theory of self-reproducing automata” by John von Neumann [112] was tested in 1971 
using the self-replicating Creeper system malware written by Bob Thomas at BBN 
Technologies [112,113]. Creeper infected DEC PDP-10 computers running the TENEX 
operating system. Creeper gained access via the ARPANET and copied itself to the remote 
system with the message "I'm the creeper, catch me if you can!" [114]. Creeper was an 
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experimental program, and the Reaper malware program was later (1971) created to delete 
Creeper [115,116]. The rabbit (or wabbit) virus (created in 1974) was known to spread by 
creating multiple copies of itself [90,115]. The next malware recorded in 1975 included the 
ANIMAL, the first Trojan, and the shockwave rider. While the program PERVADE acted 
as a catalyst to create a copy of itself and ANIMAL in every directory in the host system 
[90,117–119], Shockwave Rider spread through a network of computers [120–127]. Elk 
Cloner was a boot sector virus that appeared in 1981 and Elk Cloner caused the first large-
scale outbreak of computer virus in history [90,128]. Shortly after Elk Cloner was the 
creation of the self-replicating computer virus in 1983. The virus spread to other programs 
by the activity of modifying them to include an evolved copy of itself [90,129]. The 
evolution of malware appears to happen in quick succession with the backdoor introduced 
in 1984. The backdoor attacks the host system by modifying the C-compiler to embed into 
the login command, thus, the backdoor insertion code is activated when the C-compiler is 
eventually used to compile itself. This happens even if neither the backdoor nor the backdoor 
insertion code was present in the source code [113,130–135]. Later, was the introduction of 
Brain boot sector (virus) [aka Lahore, Pakistani, Pakistani Brain, and Pakistani flu] in 1986. 
It was created in Lahore Pakistan and became the first IBM PC compatible virus that was 
responsible for the first IBM PC compatible virus epidemic [90,136,137]. In 1987, the 
Vienna virus and Lehigh virus were introduced. The Vienna virus attack was on the IBM 
platform [138],  while the Lehigh virus (boot-sector virus) did not spread because it was 
discovered and stopped at Lehigh University [138]. Also in the same 1987, the viruses, Yale, 
Stone, Ping Pong, SCA and Byte Bandit, (boot-sector virus) were introduced [139]. The 
cascade was the first encrypting file virus and the Jerusalem virus that attacked and 
destroyed all executable files on infected machines [139]. In the same year, the Christmas 
Tree EXEC, a computer worm disguised as a benign holiday greeting was introduced. It 
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spread rapidly via email and clogged up networks worldwide [140]. In 1988, the Ping-pong 
virus, an MS-DOS boot sector virus, was introduced [141]. In addition, the Cyber AIDS and 
Festering Hate ApplePro DOS viruses were introduced in the same year. These viruses 
spread from underground pirate BBS systems and started infecting mainstream networks 
[141]. Furthermore, the Morris worm was introduced, and this was an 
Infected DEC VAX and Sun machines running BSD UNIX that are connected to 
the Internet. It became the first worm to spread extensively "in the wild", and one of the first 
well-known programs exploiting buffer-overrun vulnerabilities [141–146].  
 
In 1989, Ghostball Computer virus was introduced. It was the first multipartite virus 
designed to infect both the executable and COM-files and boot sectors on MS-DOS systems. 
It captured specific information entered or saved by the user, with the corresponding threat 
to privacy and caused the loss of information stored on the computer on either specific files 
or data in general. It affected the productivity of the computer and the network to which it 
was connected or other remote sites. It decreased the security level of the computer but did 
not automatically spread itself [147,148]. In addition, AIDS Trojan (ransomware) was 
introduced; this virus was mailed to subscribers of PC Business World magazine and a WHO 
AIDS conference mailing list. This DOS Trojan lay dormant for 90 boot cycles, and then 
encrypts all filenames on the system, displaying a notice asking for $189 to be sent to a post 
office box in Panama in order to receive a decryption program [138]. In 1990, the 
polymorphic virus (chameleon family) was launched. It remained in the wild for almost 20 
years and reappeared afterward; during the 1990s it tended to be the most common virus in 
the wild with 20 to more than 50 percent of reported infections [134,137,149,150]. 
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In 1992 was the introduction of Michelangelo virus; the virus was designed to infect DOS 
system but did not engage the operating system or make any OS calls. However, it operated 
at the BIOS level. It was rumoured the virus would wipe out information from millions of 
computers. However, the effect of the virus was seen to be minimal [151]. 1993, marked the 
launch of Leandro Boot Virus (Leandro & Kelly). This boot virus emerged in pirate MS-
DOS operating system software. The virus infected the boot when it was turned on and 
would infect any disc inserted into the PC. It spread quickly due to the popularity 
of BBS and shareware distribution [113]. In 1994 and 1995, One Half and Concept were 
introduced. The former was DOD-based polymorphic computer virus while the later was the 
first Macro virus that attacked the French version of Microsoft Word document [98]. 
However, in 1996 the Ply, a DOS 16-bit based complicated polymorphic virus appeared 
with built-in permutation engine. Furthermore, Boza and Laroux were introduced. Boza was 
the first virus designed specifically for Windows 95 files to arrive while Laroux was the first 
wild-spread macro virus to infect Excel spreadsheets to appear [98]. Staog, the first Linux 
virus that attacked Linux machine was introduced [114,115].  
 
In 1998, CIH virus was formed; it was the first known virus able to erase flash ROM BIOS 
content [116].  Whereas Happy99 worm was introduced in 1999, it invisibly attached itself 
to emails and displays fireworks to hide the changes being made, ultimately wishing the user 
a happy New Year. It modified system files related to Outlook Express and Internet 
Explorer (IE) on Windows 95 and Windows 98 [98]. In the same year also, Melissa worm 
Targeting Microsoft Word and Outlook-based systems, and creating considerable network 
traffic was introduced [117,152,153]. Similarly, Explore Zip worm and Kak worm were 
introduced; the former destroyed Microsoft Office documents while the latter was a 
JavaScript computer worm that spread by exploiting a bug in Outlook Express [118]. In 
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2000, ILOVEYOU worm (Love Letter, or VBS, or Love Bug worm) was introduced. It was 
a computer worm believed to be created by a Filipino computer science student. Written in 
VBScript, Love Letter infected millions of Windows computers worldwide within a few 
hours of its release. Using social engineering techniques, it was considered as one of the 
most damaging worms ever [34,119]. In the same way, Pikachu virus was introduced. This 
virus was believed to be the first computer virus targeting children. It contained the character 
"Pikachu" from the Pokémon series and distributed in the form of an e-mail titled "Pikachu 
Pokemon" with the message: "Pikachu is your friend." The attachment to the email has "an 
image of a pensive Pikachu", along with a message stating, "Between millions of people 
around the world I found you. Don’t forget to remember this day every time MY FRIEND." 
Along with the image, there was a program, written in Visual Basic 6, called 
“pikachupokemon.exe” that modified the AUTOEXEC.BAT file and added a command for 
removing the contents of directories C:\Windows and C:\Windows\System at computer's 
restart. However, a message would pop up during startup, asking the user if they would like 
to delete the contents. The affected operating systems were Windows 95, Windows 98 and 
Windows Me [120]. In 2001, the Anna Kournikova virus was created. This virus hit e-mail 
servers hard by sending an e-mail to contacts in the Microsoft Outlook address book [121]. 
It was also the year that Sadmind worm and Sircam worm were created.  The former spread 
by exploiting holes in both Sun Solaris and Microsoft IIS [154–156],  whereas the later 
spread through Microsoft systems via e-mail and unprotected network shares [134,137,157]. 
 
Code Red worm and Code red II (Code Red worm) started also in 2001 [158,159].  The 
Code Red worm was known to attack the Index Server ISAPI Extension in 
Microsoft Internet Information Services [126,127]. On the other hand, code Red II began 
aggressively to spread onto Microsoft systems, primarily in China [127–129]. In the same 
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year, Nimda worm spread through a variety of means including vulnerabilities in Microsoft 
Windows and backdoors left by Code Red II and Sad-mind worm [128,130] while Klez 
worm exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer and Microsoft Outlook and 
Outlook Express [137]. In 2002 Simile virus and Beast were introduced; Simile virus was 
a metamorphic computer virus written in assembly [137] while Beast was a Windows-based 
backdoor Trojan horse, more commonly known as a RAT (Remote Administration Tool). It 
was capable of infecting almost all versions of Windows [137]. Mylife and Optix Pro were 
equally introduced in 2002; Mylife was a Windows-based backdoor Trojan horse, more 
commonly known as a RAT (Remote Administration Tool). It was capable of infecting 
almost all versions of Windows [160,161].  Optix Pro was a configurable remote access tool 
or Trojan, similar to Sub Seven or BO2K [162,163]. 
 
In 2003, SQL Slammer worm was introduced; it was known as Sapphire worm, Helkern and 
other names, attacked vulnerabilities in Microsoft SQL Server and MSDE becomes the 
fastest spreading worm of all time (measured by doubling time at the peak rate of 
growth), crashing the Internet within 15 minutes of release [164]. Graybird was a Trojan 
horse also known as Backdoor. Graybird was also introduced in the same year  [165,166]. 
ProRat and Blaster worm was introduced in the same year. However, ProRat was a Turkish-
made Microsoft Windows-based backdoor Trojan horse, more commonly known as a RAT 
(Remote Administration Tool) [167], while Blast worm (Lovesan worm), rapidly spread by 
exploiting a vulnerability in system services present on Windows computers [137].   
Similarly, Welchia (Nachi) worm was introduced in 2003 [168]; the worm tried to remove 
the Blaster worm [169] and patch Windows. Sobig worm (technically the Sobig.F worm) 
was also introduced in the same year as the Welchia.  The worm spread rapidly through 
Microsoft systems via mail and network shares [170]. Others include; Swen, a computer 
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worm written in C++ [171] and Sober worm [172], which was first seen on Microsoft 
systems and maintained its presence until 2005 with many new variants. The simultaneous 
attacks on network weak points by the Blaster and Sobig worms caused massive damage.  
The Agobot and Bolgimo were also introduced in the same year [137]. The Agobot was a 
computer worm that can spread itself by exploiting vulnerabilities on Microsoft Windows. 
Some of the vulnerabilities are MS03-026 and MS05-039. Conversely, Bolgimo was a 
computer worm that spread itself by exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability at Microsoft 
Windows DCOM RPC Interface [137].  
 
In 2004 was the introduction of the Bagle worm and L10n worm (Lion). Bagle worm a mass-
mailing worm affecting all versions of Microsoft Windows. There were two variants of 
Bagle worm, Bagle.A and Bagle.B.  The Bagle worm was discovered on February 17, 2004 
[173]. Moreover, L10n worm a Linux worm that spread by exploiting a buffer overflow in 
the BIND DNS server. It was based on an earlier worm known as the Ramen worm 
(commonly, albeit incorrectly referred to as the Ramen Virus) which was written to target 
systems running versions 6.2 and 7.0 of the Red Hat Linux distribution [174].  In addition, 
Mydoom and Netsky worm were discovered. MyDoom worm currently holds the record for 
the fastest-spreading mass mailer worm [175], while Netsky worm, was a worm that spread 
by email and by copying itself to folders on the local hard drive as well as on mapped 
network drives if available. Many variants of the Netsky worm appeared [176]. In the same 
year, the Witty and Sasser was discovered. The Witty worm was a record-breaking worm in 
many regards. It exploited holes in several Internet Security Systems (ISS) products. It was 
the first internet worm to carry a destructive payload and it spread rapidly using a pre-
populated list of ground-zero hosts [176]. Sasser merges by exploiting a vulnerability in the 
Microsoft Windows LSASS service and causes problems in networks, removing MyDoom 
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and Bagle variants, even interrupting business [177].  In addition, Caribe (Cabir), a computer 
worm designed to infect mobile phones that run Symbian OS was introduced. Caribe was 
the first computer worm that can infect mobile phones. It spread itself through Bluetooth 
[178]. Equally, Nuclear RAT (Nuclear Remote Administration Tool) was also discovered. 
This backdoor Trojan infected Windows NT family systems (Windows 2000, Windows 
XP, and Windows 2003) [179]. Still, in 2004, Vundo (Vundo Trojan, Virtumonde or 
Virtumondo, MS Juan) and Bifrost (Bifrose) were introduced. This was a Trojan known to 
cause popups and advertising for rogue antispyware programs, and sporadically other 
misbehaviour including performance degradation and denial of service with some websites 
including Google and Facebook [180]. Bifrost (Bifrose) was a backdoor Trojan that can 
infect Windows 95 through Vista. Bifrost uses the typical server, server builder, and client 
backdoor program configuration to allow a remote attack [179]. Finally, in 2004 Santy 
(webworm) was introduced. This was the first known "webworm" to be launched. It 
exploited the vulnerability in phpBB and used Google to find new targets. It infected around 
40000 sites before Google filtered the search query used by the worm, preventing it from 
spreading [181]. 
 
Furthermore, in 2005 Zotob [182] the copy protection rootkit was launched; this was a 
rootkit deliberately and surreptitiously included on music CDs sold by Sony BMG and 
exposed. The rootkit creates vulnerabilities on affected computers, making them susceptible 
to infection by worms and viruses [183]. Also Zlob Trojan; This was a Trojan horse program 
masquerading as a required video codec in the form of the Microsoft Windows ActiveX 
component and was first detected in late 2005 [167]. Subsequently, Bandook or Bandook 
Rat (Bandook Remote Administration Tool) was also detected in 2005. It was a backdoor 
Trojan horse, which infected the Windows family. It used a server creator, a client, and a 
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server to take control over the remote computer. It used process hijacking/kernel patching 
to bypass the firewall, and let the server component hijack processes and gain rights for 
accessing the Internet [167]. 
In 2006, Nyxem worm was detected. Nyxem spread by mass mailing. Its payload, which 
activates on the third of every month, starting on February 3, attempts to disable security-
related and file sharing software, and destroy files of certain types, such as Microsoft Office 
files [173].  However, in the same year, OSX/Leap-A or OSX/Oompa-A and Brontok variant 
N were detected. The former was the first-ever malware for Mac OS X, a low-threat Trojan-
horse, while the later was a mass-email worm and the origin for the worm was from 
Indonesia. 
 
2.2 Economic Impact of Malware Attacks 
 
The emergence of malicious software (malware) as an attack and valuable-information-
stealing tool added new dimensions to the subject of digital cybercrime. Over the years, 
different sectors of the economy have experienced different types of malware attacks. Some 
sectors are subject to more attacks than others are in comparison. In 2013, the Internet 
Security Threat Trends identified the risk level of malware attacks in some sectors as 
follows:  Mining sector (risk ratio: 1 in 2.7), Public Administration (Government) (risk ratio: 
1 in 3.1), and Manufacturing (risk ratio: 1 in 3.2) are considered high risk. Considered to be 
Medium risk sectors include Wholesale (risk ratio: of 1 in 3.4), Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services (risk ratio: 1 in 3.9), Finance, Insurance 
& Real Estate (risk ratio: 1 in 4.8). Low risk sectors include: Services – Non-traditional (risk 
ratio: 1 in 6.6), Construction (risk ratio: 1 in 11.3), and Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing (risk 
ratio: 1 in 12.0) [184]. The risk ratios for these different economic sectors are presented in 
Figure 12 and Figure 13. The values of the risk ratios suggest that Mining, Public 
Administration, and Manufacturing, in that order, are more at the risk of malware attacks. 
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Figure 12: Risk Ratio of Malware Attack per (Industry) Economic Sector (Semantec 2014) 
 
 
Figure 13: Rate of Malware Attack (%) per Economic Sector (Industry) (ContentKeeper 2013) 
 
 
To investigate the sectoral economic impacts, research was conducted on the Global cost of 
cybercrime.  In 2013, a study was conducted on the Global Analysis of Cost of Data Breach 
[55]. In 2014 and 2015, similar studies were conducted on the Global Cost of Cyber Crime 
[185], (PonemonInstitute 2015). Further study was conducted in 2015 on the Global 
Analysis of Cost of Data Breach [187]. These studies revealed variations and how each 
industry is impacted by malware attacks as shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15. While Figure 
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14 shows the average and yearly costs of attacks to industries, Figure 15 shows the 
contributions of the different types of Cybercrime to these costs. 
 
Figure 14: Annual economic cost of malware attacks on Sectors of the World economy: showing the 
cost for the various sectors for 2013-2015 and their collective average cost for the same period  
 
 
Figure 15: Cybercrime attacks & cost (%) and cost of attacks ($1000.00): x-axis is the different 
malwares, primary y-axis is the annual %-cost contribution of each malware, secondary y-axis is 
annual cost impact of each malware in dollars 
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2.3 How Do Industries Control Ransom-ware threats 
 
The urgency to prevent ransomware attacks has resulted in many types of research on 
signature-based and behaviour-based methods. Signature-based methods rely mainly on the 
identification of known malware. It is easy for algorithms to scan and determine the digital 
signature of objects because, in computing, every object has attributes that are used to create 
a unique signature. Objects identified as malicious are added to repositories making it easy 
to use for future matching. However, the appearance of new versions of malicious codes that 
evade the recognition of signature-based technologies has rendered the signature-based 
techniques ineffective for the control of malware. In other words, signature-based techniques 
can only track known malware. To track and detect those malicious codes that evade 
signature-based technologies, a behavioural analysis approach needs to be adopted. In 
behaviour-based approach, objects are evaluated based on their intended actions before they 
execute the behaviour. The behavior-based approach, though evolving, still has limitations. 
This is the ability of a malware to obfuscate and avoid detection by attempting to curtail 
malicious activities [188,189]. In the effort to overcome malware threat, andronomy was 
introduced as a framework to detect malware in Android mobile devices. Andronomy, as a 
Host-based malware detection system, monitors various features and events on the host 
device and applies Machine Learning to classify collected data as benign or malicious [190].  
 
2.4 Clustering Overlap and Machine Learning Approach to the Control of 
Ransomware  
 
Clustering overlap and machine learning techniques have been applied, severally, to analyse 
different datasets including social network datasets and others. Traditional clustering 
algorithms such as k-means have the limitation of producing disjoint and exhaustive 
clustering. This means that data points are assigned to one cluster ignoring there could be 
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overlaps and outliers. Consequently, the Fuzzy k-means algorithm was proposed for 
overlapping clustering [191,192]. However, the Non-Exhaustive Overlapping K-means 
(NEO-K-means) was introduced to tackle the problem of overlapping clustering and outliers 
in a unified way, which was suggested to prove effective to detect overlapping community 
in a dataset [191]. Attempting to overcome time series clustering problems associated with 
distance measure for efficient clustering of the dataset with input-output time series, an 
extension of Martin cepstral distance was proposed. The extension allows the efficient 
clustering of these time series and applies it to the simulated dataset [193]. 
 
Different supervised and unsupervised machine learning approaches were used to 
investigate overlapping clusters in ransomware network dataset. The HP Neural network 
creates multilayer neural networks that pass information from one layer to the next to map 
an input to a specific category or predicted value. The HP Neural node enables this mapping 
to take place in a distributed computing environment, which enables you to build neural 
networks on massive data sets in a relatively short amount of time [194]. A neural network 
consists of units (neurons) and connections between those units. There are three types of 
units namely the Input Units, Hidden Units and Output Units. The Input Units obtain the 
values of input variables and standardize those values; they can be connected to hidden units 
or to output units. Hidden Units perform internal computations and provide the nonlinearity 
that makes neural networks powerful; and they can be connected to other hidden units or to 
output units. Output Units compute predicted values and compare those values with the 
values of the target variables; and they cannot be connected to other units [194]. However, 
the HP Neural network failed to create a distinct visualization of overlapping clusters that is 
required in the current investigation. Hierarchical clustering method (Ward’s clustering) 
and a non-hierarchical clustering method (k-Means clustering) were used to visualize and 
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analyze overlapping clusters in a ransomware network dataset to identify the active cluster 
overlap in an online network environment [195]. The hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
clustering showed cluster overlaps, but the visualization was very fuzzy and did not show 
distinct classification (groupings) required to identify the active cluster overlap. In addition, 
non-hierarchical k-Means is applicable only if the mean is defined for categorical data, and 
it is sensitive to outliers and requires the specification of the number of clusters (k) by the 
user.  
 
Neural Networks are statistical learning models which are modeled based on the 
information processing procedure found in the brain [196]. Neural Networks have evolved 
from modeling simple problems to a wide variety of complex problems and this has been 
fueled by the availability of computation ability and novel algorithms. Neural networks, just 
like the brain can solve complex problems such as image recognition, speech processing, 
and natural language processing [196]. The artificial equivalents of biological neurons and 
synapses are the nodes and weights respectively [196]. Several different types of Neural 
Networks exist based on their application, including a simple three-layer feed forward 
backward propagation network as it is a popular multilayer perceptron used to model 
nonlinear data for prediction and classification tasks [196–198]. While Neural Networks is 
good for classification, it lacked the clustering and visualization advantage of presenting the 
overlapping clusters in a network dataset that the present investigation seeks to explore to 
profile and identify the active cluster overlap in a ransomware network. This research 
investigated the use of Random Forests to identify overlapping clusters in a ransomware 
network. Random Forests constructs many classification trees and thus the name 'forest'. For 
each pathway, the input data for Random Forest would be a ransomware network variables 
expression matrix of the ransomware network variables belonging to the pathway by the 
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number of subjects in the dataset. Every tree in a Random Forests is built using a 
deterministic algorithm and the trees are different from the ordinary tree algorithms (e.g. 
CART) owing to two factors. First, at each node, a best split is chosen from a random subset 
of the predictors rather than all of them. Second, every tree is built using a bootstrap sample 
of the original observations. A subject is put down a tree for classification using the input 
vector of ransomware network variable expression for ransomware network variables within 
a pathway. The tree gives a classification and decides which class this subject belongs to. In 
the end, the forests choose the class that gives the majority votes for each subject. The out-
of-bag (OOB) data, approximately one-third of the observations, are then used to estimate 
the prediction accuracy. Small classification error based on ransomware network variable in 
a given pathway would indicate the pathway as potentially interesting [199,200]. However, 
Random Forests did not produce an identifiable visual mapping of distinct overlapping 
clusters in the network community. The use of machine learning algorithms to extract 
valuable information from the wild exposes the algorithms to the threat of data poisoning; a 
situation of a coordinate attack in which a fraction of the training data is controlled by the 
attacker and manipulated to subvert the learning process [201]. As a counter measure to data 
poisoning, a back-gradient optimization algorithm was proposed to compute radiant of 
interest through automatic differentiation and the reversal of the learning procedure to 
drastically reduce the attack complexity [201]. The Software-Defined Networking (SDN) 
based detection approach utilizes the characteristics of ransomware communication, namely 
the HTTP messages’ sequences and their respective content sizes [202,203]. However, the 
preventive and reactive security measures can only partially mitigate the damage caused by 
modern ransomware attacks [204]. Pure-detection approaches (e.g., based on analysis 
sandboxes or pipelines) are not sufficient nowadays, because often we do not have the luxury 
of being able to isolate a sample to analyze, and when this happens it is already too late for 
43 
 
many users [204]. A forward-looking solution is to equip modern operating systems with 
practical self-healing capabilities against this serious threat. Therefore, ShieldFS, an add-on 
driver that makes the Windows native filesystem immune to ransomware attacks was 
proposed. For each running process, ShieldFS dynamically toggles a protection layer that 
acts as a copy-on-write mechanism, according to the outcome of its detection component. 
Internally, ShieldFS monitors the low-level filesystem activity to update a set of adaptive 
models that profile the system activity over time [204]. Unfortunately, ShieldFS is not 
cluster based and lacks the capability to profile overlapping clusters. The proactive approach, 
known as Cyber Defense focuses on finding out methods to prevent threat incidents from 
occurring rather than analyzing threat incidents after they had occurred. They use the 
predictive analysis method to find what would be the actions that would be used by an 
attacker to compromise the system [205].  
 
RansomWall, a layered defense system for protection against Cryptographic Ransomware 
follows a Hybrid approach of combined Static and Dynamic analysis to generate a novel 
compact set of features that characterizes the Ransomware behavior. The presence of a 
Strong Trap Layer helps in early detection. It uses Machine Learning for unearthing zero-
day intrusions. When initial layers of RansomWall tag a process for suspicious Ransomware 
behavior, files modified by the process are backed up for preserving user data until it is 
classified as Ransomware or Benign [206]. Present day malware shows stealthy and 
dynamic capability and avails administrative rights to control the victim computers [207]. 
Malware writers depend on evasion techniques like code obfuscation, packing, compression, 
encryption or polymorphism to avoid detection by Anti-Virus (AV) scanners as AV 
primarily use syntactic signature to detect a known malware. To overcome these evasion 
techniques, an approach based on semantic aspect of PE executable that analyses API Call-
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grams to detect unknown malicious code was proposed [207]. Another study proposed a 
platform that derives the common execution behavior of a family of malware instances. A 
clustering graph is constructed for each instance that represents kernel objects and their 
attributes, based on system call traces. The method combines these graphs to develop a 
super-graph for the family. The super-graph contains a subgraph, called the Hot-Path, which 
is observed during the execution of all the malware instances. The proposed method is 
scalable, identifies previously-unseen malware instances, shows high malware detection 
rates, and false positive rates close to 0% [208,209]. In a comparative study of machine 
learning techniques, the use of linear classifiers, ensembles, decision trees and various 
hybrid techniques to detect malware was investigated. The study proves the ensemble 
algorithm provides the best malware detection rate, but it also has the highest false positive 
rate. To use this algorithm in practice, it requires a combination of a method for filtering 
false positive, such as file white-listing [210]. The signature-based malware detection is not 
effective during zero-day attacks. Until the signature is created for new malware, distributed 
to the systems and added to the anti-malware database, the systems can be exploited by that 
malware. But Machine learning methods, Association rule, Support Vector Machine (SVM), 
Decision tree, Random forest, Logistic Regression and Naive Bayes, that learns from the 
header data of PE32 files can be used to create more effective antimalware software, which 
can detect previously unknown malware and zero-day attack [211,212]. In a clustering 
approach to malware detection, a scalable system for network-level behavioural clustering 
of HTTP-based malware aims to efficiently group newly collected malware samples into 
malware family clusters [213]. The objective is to obtain malware clusters that can aid the 
automatic generation of high quality network signatures, which can in turn be used to detect 
botnet command-and-control (C&C) and other malware-generated communications at the 
network perimeter [214].  
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The Anubis is another platform applied for a dynamic malware analysis. It is designed to 
execute binaries submitted in a controlled environment. The system analyses the execution 
of the binaries by monitoring the invocation of important Windows API calls and system 
services and records the network traffic to track its data flow, thereby examining the 
influence of code polymorphism on evolution [215]. Nowadays, malware writers use 
polymorphic, metamorphic and obfuscation techniques to evade detection from commercial 
anti-virus and anti-spyware that use signature-based techniques [216]. To overcome this 
problem of evading detection, a machine learning framework to automatically analyse 
malware behaviour was proposed. The framework, incremental approach for behaviour-
based analysis, identifies new classes of malware with similar behaviour (clusters) and 
assigns the unknown malware to the discovered class (classification) [217]. Relying on the 
analysis of instruction frequency and function-based instruction sequences, an Automatic 
Malware Categorization System (AMCS), the principled cluster ensemble framework 
for combining individual clustering solutions based on the consensus partition was 
developed. The framework automatically groups malware samples into families that share 
some common characteristics using a cluster ensemble by aggregating the clustering 
solutions generated by different base clustering algorithms [218]. In another study, 
BotMiner, Clustering Analysis of Network Traffic for Protocol - and Structure-
Independent Botnet Detection was developed to overcome shortcomings of the “botnet 
command and control (C&C) protocols and structures” in preventing cyber-threats such as 
spam, distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS), identity theft, and phishing. The BotMiner 
platform is C&C independent and on evaluation, the BotMiner prototype was claimed to 
have very low false positive rate [219]. Data mining was introduced to detect malware using 
three different static features for malware classification: Portable Executable (PE), strings 
and byte sequences. In the PE approach, the features (like list of DLLs used by the binary, 
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the list of DLL function calls, and number of different system calls used within each DLL) 
are extracted from DLL information inside PE files. Strings are extracted from the 
executables based on the text strings that are encoded in program files. The byte sequence 
approach uses sequences of n bytes extracted from an executable file. They used a data set 
consisted of 4266 files including 3265 malicious and 1001 benign programs [205,220]. A 
rule induction algorithm called Ripper [221] was applied to find patterns in the DLL data. 
A learning algorithm Naive Bayes was used to find patterns in the string data and n-grams 
of byte sequences were used as input data for the Multinomial Naive Bayes algorithm. The 
Naive Bayes algorithm, taking strings as input data, gives the highest classification accuracy 
of 97.11%. The authors claimed that the rate of detection of malwares using data mining 
method is twice as compared to signature based method [205,212,220]. 
 
2.5 Summary of Literature Review 
The background of the study reviewed a wide range of issues relating to the menace of 
ransomware and its spread through technological advancement. Among the issues reviewed 
was the evolution of different kinds of malware from 1971 to 2008. Also reviewed was the 
propagation pattern and termination of the identified malware. The economic impact of the 
attack of the identified malware to different sectors of the World economy was highlighted. 
Consequently, several measures were adopted to control malware attacks and minimize 
losses. Despite these measures, malware attacks continue to be on the increase. The malware 
detection techniques in use, including machine learning approaches are signature-based, 
runtime-based or hybrid. These focus on malware properties and processes under inspection. 
The existing malware detection algorithms rely on the properties and behaviours of malware 
(signature, rule-set, and processes under inspection or runtime) to detect malware. Because 
of the reliance on post-attack history of new malware, most detection can take place only 
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when such properties, signatures and runtime behaviours are analysed and registered in the 
malware database. In this case the malware had attacked already. In these techniques 
malware still evade detection through obfuscation (dead-code insertion, register 
reassignment, subroutine reordering, code transportation, and code integration), 
fragmentation and session splicing, application specific violations, protocol violation, 
inserting traffic at IDS, denial of service, and code reuse attacks [222,223].  
 
Among these measures to control malware threat, there was no network content and link 
structure (network variable and content) based approach to control malware. There was 
no approach dedicated to Exploratory Machine Learning using overlapping clusters of 
network content and link structure to control ransomware threat. The active cluster overlap 
approach in this research focuses on finding out methods to prevent threat incidents from 
occurring rather than analyzing threat incidents after they had occurred using overlapping 
clusters and identifying thresholds. Therefore, this study proposes a real-time Exploratory 
Machine-learning Cluster Overlap System (EMCOS) for links and contents cluster analysis 
in a complex ransom-ware network to build an understanding and knowledge for future 
development of a tool to control malware threat. 
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CHAPTER 3  
BACKGROUND OF E-SECURITY THREATS AND ATTACKS AND 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.0 Background of E-security Threats and Attacks 
 
Cybersecurity has become a global issue depicting a complex social and technical challenges 
for different sectors of the World economy. The spread of security threats derives from 
technological advancements and the inter-connectivity of the cyberspace. It is important to 
classify e-security threats and attacks to understand their purpose, different behaviours and 
mode of propagation. Common types of malware and cybersecurity attacks include the 
following: Phishing, SQL Injection (SQLi), Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Man-in-the-Middle 
(MITM), Malware, Denial-of-Service (DoS), Spear Phishing, Whaling Phishing, and Brute-
Force and Dictionary attacks [224,225].  
 
The category of malware (attacks) refers to various forms of harmful software, such as 
viruses and ransomware and they can be classed as follows: 
a) Viruses pose considerable problems for cyber-connected devices. They are malicious 
applications that activate and replicate (reproduce) themselves in a user’s computer 
device without permission. In this process they modify and infect other legitimate 
software applications. They infect other programs by modifying them to include an 
evolved version of it. Replication is seen as an important characteristic of a computer 
virus [138,226,227].  
b) Worms are independent programs that can to spread copies of itself or of parts of itself 
to other computers, commonly across network connections. These copies are themselves 
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fully functional independent programs, which are capable either of spreading further or 
of communicating with the parent worm to report back results of some computation 
[90,227,228]. 
c) Trojan Horses are self-contained programs. Unlike the computer viruses, trojan horses 
do not need to attach itself to other programs to attack a computer device. Trojan horses 
present themselves as benign software and deceive computer users to believe they are 
downloading benign application. Trojan horses may have functions of use to the user 
[132,217,229–231]. 
d) Adware is purposely designed to display advertisements on a computer. Adware do not 
have the capability to replicate itself; it can be seen as a subclass of spyware and will 
unlikely lead to dramatic results [226]. 
e) Spyware is a malicious application used for the purposes of espionage. It tracks the 
user’s search history to send personalised advertisements and sells them to third parties 
[211,232,233].  
f) Rootkits enable the attacker to have unauthorized access to data with higher permissions 
than is allowed. For example, rootkits can be used to give an unauthorized user 
administrative access. Rootkits always hide their existence and quite often are 
unnoticeable on the system, making the detection and therefore removal incredibly hard 
[226,234]. 
g) Backdoors as a malware provide additional secret “entrance” to a device system for 
attackers. It does not cause any harm by itself but provides access to attackers, therefore, 
they are not used independently but precede other malware attacks [229,232]. 
h) Keyloggers are malware class that aims to harvest sensitive data by recording any typed 
in information. It logs all keys pressed on a given device by the user. Through this 
process, it stores all user input data such as passwords, bank details and other private 
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and sensitive information. Keyloggers strive to hide their presence using rootkit-like 
techniques to evade detection by antivirus and other system protections [235]. 
i) Ransomware is designed to encrypt all data on a device, and then asks the victim for a 
ransom to be paid in exchange for a decryption key. Ransomware hinders working of a 
computer and restricts user access to your computer or your files and displays a message 
that demands payment for the restriction to be removed [236,237]. Three types of 
identifiable ransomware exist, namely the Scareware, locker, and Crypto-ransomware 
[237]. The Scareware poses the least security threat. It only posts a message on your 
screen to say the your computer is locked but does not actually encrypt any file or data 
in your computer [237–239]. The locker locks up the system and demands a ransom. It 
denies the user access to certain programs or to the whole computer till ransom is paid. 
The severity of this ransomware is medium [237,240]. The crypto-ransomware has a 
severe security impact. The crypto-ransomware encrypts the user data and denies access 
to them until the victim pays ransom [237,240–243]. The most popular variants of 
crypto-ransomware include: Crypto-wall, CTB-Locker, Torrent-Locker, Tesla-Crypt, 
and Cryp-Vault [237,241,244,245]. 
 
3.1 Methodology 
 
The achievement of the aims and objectives in section 1.3 follows some strategies laid out 
in this section. The strategies outline a plan of actions to (ensure that the investigation is 
robust, reliable and repeatable, and subsequently) achieve the aim of this study. In other 
words, research methods (methodology) describes the specific techniques applied in a 
specific study [246]. The strategies adopted are mainly exploratory and machine learning to 
achieve the aims of this study [246]. The research techniques adopted aims to define the 
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strategies adopted, the algorithms employed and the concepts and frameworks to achieve a 
robust, reliable and reproducible (repeatable) investigation. These include a review of 
related literature, implementation of research concept (theory), modeling and evaluation 
[247,248]. Having identified the aim of the study, the first step is to define the criteria to 
achieve them. In this case, the initial step is to decide on the source and nature of data. Then 
decide whether the data fits a supervised or unsupervised machine-learning algorithm as 
shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. The algorithm in Figure 4 suggests the suitable use of 
Clustering, which is an unsupervised machine learning technique. Clustering models (e.g. 
K-means) groups and interprets data based only on input data [249]. The data for this 
investigation, therefore, fits into the clustering model. The schematic of the methodology is 
shown in the Strategies for the Achievement of Research Aims (Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16: Methodology: Strategies for the Achievement of Research Aims 
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The execution of these research strategies satisfies the research questions of “Why, What 
and How” (Figure 16), which is further expanded in the schematic representation of 
strategies to achieve the research aim (Figure 17) presented in the implementation Chapter 
4. 
 
i. The “Why” question of the research investigates the reasons behind continued attacks of 
ransomware on different sectors of the world economy, the motivations and factors that 
enable the spread of these threats. This is against the background that organizations make 
huge investments in security against these threats (Figure 2). The success in removing 
active cluster overlaps helps security practitioners and organizations to take quick 
decisions and mitigating actions against ransomware threats even before they attack. 
Consequently, access to user’s valuable data and information is controlled. 
ii. The “What” question of the research looks at what approaches the research should take 
to create solutions to counter the threats of ransomware, in other words, to help in quick 
decision-making and preventing ransomware attacks. The main concept is the use of 
exploratory machine learning approaches to investigate ransomware network systems to 
identify and understand key performance parameters in the link structures and content 
relevance of the network that lead to the formation of clusters and cluster overlap to build 
knowledge and understanding of the dynamic system operation profile. This helps to 
identify the active cluster overlap node to remove to dislodge ransomware network 
threats even before they attack. This procedure includes graphical visualization of 
ransom-ware network clusters, investigation of nodes intensity values and other key 
performance parameters in the formation of cluster overlaps (Figure 16). The exploratory 
system, when implemented, will continually monitor the events’ activities (or traffic) in 
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the ransomware network to identify and remove every evolving and consistent active 
overlapping cluster node. 
iii. The “How” question of the research defines the approaches undertaken to execute, 
measure, validate the results, and ensure the aim of the investigation is satisfied. This 
seeks to profile and track the active overlapping cluster nodes over cumulative half-yearly 
segments of the entire time series to establish and understand temporal morphology 
consistency (Figure 16). Inconsistent cluster overlaps would be indications of change in 
event activity within the network and suggest the entry or exit of an entity (ransomware 
connection) within the network community, thereby denoting the initiation or formation 
of an attack and prompting a need for action. 
The relationship, thereby, established to detect, validate and remove the active overlapping 
cluster (AOCLust) follows the adaptation of the Davies-Bouldin index [250]: 
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𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛 is the number of overlapping clusters, 
 𝑠𝑥 is the total intensity (strength) of the overlapping cluster 𝑥,  
𝜎𝑥 is the average intensity (or total intensity) of all elements in the overlapping cluster 𝑥 to 
intensity 𝑠𝑥,  𝑑(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) is the difference (distance) between intensity 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗.  
 
Since algorithms that produce clusters with low intra-cluster intensities (high intra-cluster 
similarity) and high inter-cluster intensities (low inter-cluster similarity) will have a low 
Davies–Bouldin index, the clustering algorithm that produces a collection of clusters with 
the smallest Davies–Bouldin index is considered the best algorithm for active overlapping 
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cluster (AOClust) based on this criterion. Hence, this research adopts Davies-Boulin index 
to quantify and identify the active overlap cluster node. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
The Chapter discusses the design and implementation of the Exploratory Machine-learning 
Cluster Overlap System (EMCOS). The EMCOS is designed to identify the active cluster 
overlap node for timely removal to dislodge ransomware-network-event activities and 
prevent the attack. First, this section specifies the requirements of this project schematically 
represented in the process map (Figure 17). The requirements include: 
 
 
Figure 17: Process Map of Exploratory Machine-Learning Cluster Overlap System (EMCOS) 
 
 
a) Acquiring the raw data and pre-processing it to the required format suitable for other 
processes. 
b) Mapping the Network communities’ clusters to understand the topology (structure) of 
the Network 
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c) Mapping different sub-graphs (sub-clusters) of the Network events and the cluster 
overlap object intensities 
d) Identifying cluster overlap nodes and the cluster objects intensities 
e) Extracting and classifying the cluster objects intensities into different clusters 
f) Determine and remove active overlap cluster (AOCLust) node 
Further to outlining the requirements, this section outlines the source of data collection and 
the pre-processing methods. The chapter will highlight the reasons relating to some technical 
decisions taken in the investigation. The section also discusses the procedures for the 
Network clustering, profiling, and tracking of the active cluster overlap nodes to establish 
consistency and validate the system. Key performance parameters considered in the profiling 
and tracking of active cluster overlap nodes are outlined in this implementation chapter. 
These parameters define the various network cluster graphs that are presented in the general 
investigation, and how they are used to establish understanding of pattern consistency in the 
active cluster overlap node for subsequent validation of the Active Cluster Overlap Profiling 
and Tracking System (ACOPTS) for the prevention of threat. 
 
All the methods or steps applied in this project were developed using R and SAS Enterprise 
Miner 14.3 environment, specifically the exploratory link analysis node in SAS. The steps 
include the partitioning of the network data into cumulative half-yearly sub-sets, applying 
cluster, and time series algorithms to map the ransomware network clusters to track the 
cluster formation and development, and to establish topological patterns at different stages 
of the network time series. These identify the overlapping clusters and the extraction of the 
intensity values of all the elements (objects) in the various cluster nodes. Through 
exploratory operations, the study classifies and tracks the cluster overlaps and their 
intensities over different cumulative datasets to establish the consistency of the active cluster 
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overlap node. Subsequently, the intensities and other performance parameters (such as Out-
degree Centrality of Node, Weighted Eigenvector Centrality, Clustering Coefficient 
Centrality, Weighted Closeness Centrality, Weighted Betweenness Centrality, and 
Weighted Influence Centrality, et cetera) of the cluster overlap nodes are extracted (Figure 
18). Through the exploration of cluster overlap nodes (vertices) intensity values and other 
key performance parameters, the study will profile and track the cluster formation and 
development to identify active cluster overlap that can be removed to control the threat.  
 
Figure 18: Schematic Representation of Strategies to Achieve Research Aim 
from the import of raw data to the removal of the active overlap cluster node 
 
 
4.1 Ransom-ware Data Collection and Processing 
 
Data collection is based on data feeds from the website, https://ransom-
waretracker.abuse.ch/feeds/csv/. The website gives a constantly refreshed list of online and 
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offline ransom-ware families. This represents a dynamic data environment. The feeds CSV 
file is imported directly into RStudio (R) where the data was transformed and converted into 
appropriate data frame and format by running required algorithms. RStudio (R) was chosen 
for pre-machine learning processes and analysis of k-means clustering.  
 
4.2 Supervised Machine Learning Approach 
 
Preliminary processes with k-means clustering in R did not show the desired clarity and 
distinction of clustering and clustering overlaps (Figure 19 and Figure 20).  
 
Figure 19: Detection of overlaps by use of kmeans centers – Centroids (k-means in R): where K=12 
clusters represent the various ransomware families overlapping one another without clarity 
 
 
Figure 20: K-Means Components Cluster Plots (topology) showing community network of different 
families of ransom-ware (k-means in R): where K=12 clusters represent the various ransomware 
families overlapping one another without clarity 
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HP Neural node in the SAS Enterprise Miner Workstation 14.3 was used to analyse the 
ransomware network data to understand the clustering pattern of the algorithm using the 
ransomware network data.   
 
Figure 21: Link Graph Showing Input and Output Data (Variable) in HP Neural 
 
The link graph (Figure 21) shows the input and output data (variable) in the HP Neural 
Network. The link graph indicates the algorithm received seven input variables, ASN, 
Country, Host, IPAddress, Registrar, Status and URL for process.  The computation showed 
three hidden neurons and three hidden layers in the processing of the input data. The process 
shows the output data to be Malware. The output value suggests that HP Neural is more 
suitable for prediction analysis. In addition, the HP Neural Network algorithm did not 
produce a distinctive cluster overlap that is required for profiling and analysing the effect of 
overlaps in the timely control of ransomware threat. The HP Forest node was also used to 
analyse the ransomware network data. The leaf plot (Figure 22) and Iteration plot (Figure 
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23) show there was no visible clustering in HP Forest. Therefore, the HP Forest algorithm 
is not suitable for further analysis of overlapping cluster. Likewise, the HP Principal 
Component, HP Tree and Neural Network did not produce any explorable overlapping 
clusters for further profiling and analysis to determine active cluster overlap to remove for 
a timely control of ransomware threat. 
 
 
Figure 22: Leaf Plot Showing Base and Incremental Number of Leaves in HP Forest 
 
 
Figure 23: Iteration Plot Showing the Average Square Error of Ransomware Network Data in HP Forest 
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To achieve the desired clarity and distinction in the cluster and cluster overlap plots for 
analysis, this investigation continued with Unsupervised Machine Learning approach 
(Clustering) in the graphing and analysis with SAS Enterprise Miner 14.3, Base SAS 9.4 
and SAS Enterprise Guide 7.1. 
 
While exploratory machine learning investigations are done in SAS, the graphs and results 
run in other tools like R, Python, Matlab, Maltego, and Gephi would be shown to bring 
clarity where they are required to present more visual understanding and comparisons. To 
achieve the overall aims and objectives of this investigation, the imported dataset, 
RansomwareFeed (Source: Ransom-waretracker.abuse.ch), is converted into data.frame 
for use in the different machine learning algorithms. The dataset is converted from text data 
to a numerical dataset to fit the required format of most machine-learning algorithms. 
Subsequently, the dataset is standardized to avoid overfitting. The resulting dataset is 
randomly partitioned, where required, into 70% train dataset to train and model the data to 
establish network characteristics and patterns, and 30% test dataset to test the accuracy and 
validity of the patterns/model using machine learning. Further processes carried out to 
achieve the aims and objectives of this research are stated in sections 4.3 – 4.5 below as 
previously depicted in Figure 18 above. 
 
4.2 Cluster Graphing to show different Communities (sub-cluster) of 
Ransomware Network 
 
Pursuant to steps, 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 the general Network cluster representation will help to 
understand the topology (structure) of Ransom-ware Community (Family) Networks (Figure 
24). The Network Communities cluster presents the general structure of the network, 
showing the nodes, vertices and the direction of links. However, it fell short of defining the 
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sub-communities or sub-clusters and the overlapping clusters by only presenting the cluster 
of objects around the input variables.  
 
Figure 24: General Network Communities Constellation Plot 2015Jan-2018Jun 
Showing different cluster node and clustering objects in the network 
 
To make up for the shortcoming above, specific graphical cluster representations will be 
presented. Such cluster graphs are designed to show the relationships between the nodes 
(clusters), vertices (links) and contents of the Network. These identify the key performance 
parameters in the formation and development of clusters and cluster overlaps. Such 
parameters as the Cluster Nodes Intensity, Out-degree Centrality of Node, Weighted 
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Eigenvector Centrality, Clustering Coefficient Centrality, Weighted Closeness Centrality, 
Weighted Betweenness Centrality, and Weighted Influence Centrality, et cetera and other 
Unweighted Centrality Measures of the Network will be determined. The Ransom-ware 
Network Communities graph attempts to show the topology and different ransomware 
network elements (objects) clusters (nodes) as depicted in Figure 24. The network 
associations and content relevance will be analysed using the above listed key parameters 
(components). 
 
4.3 Detection of Ransomware Cluster Network Overlap (Hubs) and Outliers 
using Machine Learning Algorithms  
 
The objective of using exploratory and machine learning of links and cluster analysis is to 
detect the overlaps (hubs) of different nodes of Ransom-ware Network sub-cluster and 
outlier nodes to satisfy step 1.3.3. Cluster overlaps, (e.g. k-means centres), also known as 
the centroids, in the representative-cluster overlap plot in Figure 25 show the cluster overlap 
node 1 as the active cluster overlap node of the ransomware networks (variable clusters). 
Figure 25 shows that cluster overlap node 1 originated all the outward traffic links of the 
ransomware threat and did not receive any inward traffic link. Thus, it is the primary 
originating and distribution link to nodes 2, 3, 4, and 5. This means that all elements of the 
ransomware threat patterns coalesce and overlap at node 1 before distribution (transmission) 
to other nodes. This is further illustrated in the representative cluster-constellation plot in 
Figure 26 that shows the link connections (relationships) of different nodes, hence satisfying 
step 1.3.3. The connections, in Figure 26, show that cluster node 1 (active cluster node) 
originates all primary connections to other cluster nodes and does not receive any incoming 
link. Furthermore, the representative cluster-constellation plot in Figure 26 shows the link 
connections (relationships) of different nodes, hence satisfying step 1.3.3. The connections, 
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in Figure 26, show that cluster node 1 (active cluster node) originates all primary 
connections to other cluster nodes and does not receive any incoming link.   
 
 
Figure 25: Representative General Cluster Overlap Plot (Jun2015): 
Showing cluster overlap nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
 
Node 1 is the source originator of the developing ransomware threat. It transmits the threat 
through other nodes, while node 5 is the major node through which the threat is distributed 
to network-connected user devices. Consequently, Figure 27 shows the resultant effect of 
disconnecting or deleting the active cluster Link node 1. This shows the network events 
traffic was effectively dislodged resulting in the timely control of threat.  
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Figure 26: Representative General Cluster Constellation Plot: Showing link connections among cluster 
nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 where cluster node 1 generates all outward links, receives no inward links 
whereas cluster node 5 receives all inward links, and does not give outward link 
 
 
The same result occurs in Figure 28 when the active cluster overlap node 1 is disconnected 
or deleted. The result suggests the dislodgement of the ransomware network and prevention 
of threats before it attacks its target industry device. Consequently, Figure 27 shows the 
resultant effect of the disconnection or deletion of the active cluster Link node 1. This shows 
the network events traffic was effectively dislodged resulting in the control of threat. The 
same result occurs in Figure 28 with the disconnection or deletion of the active cluster 
overlap node 1. The result suggests the dislodgement of the ransomware network and 
prevention of threats before it attacks its target industry device. 
 
1
2
3
4
5
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Figure 27: Representative Cluster Overlap showing the dislodgement of the network  
when Link Node 1 is disconnected 
 
 
Figure 28: Representative Overlap Cluster showing the dislodgement of the network  
when cluster node 1 is disconnected 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
Item-cluster Overlap Plot when Cluster Node 1 is Disconnected 
2 3
4 5
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4.4 Implications of Removing the Active Cluster Overlap Node in Validation Analysis 
of the Ransomware Threat 
 
The procedure above demonstrates that removal of the active cluster overlap node in the 
ransomware network traffic, timely and effectively dislodges the network traffic and 
prevents the ransomware threat from attacking the network-connected devices. Figure 25 
and Figure 26 clearly depicts the origination and destination of ransomware network traffic. 
Whilst it is evident that cluster overlap node 1 originates the entire traffic in the network, it 
is also true that all traffic terminates at cluster overlap node 5 (terminal node). Through the 
terminal node 5, the ransomware threat is transmitted into connected user devices. Whilst 
there are inward and outward traffic (links) in cluster overlap nodes 2, 3, and 4, these nodes 
are mere traffic by-pass and do not transmit into user devices. Figure 26 clearly shows that 
cluster overlap node 1 had four outward links, each to cluster overlap nodes 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
However, it does not receive any inward links. Cluster nodes 2, 3, and 4 respectively 
received one inward links from cluster node 1 and gave out the same one outward links, 
respectively to cluster node 5. In the next sections, this investigation would take steps to 
prove and validate cluster node 1 as the originating and active cluster node; while cluster 
node 5 or any other terminal node would be proved to be the ransomware threat dispersion 
node. 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
In section 4.4, the study suggests that cluster overlap node 1 is the active cluster overlap 
node, therefore, its removal effectively and timely dislodges the ransomware network 
threat. Conversely, cluster node 5 or any other terminal node is the terminal cluster node 
that disperses ransomware to connected user devices through the IPAddresses. While 
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there could be the temptation to consider removing other cluster overlap nodes, if cluster 
node 2 is removed, the ransomware network traffic would still reach the terminal node 
(node 5) through the by-pass of nodes 3 and 4. The same situation occurs if cluster node 3 
or node 4, respectively, is removed, suggesting that the network traffic is not dislodged. 
Therefore, cluster overlap node 1 is the active and appropriate node to remove to timely 
stop the flow of ransomware traffic to the terminal node and consequently preventing 
dispersion of threat into the network connected user devices and systems. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS AND GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF TIME SERIES 
RESULTS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
This research has taken several approaches to investigate the topology, link relationship and 
content relevance of a complex ransomware network [251]. These approaches aim to explore 
the dynamics of temporal events and cluster formation in a ransomware network. The aim 
is to gain an understanding of the propagation of clusters and cluster overlaps in a complex 
ransomware network. The exploratory approach attempts to profile and track active cluster 
overlap nodes to determine their consistency as the node to remove to dislodge ransomware 
threats. In other words, this helps to detect the active cluster node to remove to prevent 
threats before the attack. The results are presented in stages following a logical order of 
investigation. In this chapter, the investigation presents the results of time series, link 
clustering, and content relevance visualization and analysis to prepare the ground and 
provide the necessary data to build discussions in the succeeding chapters. 
 
5.1 Time Series of Ransomware Data 
 
A network time series has been defined as a multivariate represented graphically to describe 
the connection between the variables (or nodes) [252].  In this study, the time series of the 
target data was mapped to reveal the pattern and distribution of temporal events in a 
ransomware network over the available time January 2015 – June 2018 [253–255]. Prior to 
mapping and further time series exploration, the network data was pre-processed with the 
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TS Data Preparation node within SAS.  Using the graph explore node of time series in SAS 
enterprise miner, the “Multiple Time Series for all Variables Events Activities in the 
Ransomware Network” (Figure 29) was mapped to display the distribution pattern for the 
time series for all variables in the network. 
  
 
Figure 29: Multiple time series for all variable events activities in Ransomware Network 
 
The time series graph (Figure 29) shows the distribution of the activity level of events within 
the different quarter, half-year, and annual period [256,257]. Prior to mapping the time series 
distribution, the ransomware network data was prepared using the SAS time-series data 
preparation node. The Time Series Events Activities Jan2015 - May2018 (Figure 29, 
Appendix 3) and the percentage values of the events’ variables (Figure 30, Appendix 4) 
suggest a stationary low activity of events ranging from 0.00 – 0.50% from the start of 
Jan2015 to Jan2016. There was an increase in the events’ activities across all variables to 
8.67 – 12.91% in the period ending May2016. The period ending Sep2016 recorded a range 
of 24.96 -2 9.17% increase in the events’ activities. However, there was a large increase in 
the events activities for the period ending Jan2017 (Figure 30, Appendix 4). At this period, 
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the events activities increased to 51.00 – 56.77% among all the events variables. After this 
increase, the events activity level decreased to the range of 0.42 – 2.50% for the period 
ending May2017. The periods Sep2017 and Jan2018 recorded an increase to 3.05 – 4.94% 
in the events’ activities and decreased to 0.01 – 0.02% for the last period ending May2018. 
The percentage values (Figure 30) show there was onset of active events activities from 
May2016 that climaxed in the period ending Jan2017. The reasons for the overall 
distribution pattern of the time series in relation to the threat will be discussed in later 
chapters.  
 
Figure 30: Percentages of Variable Events Time Series 
 
5.1.1 Decomposition of Time Series 
To investigate the components that influence the dynamics of the network, there is a need to 
decompose the time series plot. Decomposition was achieved using the time series 
decomposition node of SAS. The decomposition follows a general mathematical approach 
shown in  Equation 2 [258,259]:  
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where   
tO  is the time series value (actual data) at time t; 
tTC  is a deterministic trend-cycle or general movement component; 
tS  is a deterministic seasonal component; 
tI  is the irregular (remainder or residual) stationary component. 
 
The decomposition resulted in many components of the series. Figure 31 shows the original 
network distribution time-series.  
 
Figure 31: Original Time Series of Ransomware Network 
 
The Event trend-cycle component (TCC) of the series is shown in Figure 32. This measures 
the long-term pattern of the time series after filtering out the high and low-frequency events 
of the series [260,261]. Also called the short-term trends, the trend-cycle Component (TCC) 
is useful for short-term analysis of time series [262]. TCC is measured by the centered 
moving average of the original data series ( )tO . Another component is the seasonal-irregular 
component (SIC) of time series (Figure 33). The SIC is computed using Equation 3: 
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where  the components are as defined in Equation 2. 
 
Figure 32: Event Trend-Cycle Component 
 
 
Figure 33: Events Seasonal-Irregular Component 
 
Further components of the time series include the Event Seasonal Component (SC), Event 
Trend-Cycle-Seasonal Component (TCSC) and Events Irregular Component (IC) shown in 
Figure 34, Figure 35 and Figure 36 respectively. Figure 34 is the seasonal component of 
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the time series of the network. This seasonality component shows when there are regular 
fluctuations in the time series during corresponding times over a given number of years. The 
seasonal component (SC) is computed from the seasonal averages of
tSI . Conversely, Figure 
35 shows the Event trend-cycle-seasonal component (TCSC) of the time series of the 
ransomware network. The TCSC is a cyclic seasonal pattern in the data that explains 
fluctuations that are not of a fixed period but are influenced by seasons [263]. 
 
Figure 34: Event Seasonal Component of Network Time Series 
 
75 
 
 
Figure 35: Events Trend-Cycle-Seasonal Component of Network Time Series 
 
The Events Irregular component (Figure 36) is a measure of the unpredictable behaviour of 
the ransomware network or events in a time series [264]. The unpredictable nature of this 
component makes it a random variable. Modeling, therefore, requires this component to be 
the only random component while ensuring that other components are consistent. The Event 
Trend Component (ETC) of the time series is shown in Figure 37. The ETC explains the 
overall and persistent long-term structure, behaviour, pattern or movement of a time series. 
This means the time series assumes a fixed pattern. The ETC could assume a positive or 
negative value depending on the direction of change, either increasing or decreasing growth. 
The trend component becomes stationary if there is no change in growth [265,266]. 
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Figure 36: Events Irregular Component of Network Time Series 
 
 
Figure 37: Event Trend Component of Network Time Series 
 
Figure 38 shows the trend-cycle seasonal component of the time series of ransomware feeds 
dataset. The seasonality component shows when there is a regular fluctuation in the time 
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series during corresponding times over a given number of periods (years). The Irregular 
component in Figure 39 is a measure of the unpredictable behaviour of any network or events 
in a time series [264]. The unpredictable nature of the irregular component makes it a 
random variable. Modeling, therefore, requires the irregular component to be the only 
random component while ensuring that other components are consistent. 
 
Figure 38: Event Trend Cycle Seasonal Component 
 
 
Figure 39: Events Irregular Component 
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Other components to consider are the seasonally adjusted series, and percent change 
seasonally adjusted series (PCSA) in Figure 40 and Figure 41. These components are 
important because seasonally adjusted series in Figure 40 helps to estimate and remove 
movement in a time-series caused by regular seasonal variations in events activity [267–
269], while the PCSA in Figure 41 plots the percentage changes in the seasonally adjusted 
component of the event time series [259].  
 
Figure 40: Event Seasonally Adjusted Series 
 
 
Figure 41: Event Percent Change Seasonally Adjusted Time Series 
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The Cycle Component (CC) of the time series is shown in Figure 42. Cycle Components are 
fluctuations or patterns that do not have fixed periods; they are not associated with the effects 
of calendar periods. CC is quite different from seasonal components that are associated with 
fixed effects relating to calendar periods [270]. Whilst seasonal components measure the 
effects of the same (corresponding) calendar periods over an event, the Cycle Component 
(Cyclic pattern) shows the fluctuations (rises and falls) that are not of a fixed nature, which 
occur in an event (data) for at least two years and over. 
 
Figure 42: Event (Trend) Cycle Component (ECC) 
 
5.1.2 Time Series Similarity Measures 
 
The time-series similarity node of SAS enterprise miner 14.3 was used to generate the 
Malware versus Input Series in Figure 43, and Distance Measure Map in Figure 44. 
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Similarity procedure (SAS) computes similarity measures associated with time-stamped 
data, time series and other sequentially ordered numeric data. PROC SIMILARITY 
computes similarity measures for time-stamped transactional data (transactions) with respect 
to time by accumulating the data into a time series format, and it computes similarity 
measures for sequentially ordered numeric data (sequences) by respecting the ordering of 
the data [271]. The Similarity Measures evaluate and quantify similarities between objects 
or variables in a (ransomware) dataset by assigning real-values to them. 
 
 
Figure 43: Similarity Measure: Malware versus Input Series 
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Figure 44: Distance Measure Map 
Figure 43 is a similarity measure assigning real-values to the ransomware variables or 
contents and quantifying them for the determination of their content relevance, contribution 
and closeness with other objects in a given network. It compares each of the input variables 
against the target variable in the time series. The Similarity Measure: Malware versus Input 
Series (Figure 43) demonstrates the threat of malware in the cyberspace is similar and more 
likely to cluster, in the following order: Country, IPAddress, ASN, Status, and Registrar, 
respectively. The higher the similarity value of an object, the more likely it is clustered with 
the malware threat (object). Similarly, Figure 44 presents the distance map of the objects in 
the overlapping clusters. The values of the distance measure map also show how objects in 
the ransomware network (dataset) are likely to group together in a cluster. The distance map 
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64.854
54.297
24.437
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indicates that URL, Host, Country and IPAddress are more likely to cluster together in that 
order. While the map indicates that ASN and Status appear to cluster together, the Registrar 
appears to cluster separately.  
 
5.1.3 Implications of the Components of the Time Series on the Development of 
Ransomware Threats 
 
Time series analysis helps to identify trends, cycles and seasonal variations to aid in the 
forecasting (predicting) of future events using a collection of data input at specific intervals 
over a period. Time series analysis gives an understanding of the underlying forces leading 
to a given trend of events in the time series data point. It is useful in forecasting and 
monitoring the data points by fitting appropriate models to it. The percentages of variable 
(ransomware) events time series (Figure 30) clearly shows the evolving ransomware threat 
was stationary at almost 0.00% from the period, Jan2015 – Jun2016. The development 
(onset) of the threat increased to 8.67 – 12.91% across all the events variables in May2016. 
These values doubled to 24.96 – 29.17% in Sep2016 suggesting a more intense activity. The 
threat activities doubled further to 51.00 – 56.77% in Jan2017, indicating the period of active 
attack. The activity level dropped and became apparently stationary at 0.01 – 4.44% for the 
period May2017 – May2018. The original time series of the ransomware network data 
(Figure 31) reflects the percentage pattern description of the time series (Figure 30). The 
description is also true for the Trend-cycle components of the time series (Figure 32). 
Because the ransomware network data is cumulative, the Trend-cycle does not appear to be 
affected by season as shown by the Events Seasonal-Irregular Component (Figure 33), 
which appears to be stationary. This interpretation is corroborated by the stationary nature 
(regularity) of the Event Seasonal Component of the Network time series (Figure 34). This 
suggests that ransomware activities (threats) in the network are not influenced by seasons or 
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periods but are purely ransomware traffic. The Events Trend-Cycle-Seasonal Component 
(Figure 35) mirrors exactly the Event Trend-Cycle Component (Figure 32) to suggest there 
are no seasonality in the ransomware network traffic activities. This means the only 
influence on the traffic is the onset of ransomware threat and the actual attack. The Events 
Seasonal-Irregular Component also shows stationarity in the amplitudes of the waves 
(Figure 33) to mean there was no extraneous factors, other than ransomware threat, in the 
network trend. The distribution pattern is seen in other components of the Time Series 
including Events Irregular Component of the Time Series (Figure 36), Event Trend 
Component of Network Time Series (Figure 37), Event Trend Cycle Seasonal Component 
(Figure 38), Event Seasonally Adjusted Series (Figure 40), Event Percent Change 
Seasonally Adjusted Time Series (Figure 41) and Event (Trend) Cycle Component (ECC) 
(Figure 42). The decomposed Time Series Components show the only influence on the 
ransomware network Time Series is the onset and real attack events of ransomware threat, 
which occurred between Sep2016 and Jan2017. The Similarity Measure (Figure 43) and 
Distance Measure Map (Figure 44) show the degree closeness and betweenness of the 
variables and how likely they can cluster together. The measure of the distance measure map 
shows that URL has a highest degree of 97.16. This is followed by the Host (91.89), Country 
(67.66), IPAddress (64.85), Registrar (54.30), ASN (40.12) and Status (24.44) respectively. 
The understanding that ransomware is the only influence in the Time Series will help in the 
profiling and validation of the overlapping clusters in the network time series in Chapter 6. 
 
5.1.4 Summary 
 
The results of the decomposed components of the Time Series has demonstrated that 
ransomware threat was the only influence in the time series of the ransomware network 
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traffic. The knowledge of this trend will be valuable in Chapter 6 to profile, proof and 
validate the overlapping clusters in the network. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND SUMMARY  
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
The main concept of this investigation is to establish the dynamics and pattern consistency 
in the active cluster overlap node and to show the effectiveness of its removal to dislodge 
impending ransomware threats. Focusing on the aim of this investigation, the achievement 
hinges on the relationship between the General Network clusters, and the traceable and 
consistent formation and development of the active cluster overlap node from one 
cumulative period to another period in the time series of the network. These periods are 
taken six-monthly cumulative from the first time-stamp in the first year to the last time stamp 
in the last year of the ransomware dataset. Different graphical plots of the ransomware 
network clusters, and other derived plots to establish the aims of this research will be 
presented and discussed. The discussions will prove the effectiveness of the principles of 
exploratory and machine learning approach to the identification of cluster overlaps in the 
control of ransomware threat, and the validation (evaluate) of its performance. The 
discussions are based on the results of the experiments and analysis, which were conducted. 
It is important to state, however, that the effectiveness of any system built from this principle 
in the wild is beyond the scope of this investigation. This will be left for future studies and 
implementation to characterize. 
 
6.1 Visualizing and Exploring the Topology of Ransomware Network  
The visualization of data has become indispensable in the business world. It also finds 
application in social networking and reveals hidden information. Visualization of the 
86 
 
ransomware network data helps to reveal, not only the obvious structures but also the hidden 
patterns of the network. Simply said, it is highly informative, and gives a clear understanding 
of the interaction of events within the network. In the Introduction of Chapter one, this study 
presented the visualization (graph) of the ransomware communities’ network (Figure 5). For 
ease of reference, the ransomware communities’ network graph is represented (Figure 45).  
 
Figure 45: Ransomware Communities Network: 
Showing cluster nodes of different ransomware families in the wild 
 
The figure shows the topology of the ransomware network in the cyberspace (wild) prior to 
pre-processing as captured by the Maltego visualization tool. It is evident from the graph 
that there are clusters of twelve different ransomware families showing distinct partitions 
with various connecting links and distribution sources. The ransomware is in different 
families namely: Sage, GlobeImposter, DMALocker, Cerber, Fakben, and Locky. Other 
ransomware families include Cryptowall, TeslaCrypt, TorrentLocker, PayCrypt, CTB-
Country IPv4 Address
URL Malware
Host ASN
Registrar Status
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Locker, and PadCrypt. The contents and connecting links of the network come from the 
various entities such as the ransomware family, originating country of the ransomware, the 
Registrar, the Host, the URL (Universal Resource Locator), the status of the ransomware 
(online/offline), and the ASN (autonomous system number) of the ransomware. 
 
Further processing and clustering show different structure (topology) of the Network. The 
cumulative half-yearly events’ time series are plotted to reveal the topological development 
and changes between network clusters on different periods along the entire time series 
(Figure 29). For ease of reference and clear visual understanding, the structural formation 
and development of the clusters of the various cumulative half-yearly periods are shown in 
the “Progressive topology of cluster formation and development in the various cumulative 
time series of the Network (a-h)” (Figure 46a–h).  
 
a: Topology of  
cumulative period 
2015Jun 
 
b: Topology of 
cumulative period 
2015Dec 
 
c: Topology of 
cumulative period 
2016Jun 
 
d: Topology of 
cumulative period 2016Dec 
 
e: Topology of  
cumulative period 
2017Jun 
 
f: Topology of  
cumulative period 
2017Dec 
 
g: Topology of  
cumulative period 
2018Jun 
 
h: Number of Clusters for 
each Cum Half-yearly Time 
Series 
 
Figure 46: Progressive topology of cluster formation and development in the various cumulative time 
series of the Network (a-h) 
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The progressive topology of cluster formation and development in the various time series of 
the network (Figure 46a–h) visualizes the structural changes in the network clusters that 
occurred during the various cumulative periods of the ransomware network time series. 
Without an explanation at this point, the sequence of these graphs suggests that the number 
of clusters continues to decrease until it reaches a minimum number (Figure 46c, h) 
suggesting an onset of a threat. Following immediately is a spike in the number of clusters 
to a maximum suggesting a full-blown active ransomware attack (Figure 29, Figure 30 and 
Figure 46d, h).  
 
The cluster graph of the first half-yearly period of the time stamp 2015Jun is displayed in 
Figure 47a. Contrary to the Ransomware Communities Network: Showing cluster nodes of 
different ransomware families in the wild (Figure 45), the node-links connections and 
density distributions (Figure 47a) reveal that the formation of the clusters is based on the 
items and contents of the network, including ransomware. The clustering was not just around 
the ransomware families as was evident in the community’s network in the open cyberspace 
(wild). The elements of the network are converted to bin items prior to clustering. However, 
the number of clusters cannot be determined from this plot until the presentation of the plots, 
which show:  
• The number and size of the clusters for the cumulative half-yearly period 2015Jun 
(Figure 47b)  
It is clear from the “Network cluster graph showing (a) the node-links connections and 
density distribution, (b) Number and size of clusters for cumulative half-yearly period 
2015Jun” (Figure 46b), that this period has five clusters, apparently because of the weight 
values of the clusters as shown in the key performance parameters for the period ending 
2015Jun (Figure 48). To achieve a good representation plot, the gap between the highest and 
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lowest actual average values of the key performance parameters for all cumulative periods 
are normalized using the following relations: 
 ( )................................ )....................................................6 log (3.KPP x Eqn= +   
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐾𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑘𝑒𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟  
𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠, 6 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
 
It is important to observe that the network is a directed network. The connections suggest an 
even distribution among the nodes with higher concentration (distribution density) on a few 
nodes. This is evident in the time series for the first half-year cumulative period Jan2015-
Jun2015 (Figure 29). Summarily, the distribution density is reflected in the key performance 
parameters of the network and their corresponding percentage values (Figure 48, Figure 49 
and Appendix 5) paying special attention to the following average values: cluster weight, 
out-degree centrality, weighted eigenvector centrality, weighted closeness centrality, 
weighted betweenness centrality, and clustering coefficient centrality. A visual assessment 
of the cluster graphs (Figure 47a, b) cannot point to the dominant cluster node until further 
analysis is conducted.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 47: Network cluster graph showing (a) the nodes-links connections and density distribution, (b) 
Number and size of clusters for cumulative half-yearly period 2015Jun 
 
The interest of this study is not the dominant cluster in the general network but the dominant 
(active) overlapping cluster, which would be discussed later in this chapter. At this point, it 
is difficult to understand the pattern (onset) of ransomware threat without the analysis of the 
behaviours of cluster formation and development of subsequent cumulative time series. 
However, the percentage values of the key performance parameters (Figure 49, Appendix 
5) show that cluster node 1 recorded the highest percentage (16.89 – 84.96%) distributions 
in all the measures of centrality than those recorded by cluster nodes 5, 3, 2 and 4, 
respectively, in that order. The percentage values show, on average, a 34.33% distribution 
for all variable activities in cluster node 1 with the highest percentage distribution of 84.96% 
and 54.91% on weighted betweenness centrality and unweighted betweenness centrality 
respectively. 
1
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Figure 48: Key Performance Parameters General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 
2015Jun: showing Log10(av. values) of the various key performance parameters for cluster nodes 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5. 
 
The percentage value distributions recorded in cluster node 1 include: Weight measure - 
34.70%, Out degree centrality - 27.37%, Weighted eigenvector centrality – 37.83%, 
Unweighted eigenvector centrality – 27.79%, Weighted closeness centrality – 24.52%, 
Unweighted closeness centrality – 21.97%, Weighted betweenness centrality – 84.96%, 
Unweighted betweenness centrality – 54.91%, Weighted influence1 centrality 34.70%, 
Weighted influence2 centrality – 26.68%, Unweighted influence1 centrality – 27.37%, 
Unweighted influence2 centrality – 26.59%, and clustering coefficient centrality – 16.89%. 
These values are higher than the values for other clusters; and following next was the values 
for cluster nodes 5, 3, 2 and 4 in that order.   
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Figure 49: Percentage Values of Key Performance Parameters for Clusters 1 – 5 - General Network Item 
Constellation Plot - Node Data 2015Jun 
 
The next stage of the ransomware events activities is represented in the cluster map for the 
cumulative half-year period ending 2015Dec (Figure 50a). A look at this plot (Figure 50a) 
shows a higher distribution density of the links than they were in Figure 47a. There is a 
higher distribution density of the links in all the measures of centrality resulting in reduced 
percentages ranging from 0.73 – 26.48% (Figure 51, Figure 52 and Appendix 6) in cluster 
node 1 compared to 16.89 – 84.96% that was recorded in Figure 47a, Figure 48, Figure 49 
and Appendix 5. The loss of cluster node 5 in this period resulted in higher density 
distribution in cluster nodes 3 and 4 by percentage increases ranging from 21.82 – 99.04% 
and 0.06 – 26.67% respectively (Figure 52 and Appendix 6). This suggests that clusters 3 
and 4 might have absorbed cluster node 5 based on pattern similarity. Unlike the node-links 
connections and density distribution for the period 2015Jun (Figure 47a), the links 
(connections) for the period 2015Dec (Figure 50a) appear to be more densely distributed in 
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about 90% of the nodes, cluster nodes 1, 3 and 4, while a few 10% of the nodes, node 2, 
appear to be sparsely connected (Figure 50a).  
Subsequently, the number of clusters formed (Figure 50a) for the second cumulative period 
ending 2015Dec is seen to be four (Figure 50b). This suggests that a slight increase in the 
number of events between Jul2015 and Dec2015 (Figure 29), increased the cluster average 
weight, thereby resulting in an increased distribution (cluster) density. Consequently, there 
was a resulting decrease in the number of clusters for the second cumulative period of the 
network given the slightly higher weight, weighted closeness centrality, and short distance 
betweenness centrality of the clustering items (Figure 51).  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 50: Network cluster graph showing (a) the nodes-links connections and density distribution, (b) 
Number and size of clusters for cumulative half-yearly period 2015Dec 
 
The 47.33% and 20.88% increase in weight in clusters 3 and 4, respectively, affected their 
corresponding centrality measures: Out degree 31.99% and 25.94%, Weighted eigenvector 
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46.54% and 20.15%, Unweighted eigenvector 30.58% and 26.62%, weighted closeness 
31.90% and 26.67%, Unweighted closeness 27.90% and 24.98%, Weighted betweenness 
99.04% and 0.06%, Unweighted betweenness 54.02% and 16.72%, Weighted influence1 
47.33% and 20.88%, Weighted influence2 28.76% and 26.14%, Unweighted influence1 
31.99% and 25.94%, Unweighted influence2 30.31% and 26.57%, and Clustering 
coefficient 21.82% and 24.12% and short distance betweenness centrality of the clustering 
items (Figure 52 and Appendix 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 51: Key Performance Parameters General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 
2015Dec: showing Log10(av. values) of the various key performance parameters for cluster nodes 1, 2, 
3, and 4. 
 
The suggestion of higher distribution density is corroborated where the key performance 
parameters show slightly higher average values of 17.92 – 31.90% in closeness centrality 
among all the clusters. This contrasts with the values of 16.36 – 24.52% in closeness 
centrality (the key performance parameters) in the preceding period ending 2015Jun (Figure 
48, Figure 49 and Appendix 5). It is also evident in the higher average weight values of 9.72 
Clust 1
Clust 3
0
2
4
6
8
Lo
g1
0
(A
v.
 V
al
u
e
s 
o
f 
P
e
rf
o
rm
an
ce
 P
ar
am
e
te
rs
)
Key Performance Parameters
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2015Dec
Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4
95 
 
– 47.33% for each of the clusters in Figure 51 and Figure 52  compared with the values of 
11.19 – 34.70% in Figure 48 and Figure 49. Furthermore, the percentage values of the 
average betweenness centrality of 0.06 – 99.04% and average clustering coefficient 
centrality of 21.82 – 27.58% show similar higher values in the 2015Dec period as against 
the respective values of 0.00 – 84.96 and 16.89 – 23.64% in 2015Jun period. This indicates 
the similarity of clustering-objects and distance between (betweenness centrality) clusters 
appear to be close. 
 
 
Figure 52: Percentages of Key Performance Parameters Cum 2015Dec Showing Percentage Distribution of 
the Link Connections 
 
A more relaxed and sparsely distributed cluster is shown in the Network cluster graph 
showing (a) the node-links connections and density distribution (Figure 53a) for the third 
cumulative half-yearly time series ending 2016Jun. Still, fewer nodes are seen to be densely 
connected while others are more lightly and evenly connected. Consequently, the “Network 
cluster graph showing (b) Number and size of clusters for cumulative half-yearly period 
2016Jun” (Figure 53b) shows a further decrease in the number of clusters to three as the 
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number of events (observations) increased. The explanation for the decrease in the number 
of clusters could be seen in the “Key Performance Parameters General Network Item 
Constellation Plot - Node Data 2016Jun: showing Log10(av. values) of the various key 
performance parameters for cluster nodes 1, 2, and 3” (Figure 54, Appendix 7) for 2016Jun 
cumulative period.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 53: Network cluster graph showing (a) the nodes-links connections and density distribution, (b) 
Number and size of clusters for cumulative half-yearly period 2016Jun 
 
The measures of centrality recorded high average weight of 27.58 – 39.88% and weighted 
closeness centrality 30.30 – 37.76% values for all the clustering nodes. The cumulative 
period 2016Jun recorded a clustering weighted/unweighted betweenness centrality of 0.00 
– 94.40% and clustering coefficient centrality 32.22 – 34.08% compared to clustering 
weighted/unweighted betweenness centrality of 0.17 – 99.04% and clustering coefficient 
centrality of 21.82 – 27.58% in the previous period 2015Dec. These values are higher than 
1
2
3
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those in Figure 48 and Figure 49 for 2015Jun and Figure 51 and Figure 52 for 2015Dec 
cumulative periods respectively. Another parameter that could explain the decrease in the 
number of clusters is the high average values of the clustering coefficient centrality, which 
ranks from 32.22% to 34.08% across the clusters. Notable are the values of the weighted 
closeness centrality (30.30 – 37.76%) and the unweighted closeness centrality (32.61 – 
33.83%) in Figure 55. The values suggest that as the number of clusters decreases with the 
increased number of observations, the weighted closeness centrality increases while the 
unweighted closeness centrality appears to remain within the same range of values, 
indicating the build-up of threat and prompting action.  
 
These results are evident in the minor spike of events activity in the time series between 
Jan2016 and Jun2016 in the plot of the “Multiple Time Series for all Variable Events in 
Ransomware Network” (Figure 29) and “Percentages of Time Series Events Activities 
Jan2015 – May2018” (Figure 30 and Appendix 4). The plots show the events activities 
increased from the range of 0.12 – 0.50% in Jan2016 to 8.67 - 12.91% in May2016, 
suggesting an average increase from 0.34% to 10.19% among all the network events. The 
point (2016Jun) where the number of clusters is seen to be at a minimum (Figure 29, Figure 
30, Figure 53, Figure 55 and Appendix 4) suggests a change in the activity level of events 
within the ransomware network. Close observation shows a significant change, with an 
average increase of 10.19% activities in all the variables, especially in the connections to 
the BIN_Status and BIN_Malware nodes as highlighted in the cluster graph 2016Jun 
suggesting an onset of threat (Figure 30, Figure 53,  and Appendix 4). Pre-judging the spike 
in the number of clusters for the cumulative half-year period 2016Dec (Figure 56a, b) it 
could be concluded that the minimum cluster threshold marks the onset of ransomware threat. 
However, conclusion can be drawn only after analysing the cluster formation and 
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development for the period 2016Dec, when a pattern (trend) must have been established 
using three or more data points. 
 
 
Figure 54: Key Performance Parameters General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2016Jun: showing 
Log10(av. values) of the various key performance parameters for cluster nodes 1, 2, and 3. 
 
 
Figure 55: Percentages of Key Performance Parameters Cum 2016Jun Showing Percentage Distribution of 
the Link Connections 
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Exploring the graph of the fourth cumulative period of 2016Dec, the node-links connections 
and density distribution show further formation and development in the network clustering 
(Figure 56a, b) with an increase from 3 to 5 in the number of clusters. The network cluster 
graph (a) for 2016Dec shows a generally lower measures of centrality in the network than 
was observed in 2016Jun, except in cluster node 5 where the weighted and unweighted 
betweenness centrality recorded 100.00% and 69.76%, respectively. However, there is a 
higher density of links in a few of the nodes than there are in others.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 56: Network cluster graph showing (a) the nodes-links connections and density distribution, (b) 
Number and size of clusters for cumulative half-yearly period 2016Dec 
 
The data for Sep2016 and Jan2017 in Figure 30 and Appendix 4 show a 24.96 - 29.17% and 
51.00 - 56.77% increase in the link connections to all the variables, suggesting an average 
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of 27.38% and 53.53% increase in network activities, especially, BIN_Malware 
(ransomware) and (ransomware) BIN_Status nodes among the few nodes that were most 
densely populated (connected) (Figure 56a). The two thick (bold) lines connecting 
BIN_Malware and BIN_Status suggest a strong link relationship between them. The high 
intensity connection strongly suggests an imminent active ransomware threat as shown 
earlier by the 53.53% increase in all the variable activities of the time series. The increases 
in the number of connections is evident in the distribution density reflected in the increase 
from 0.34% to 10.19% and 10.19% to 53.53% in the weight, out-degree centrality, weighted 
closeness centrality, clustering coefficient centrality, and other key performance parameters 
(Figure 57, Figure 58 and Appendix 8). It is interesting to note the same increase in the 
values of the weighted betweenness centrality in two cluster nodes relative to BIN_Malware 
and BIN_Status. At the period of active malware threat, it is important to note that all 
transmitting cluster nodes 1 (originating node), 2, 3, and 4 has 0.00% values for weighted 
betweenness centrality. This active threat period shows that terminal node 5 recorded 
100.00% value for weighted betweenness centrality suggesting active transmission of threat 
unto network connected devices. These values show a great difference when compared with 
their corresponding values for the preceding cumulative period 2016Jun (the onset period of 
ransomware threat) where cluster nodes 1, 2 and 3 had 0.00%, 94.40% and 5.60% 
respectively, indicating active ransomware threat. This event activity corroborates the spike 
in events of the ransomware time-series plot (Figure 29, Figure 30 and Appendix 4). The 
increase in the number of clusters at this cumulative period could be an intended action to 
distribute ransomware through many URLs and IP addresses thereby infecting as many 
devices as possible. 
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Figure 57: Key Performance Parameters General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 
2016Dec: showing Log10(av. values) of the various key performance parameters for cluster nodes 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 58: Percentages of Key Performance Parameters Cum 2016Dec Showing Percentage Distribution of 
the Link Connections 
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Analysis of further cumulative periods beyond the threat period 2016Dec reveals later event 
activities in the ransomware network. Principally, this shows whether the ransomware threat 
repeats after the initial attack. The 2017Jun cumulative period (Figure 59a, b) show a 
decrease in the number of clusters to four. Additionally, it shows an evenly connected nodes 
with about 50% of the cluster nodes more densely linked compared with others.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 59: Network cluster graph showing (a) the nodes-links connections and density distribution, (b) 
Number and size of clusters for cumulative half-yearly period 2017Jun 
 
This is evident in Figure 60, Figure 61 and Appendix 9Appendix 9: Key Performance 
Parameters - General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2017Jun The number of 
clusters still decreased to four despite the increase in the number of events in the network. 
The increase in network activity is evident in the respective average percentage increase to 
27.33%, 31.75%, 20.56% and 20.37% for clusters 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Figure 60, Figure 61 and 
Appendix 8) from 22.53%, 16.43%, 16.17%, 16.60% and 28.27% for clusters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 
5 for the period 2016Dec (Figure 57, Figure 58 and Appendix 8). This means that clusters 
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1, 2, 3 and 4 of 2017Jun absorbed cluster 5 of 2016Dec because of closer pattern similarity, 
which could suggest the onset of another ransomware threat. However, like the node-links 
connections and density-distribution in the preceding cumulative period 2016Dec, there is 
still high weight and strong connections on the BIN_Malware (54.16%) and BIN_Status 
(51.00%) cluster nodes (Figure 59a). The connection is corroborated by the high weight of 
the cluster nodes recorded in the key performance parameters and Percentage Distribution 
of the Link Connections (Figure 60, Figure 61 and Appendix 9). The presence of such strong 
connections suggests there is a sustained threat or repeat of threat of ransomware after the 
initial attack. This suggestion is evident in the continued high out-degree centrality, which 
indicates the clusters have tightly connected nodes and ready to release threat. The out-
degree centrality equally reveals the high importance score assigned to each of these nodes 
(BIN_Malware and BIN_Status) based on the number of links they hold (Figure 30 and 
Appendix 4). This shows that each of the two cluster nodes holds many direct connections 
to other nodes in the network showing active presence and distribution of ransomware threat 
through these nodes. The threat is also evident in the events percentage value of 100.00% 
recorded by the weighted betweenness centrality in cluster 2 while clusters 1, 3 and 4 
recorded 0.00% each (Appendix 9). Like the out-degree centrality, weighted and unweighted 
eigenvector centralities show that these two nodes (BIN_Malware and BIN_Status) have 
significant influence on the network based on the number of links (54% and 51% 
respectively) they have with other nodes in the network (Figure 30 and Appendix 4). The 
eigenvector centrality identifies the nodes that have an influence on the entire network by 
determining the extended connections of the nodes. In the present network, the percentage 
values of weighted eigenvector centrality (32.01%) and unweighted eigenvector centrality 
(31.35%) show that cluster node 1 has the greatest influence in the network (Appendix 9). 
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Figure 60: Key Performance Parameters for General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2017Jun: 
showing Log10(av. values) of the various key performance parameters for cluster nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
 
 
Figure 61: Percentages of Key Performance Parameters Cum 2017Jun Showing Percentage 
Distribution of the Link Connections 
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The high percentage of weighted (26.66%) and unweighted (26.59%) closeness centrality 
show the closeness of these nodes to other nodes based on the shortest path. This means that 
these nodes are well placed to influence the network and, therefore, be a major factor in the 
propagation of the ransomware threat. The clustering coefficient centrality demonstrates that 
the clustering nodes are densely connected. These values are of importance when 
determining the active cluster overlap in later sections. However, the drop in the number of 
clusters suggests the control of the spread of malware threats by direct intervention of some 
affected industries. The apparent repeat attack at this cumulative period indicates that any 
system that could effectively control the ransomware threat should have a self-healing 
mechanism and should run in a continuous cycle, and without this, there is significant risk 
of perpetuation of threats for undetermined and unconstrained time frames. 
 
In the Network Item Constellation Plot for the cumulative period ending 2017Dec (Figure 
62a), it is evident that the network is more sparsely distributed (Figure 63, Figure 64 and 
Appendix 10). The percentage average of all measures of centralities are 22.77%, 16.52%, 
16.48%, 16.12% and 28.11% for clusters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively (Figure 63, Figure 64 
and Appendix 10). These values are lower than the respective values of 27.33%, 31.75%, 
20.56% and 20.37% recorded for clusters 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the previous period ending 
2017Jun (Figure 60, Figure 61 and Appendix 9). The connections are more even at the range 
of 16.12 - 16.52% with a few more densely connected nodes at a percentage range of 22.77 
– 28.11%, BIN_Malware and BIN_Status (Figure 62a). The node-links connections and 
density distribution graph show a high volume of connections around a few cluster nodes, 
predominantly, around the same BIN_Malware and BIN_Status. Although there is a 
dispersion in the weight and density distribution of many cluster nodes, the number of 
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clusters increased to five (Figure 62b). This indicates increased traffic in the activity level 
of the network, perhaps the entry and attack of a new ransomware into the network space.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 62: Network cluster graph showing (a) the nodes-links connections and density distribution, (b) 
Number and size of clusters for cumulative half-yearly period 2017Dec 
 
Looking at the key performance parameters and their percentage values, except the increase 
in the number of clusters, all the measures of centrality (Figure 63, Figure 64 and Appendix 
10) appear to have lower values compared with the preceding cumulative period 2017Jun. 
This indicates that similar ransomware activities are taking place in the network. 
Consequently, the ransomware threat appears to be persistent and self-propagating resulting 
in lasting impact and damage. 
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Figure 63: Key Performance Parameters for General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 
2017Dec: showing Log10(av. values) of the various key performance parameters for cluster nodes 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5. 
 
 
Figure 64: Percentages of Key Performance Parameters Cum 2017Dec Showing Percentage 
Distribution of the Link Connections 
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The last cumulative time series period 2018Jun (Figure 65a, b) does not show any visible 
topological difference with the preceding period 2017Dec (Figure 62a, b). The network 
structures appear the same in terms of node-link connections and density distribution, and 
the number of clusters. Clusters are distributed evenly with very few showing higher 
connection density. The number of clusters remains five as in the preceding period. The key 
performance parameters (Figure 66, Figure 67 and Appendix 11), also, look similar in all 
the measures of centralities. This suggests a stable and consistent state. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 65: Network cluster graph showing (a) the nodes-links connections and density distribution, (b) Number 
and size of clusters for cumulative half-yearly period 2018Jun 
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Figure 66: Key Performance Parameters for General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 
2018Jun: showing Log10(av. values) of the various key performance parameters for cluster nodes 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5. 
 
 
Figure 67: Percentages of Key Performance Parameters Cum 2018Jun Showing Percentage 
Distribution of the Link Connections 
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This section has established an understanding of the various stages in the formation and 
development of clusters in the ransomware network. The topological formation and 
development of clusters show that the network clustering nodes can disperse and form new 
clusters, onward propagating a persistent threat. Consequently, to have an effective control, 
a dynamic and self-healing (ransomware) control system that works in cycles to track the 
active cluster nodes each time it forms is essential. This research proceeds to investigate the 
clustering overlaps to identify the active cluster overlap to remove to dislodge any emerging 
ransomware threat. 
 
6.2 Visualizing and Exploring Overlapping Clusters to Identify Active Cluster 
to Dislodge Ransomware Threat.  
 
The preceding section established the pattern of the formation and development of clusters 
in a ransomware network. It reveals the role of key performance parameters of the links and 
contents of the network in the execution of ransomware threats, and identification of the 
attack profile. It established the onset of ransomware threat and the full-grown threat in the 
time series and the temporal pattern of the attack impact. The structure of the network reveals 
that the removal of the dominant cluster overlap is the key to controlling ransomware threat. 
This is because the dominant (active cluster) is the traffic generating cluster. It sends out all 
the outward transmissions and does not receive any incoming link. The structure of the 
network also established the need to track overlapping clusters and develop knowledge of 
the requirements of a system that can remove the active cluster overlap to dislodge any threat.  
 
The current section investigates the dynamics of overlapping clusters in the network at 
different progressive and cumulative (period) time series (Figure 68 and section 6.1) to 
identify the most active cluster node that could be removed to dislodge a ransomware threat 
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network and prevent the attack. Previous discussions have shown the clustering of these time 
series (ransomware) network to ensure the identified active cluster node to remove to 
prevent an attack or dislodge the network is the same at all cumulative periods of the time 
series. This means the active cluster overlap must be consistent across all the cumulative 
periods based on the cluster nodes intensities and other key performance parameters. 
 
 
Figure 68: Multiple Time Series for all Variable Observations 
 
The Number of Clusters for each Cumulative Half-yearly Time Series (Figure 69) gives a 
clear visual understanding of the time effect (or several observations) on the number of 
clusters within the cumulative half-yearly time series. The time series plot reveals a pattern 
of rise and fall in the event's activities. The plot of the number of clusters for each (Figure 
69) reflects the same pattern exhibited in the time series plot (Figure 68). This suggests a 
decreasing number of clusters as the initial cumulative number of events increased. However, 
there was a sudden spike in the number of clusters between Jun2016 and Jan2017 (Figure 
69) as was observed earlier in the plot of the time series (Figure 68). The sudden spike 
appears to suggest an event activity or an attack within that period. The number of clusters 
in the time series network appears to remain the same after this period, possibly because the 
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input data for the next period (terminal period) did not change or there was not enough input 
event (data) in that period to cause structural change. There is a repeat of the same 
observation with the graphing of half-yearly (non-cumulative) events (Figure 70). Briefly, 
one of the challenges presented in the time series and number of clusters (Figure 68 and 
Figure 69) is to understand what happened along the entire time series, especially for the 
period Jan2016 to Jan2017; paying specific attention to Sep2016 to Jan2017.  Section 6.1 
has given an understanding of the events that took place along the time series in the 
ransomware network.  
 
 
 
Figure 69: Number of Clusters for each Cumulative Half-yearly Time Series 
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Figure 70: Number of Clusters for each Half-yearly Time Series 
 
For further analysis to detect the active cluster overlap along the time series, cluster overlap 
maps were created for different cumulative half-year time-series. For ease of reference, a 
series map of the cluster overlaps for the various stages of the cumulative periods is 
presented (Figure 71b-h). The series map shows each (cumulative) periodic network cluster 
overlap, which was taken at the start of the time series January 2015 to the end June 2018. 
The map reveals that the periodic network of the overlapping cluster taken at the start of the 
time series, January to June 2015 has five overlaps (Figure 71b). Subsequent overlapping 
clusters (Figure 71c-h) show four, three, five, four, five and five cluster overlap, respectively, 
which are explained later.  
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a: Number of the cluster 
for each cum half-yearly 
period 
 
b: Overlapping Cluster of 
cumulative period 2015Jun 
 
c: Overlapping Cluster of 
cumulative period 
2015Dec 
 
d: Overlapping Cluster of 
cumulative period 2016Jun 
 
e: Overlapping Cluster of 
cumulative period 
2016Dec 
 
f: Overlapping Cluster of 
cumulative period 2017Jun 
 
g: Overlapping Cluster of 
cumulative period 2017Dec 
 
h: Overlapping Cluster of 
cumulative period 2018Jun 
 
Figure 71: Number of Overlapping cluster formation and development in various cumulative time 
series of the Network 
 
Apparently, the overview of the plots shows the active clusters overlap, however, this will 
be clearer when the individual high-resolution view of each is analysed. The Network Item-
Cluster overlaps plot (Figure 72) for the first cumulative period of the network shows five 
identifiable overlapping clusters (1, 2... 5) from the plot. The plot clearly shows the network 
has directed connections. However, the size, magnitude, and direction of the connecting 
links cannot be determined from this plot by mere visual observation. Therefore, the Cluster 
Overlap Map (Figure 73) shows the connecting links (edges) of the overlaps. This shows the 
feeder (traffic generating) cluster nodes and the nodes of the receiving cluster. This research 
has built the knowledge to understand and identify the active cluster overlap node and how 
its removal can help to dislodge the network and control the ransomware attack.  
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Figure 72: Network Item-cluster Overlap Plot 2015Jun 
 
Figure 73: Cluster Overlap Map Showing 
Connecting Link Directions 2015Jun 
 
The cluster-overlap map (Figure 73) reveals that cluster overlap node 1 has four outward 
connecting links and does not have any incoming links. Cluster overlap node 2 receives one 
in-coming connection from node 1 and sends two outward connections, one each, to nodes 
3 and 5. In all, cluster overlap node 3 receives two in-ward connecting links from nodes 1 
and 2, and sends two connecting links, one each, to cluster overlap nodes 4 and 5.  Cluster 
overlap node 4 receives two in-ward links from nodes 1 and 3 and gives out one connecting 
link to cluster overlap node 5. At this period of the time series, node 5 can be seen to be a 
receiver-only node. It does not send any out-ward link. At this first period in the time series, 
it is correct to suggest that overlapping cluster node 1 is the dominant (active) cluster node 
or the events originating node, and consequently, the source of attack. The intensities of the 
overlapping cluster nodes 2015Jun (Figure 74) confirm the above understanding. The 
intensity values clearly show an apparent regular difference between the intensities of one 
clustering element (variable) and another. These intensities are related closely in values, and 
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it can be seen too, that cluster node 1 appears to have a fully developed cluster with a very 
high clustering weight value (34.70%) and other measures of centrality ranging from 21.97-
84.96%, indicating a potentially active source of attack (Figure 48, Figure 49 and Appendix 
5). This argument is not true for the measures of centrality of clusters number 2, 3, 4, and 5 
where the values range from 0.00-23.64%, 5.35-21.74%, 0.00-23.64% and 9.69-28.75% 
respectively.   
 
 
Figure 74: The Intensities of overlapping cluster nodes 2015June: 
Showing the intensities of objects in cluster overlap nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
 
 
Figure 75 corroborates the above conclusion by showing that cluster 1 has the highest 
average intensity value of 43.97% for the cumulative period 2015Jun, while the average 
intensity values of clusters number 2, 3, 4, and 5 are 5.00%, 17.17%, 11.08% and 22.78% 
respectively with their individual intensities distributed wide apart. More importantly, the 
clusters have low cluster weights and weighted betweenness centrality and appear not to be 
fully developed (Figure 49 and Appendix 5). It is important to note here that cluster 5 has a 
clustering element with an intensity value equal to 1 suggesting the element was an outlier 
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(alone by itself), with the potential to form or join a new cluster when there are objects with 
close similarities. In addition, it is important to observe that cluster node 5 is a terminal node 
with many incoming links and has the second largest average intensity value of 22.78%. 
 
 
Figure 75: Percentages of Intensity Values for each Cluster for the Cumulative Periods 2015Jun - 2018Jun; 
the cylinders represent the Clusters as follows, Blue = Cluster 1, Green = Cluster 2, Grey = Cluster 3, 
Purple = Cluster 4 and Red = Cluster 5 
 
 
The most active cluster node, cluster 1, has four outward links that feed all the other cluster 
nodes. It is the traffic originating link, which feeds other nodes, and receives from none. The 
thick dark arrows suggest that the major traffic routes originate from cluster node (links) 1 
to 3 and 1 to 5 (Figure 73). It becomes apparent that its removal terminates traffic to other 
clusters as shown in the item-cluster overlap 2015Jun when the link and cluster node 1 is 
disconnected (Figure 76 and Figure 77), thereby effectively and immediately terminating 
the impact of the attack. 
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Figure 76: Item-cluster Overlap 2015Jun when Link 
Node 1 is disconnected 
 
Figure 77: Item-cluster Overlap 2015Jun when 
cluster Node 1 is disconnected 
 
 
To establish consistency, there is a need to track this cluster node 1 to ensure it is the same 
cluster (1) node at different levels of the time series. This is done using the most consistent 
cluster overlap intensity parameter. Without repeating the graphs of the dislodged network 
for subsequent cumulative periods, the following passages present and discuss the plots of 
subsequent cumulative overlaps. 
 
To track cluster node 1 at different periods of the time series, cluster maps were plotted for 
subsequent cumulative periods to show different consisting variable nodes for all different 
clusters. Subsequent cluster graphs presented for this discussion focus on the Item-cluster 
overlap plots. Hence, the Events Item-cluster overlap and links maps for the Cumulative 
Half-Year Periods 2015Dec are presented in Figure 78 and Figure 79 respectively. Unlike 
the previous cumulative period 2015Jun, the current period has four overlapping clusters 
(Figure 78), indicating the movement of clustering objects to clusters with stronger 
membership, and a topological transition towards impending threat. This is evident in the 
Item-cluster Overlap when Link Node 1 is Disconnected 
2
5
3
4
1
Item-cluster Overlap Plot when Cluster Node 1 is Disconnected 
2 3
4 5
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average percentage values of the intensities of the clusters (Figure 75).  The values reveal 
that while the average percentage value of the intensities of the traffic originating node 
(cluster 1) decreased from 43.97% to 23.74%, the average percentage values of the intensity 
of cluster nodes 2, 3 and 4 increased from 5.00% to 11.56%; from 17.17% to 48.60%; and 
from 11.08% to 16.10% respectively. This also explains the disappearance of cluster node 5 
suggesting that it was absorbed by other nodes based on close similarity values.  
 
 
Figure 78: Network Item-cluster Overlap Plot 2015Dec  
Figure 79: Cluster Overlap Map Showing 
Connecting Link Directions 2015Dec 
 
Visual observation shows a more evenly (normally) distributed number of edges among the 
nodes (vertices) in the overlapping cluster nodes 2015Dec. However, the cluster overlap 
map for the period 2015Dec (Figure 79) shows one (concentrated) major link represented 
by a thick dark arrow line, which has an outward connection from node 1 to 3. The intense 
connection and concentration of activity on this major link (nodes 1 – 3) is visually clearer 
in Figure 75 and Figure 80. The values show that cluster node 3 recorded the highest average 
percentage intensity value of 48.60% and cluster node 1 recorded the second highest value 
of 23.74%. This shows an increase from 17.17% and a decrease from 43.97%, respectively, 
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in the preceding period. A less thick line connects node 3 (intensity = 48.60%) to node 4 
(intensity = 16.10%), suggesting a less intense relationship between the two nodes. The lines 
show the order of magnitude of the links relationship and suggests the major traffic flows 
from cluster 1 through to cluster 3 and cluster 4. The remaining link lines are shown to be 
the same (or even). The connecting links (Figure 79) reveal that cluster node 1 originates 
three outward links, one link each, to nodes 2, 3, and 4. Conversely, node 2 sends outward 
link connections with one each to nodes 3 and 4, while node 3 sends one outward link 
connection to node 4. Clearly, the connecting links map shows that cluster node 1 generates 
and gives three outward links and does not receive any incoming connection, suggesting it 
is the attack-originating and distributing node. Nodes 2 and 3 receive incoming connections 
and send out-going connections while the overlapping cluster node 4 is a receiver-only node.  
 
 
 
Figure 80: The Intensities of overlapping cluster nodes 2015Dec: 
Showing the intensities of objects in cluster overlap nodes 1, 2, 3, and 4 
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Like the preceding cumulative period 2015Jun, the intensity values of the elements show 
the same regular pattern around cluster node 1 such that the percentage of clustering 
elements are close together (2015Ju = 31.63%, 2015Dec = 25.20%) (Table 1 and Figure 81). 
Cluster node 1 also shows that it gave out all the outward links and did not receive any link 
from other nodes, therefore, corroborating the conclusion that it is the threat originating node, 
and consequently, the active cluster node (Figure 78, Figure 79 and Figure 80). 
 
The average intensity of 11.56% for cluster node 2 for the cumulative period 2015Dec reveal 
a significant difference compared to the average intensity of 5.00% for the same node in the 
period ending 2015Jun. While the number of clustering elements increased significantly to 
30 (23.62%) in the period 2015Dec from 8 (8.16%) in the 2015Jun period (Table 1 and 
Figure 81), the intensities varied in sizes for each individual values (Figure 74 and Figure 
80). Cluster node 3 has a similar increase in the number of clustering elements to 34 
(26.77%) for the period 2015Dec from 22 (22.45%) in 2015Jun with significant variations 
in the intensity values of 48.60% against the previous period 2015Jun (17.17%). There is an 
increase to 31 (24.41%) from 8 (8.16%) in the number of clustering elements in cluster node 
4 for 2015Dec in contrast to 2015Jun. In addition, the intensity values vary with great 
irregularity suggesting that cluster node 4 (2015Dec) absorbed some of the closely relating 
clustering objects from the disappeared previous cluster node 5 (2015Jun). 
Table 1: Number of Clustering Elements and Percentages 
 
Period 
Number of Clustering Elements  Percentage of Clustering Elements 
Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 Total Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 
2015Jun 31 8 22 8 29 98 31.63 8.16 22.45 8.16 29.59 
2015Dec 32 30 34 31  127 25.20 23.62 26.77 24.41  
2016Jun 23 33 23   79 29.11 41.77 29.11   
2016Dec 23 9 9 10 33 84 27.38 10.71 10.71 11.90 39.29 
2017Jun 24 33 9 9  75 32 44 12 12  
2017Dec 23 9 9 10 33 84 27.38 10.71 10.71 11.90 39.29 
2018Jun 23 9 9 10 33 84 27.38 10.71 10.71 11.90 39.29 
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Figure 81: Percentages of Clustering Elements for Different Cluster and Cumulative Periods 
 
Like cluster 5 for the period ending 2015Jun, cluster 4 has one clustering element that has 
an intensity value equal to 1, suggesting that it has an outlier element. It is worthy to note 
that while clusters 2, 3 and 4 expanded in the number of clustering elements for the period 
2015Dec, cluster node 5 which was seen in period 2015Jun disappeared (Table 1 and Figure 
81), indicating it was absorbed by other cluster nodes. Apparently, similarities developed 
with the entry of new events activities that resulted in the of absorption of cluster node 5. 
The inconsistencies in clusters 2, 3, and 4 suggest that like the period ending 2015Jun, cluster 
node 1 remains the most consistent, hence the active cluster overlap node, and the active 
source of ransomware attack.  
Further discussions focus on subsequent cumulative periods, starting with analysis of the 
cumulative period ending 2016Jun. This period is represented by the Network Item-cluster 
Overlap Plot 2016Jun and Cluster Overlap Map Showing Connecting Link Directions 
2016Jun (Figure 82 and Figure 83).  
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Figure 82: Network Item-cluster Overlap Plot 2016Jun 
 
Figure 83: Cluster Overlap Map Showing 
Connecting Link Directions 2016Jun 
 
The period has three overlapping clusters, which is one cluster less than the preceding 
period, suggesting stronger relationship in the intensities and similarities of objects within 
the clusters. This indicates the onset of ransomware threat. A Look at the network item-
cluster overlap plot 2016 (Figure 82) reveals that the three overlapping clusters appear to be 
evenly connected. However, the Cluster Overlap Map Showing Connecting Link Directions 
2016Jun (Figure 83) reveals the true connectivity of the overlaps. It is obvious that cluster 
overlap node 1 originates two outward links that connect cluster overlap nodes 2 and 3 
suggesting that these two cluster nodes are the direct distribution nodes of ransomware 
threats to network connected devices. The cluster overlap map 2016Jun shows the major 
distribution route to be from cluster node 1 to node 2 and subsequently to the terminal node 
3. The degree of the thick lines indicates this traffic route.  Cluster overlap node 2 gives an 
outward link to the terminal cluster overlap node 3. While cluster overlap node 2 receives 
one incoming link, cluster overlap node 3 receives two incoming links. It is important to 
restate that the major link axis is from cluster node 1 to cluster node 2, and from cluster node 
1
2
3
1
2
3
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2 to cluster node 3. The direction of the link arrows on the cluster map (Figure 83) shows 
that the cluster overlap node 1 generated all outward links and did not receive any incoming 
links (connection) from other overlapping cluster nodes. The all-outward link direction of 
cluster overlap node 1 establishes it is the active node; it becomes clear that cluster overlap 
node 1 is the active node. Therefore, like the previous periods, the removal of the active 
cluster node 1 will dislodge the ransomware network and control any threat before it attacks. 
 
The intensity values of the overlapping cluster node elements 2016Jun (Figure 84) 
corroborate these conclusions.  
 
 
Figure 84: The Intensities of overlapping cluster nodes 2016Jun: 
Showing the intensities of objects in cluster overlap nodes 1, 2, and 3 
 
 
It is obvious that the intensity values of the overlapping cluster node 1 are consistent with 
the values of the previous half-yearly cumulative periods (see also Table 1, Figure 75 and 
Figure 81). The table and figures show that the percentage values, number and percentage 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
A
SN
_
N
_
1
C
o
u
n
tr
y_
N
_5
H
o
st
_N
_2
H
o
st
_N
_4
IP
A
d
d
re
ss
_N
_1
M
al
w
ar
e_
N
_3
R
eg
is
tr
ar
_N
_1
R
eg
is
tr
ar
_N
_3
R
eg
is
tr
ar
_N
_5
U
R
L_
N
_1
U
R
L_
N
_3
U
R
L_
N
_5
A
SN
_
N
_
2
A
SN
_
N
_
4
C
o
u
n
tr
y_
N
_1
C
o
u
n
tr
y_
N
_4
H
o
st
_N
_1
H
o
st
_N
_3
H
o
st
_N
_5
IP
A
d
d
re
ss
_N
_2
IP
A
d
d
re
ss
_N
_4
M
al
w
ar
e_
N
_1
M
al
w
ar
e_
N
_5
R
eg
is
tr
ar
_N
_2
R
eg
is
tr
ar
_N
_4
St
at
u
s_
N
_1
U
R
L_
N
_2
U
R
L_
N
_4
A
SN
_
N
_
1
A
SN
_
N
_
5
C
o
u
n
tr
y_
N
_2
C
o
u
n
tr
y_
N
_5
H
o
st
_N
_2
IP
A
d
d
re
ss
_N
_1
IP
A
d
d
re
ss
_N
_3
M
al
w
ar
e_
N
_1
M
al
w
ar
e_
N
_5
R
eg
is
tr
ar
_N
_2
St
at
u
s_
N
_3
U
R
L_
N
_2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
In
te
n
si
ty
 o
f 
N
o
d
e
s
Nodes and Cluster IDS
Cumulative Half-Yearly Intensity of Nodes for 2016Jun
Intensity2015-2016Jun
1
2 3
125 
 
values of the clustering items for 2015Jun (43.97%, 31, 31.63%), 2015Dec (23.74%, 32, 
25.20%) and 2016Jun (31.03%, 23, 29.11%) are closer and show consistent pattern than they 
are in other cluster nodes. In addition, the intensities of cluster nodes 2 and 3 are irregular 
as was the case in the preceding periods (Figure 74, Figure 80 and Figure 84). Figure 84 also 
shows that cluster overlap nodes 2 and 3 have some elements with intensity values that are 
equal to 1, indicating that they are outliers and stand-alone. While the overlapping clusters 
of later cumulative periods of the time series are examined, it is correct to propose at this 
point that cluster node 1 remains the active cluster node because of its highest and consistent 
percentage values in all measures of centrality. 
 
 
Consequently, its removal results in dislodging the ransomware network and controls 
ransomware threats before they attack. The removal could equally be undertaken at an earlier 
stage to minimize attack impact. 
 
The investigation further examined the overlapping clusters for the period of the time series 
ending 2016Dec (Figure 85 and Figure 86). It is remarkable that after the network attained 
a minimum number of three clusters in the cumulative period 2016Jun, there was an increase 
in the number of overlapping clusters to five for the half-yearly cumulative period 2016Dec 
(Figure 86). This increase confirms the spike in the events’ activities seen earlier in the 
multiple time series for all the variable events in the ransomware network (Figure 29 and 
Appendix 3). Furthermore, Table 1 and Figure 81 show there was an active attack with 
cluster 1 and cluster 5 recording a 27.38% 39.29% in the number of clustering events. In 
addition, Figure 75 shows a wide difference between the percentage intensity values of the 
Parameters for Cluster 1 2015Jun 2015Dec 2016Jun 2016Dec 
Percentage of measures of centrality 27.41% 22.59% 39.26% 22.53% 
Number and percentage of clustering items 31 (31.63%) 32 (25.20%) 23 (29.11%) 23 (27.38%) 
Percentages of intensities of cluster objects  43.97% 23.74% 31.03% 29.15% 
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originating cluster 1 (29.15%) and the terminal cluster 5 (63.05%) on the one hand and 
cluster 2 (2.58%), cluster 3 (2.50%) and cluster 4 (2.73%) conversely. This indicates an 
increase in the events’ activities suggesting there was a full-grown ransomware threat 
(attack) that was highly active currently.  
 
 
Figure 85: Network Item-cluster Overlap Plot 2016Dec 
 
Figure 86: Cluster Overlap Map Showing 
Connecting Link Directions 2016Dec 
 
However, a look at the Network Item-cluster Overlap Plot 2016Dec (Figure 85) shows that 
cluster nodes 1 and 5 are more densely connected at 29.15% and 63.05% respectively, while 
cluster nodes 2, 3, and 4 are more evenly connected and less densely connected at 2.58%, 
2.50% and 2.73% (Figure 75, Figure 81 and Table 1). Nevertheless, the Cluster Overlap 
Map Showing Connecting Link Directions 2016Dec (Figure 86) gives a clearer 
understanding of the magnitude and direction of the connecting links. The origin and 
distribution links of the ransomware reveal that cluster node 1 is the link-generating node 
while the terminal cluster node 5 is a receiving node. Cluster overlap node 1 generated four 
outward links with one link each to the cluster nodes 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Conversely, 
the overlapping cluster nodes 2, 3 and 4 send one outward link each to cluster node 5. The 
link direction map shows the major traffic (distribution) axis is from cluster overlap node 1 
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to node 5.  The map evidently shows that cluster node 5 is a receiving only node and a 
terminal node. This means it receives incoming connections without sending any out-going 
connections suggesting that cluster node 5 is the major gateway for the distribution of attack. 
Conversely, cluster node 1 generates and sends outgoing connections without receiving an 
incoming connection. It is interesting to observe that all the BIN elements (BIN_Malware, 
BIN_Registrar, BIN_Host, BIN_URL, BIN_country, BIN_Status, and BIN_IPAddress) 
particularly the BIN_Malware are clustered in cluster node 1 in contrast to other cluster 
nodes. Consequently, like in the preceding cumulative periods, cluster node 1 is the 
dominant and active cluster overlap in the time series for the cumulative period ending 
2016Dec. The active nature of the cluster node 1 suggests that its removal will dislodge the 
activities of the ransomware network and control any imminent ransomware attack. 
 
The confirmation of the active nature of the overlapping cluster node 1 is validated by the 
intensity values of the clustering elements within each cluster (Figure 87). While the 
intensity values of the elements in the cluster overlap node 1 continue to remain consistent 
with preceding cumulative periods (2016Dec = 29.15%; 2016Jun = 31.03%), the intensity 
values of clusters node 2, 3, 4, and 5 continue to be inconsistent and irregular (2016Dec – 
clust 2 = 2.58, clust 3 = 2.50%, clust 4 = 2.73% and clust 5 = 63.05%; 2016Jun – clust 2 = 
44.08%, clust 3 = 24.89%) (Figure 75, Figure 81 and Table 1). It is obvious that the number 
of clustering elements decreased greatly in clusters 2, 3, and 4 with the following percentage 
values:  
• cluster 2 decreased from 41.77% down to 10.71%;  
• cluster 3 decreased from 29.11% down to 10.71%;  
• new cluster 4 recorded 11.90% and  
• new cluster 5 recorded 39.29% respectively,  
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while the number of clustering elements for cluster 1 appears to remain unchanged from 
the previous period (from 29.11% to 27.38%).  
 
 
Figure 87: The Intensities of overlapping cluster nodes 2016Dec: 
Showing the intensities of objects in cluster overlap nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
 
However, while the intensity values of cluster nodes 2, 3, and 4 decreased greatly, the 
percentage intensity value (39.29%) of cluster 5 is significantly high. Figure 87 shows that 
many of the intensity values in cluster 5 are equal to 1 resulting in the high percentage 
intensity value of 39.29% recorded by cluster 5 in 2016Dec. This suggests there are many 
(10) outlier elements (Figure 85), which are stand-alone in the cluster node 5. It also reveals 
a high intense activity suggesting there was an active attack. Therefore, the consistency of 
the intensity values of the clustering elements validates the conclusion that cluster node 1 
remains consistent and continues to be the active cluster node that initiates and executes 
attacks, and its removal dislodges the threat. 
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In continuation, the formation and development of overlapping clusters and link connections 
plot for the cumulative period 2017Jun of the time series is presented in Figure 88 and Figure 
89. Unlike the preceding period 2016Dec, the 2017Jun cumulative period has only 4 
overlapping clusters (Figure 88). This period has two terminal nodes 3 and 4. Cluster overlap 
node 1 appears to have more edges connecting to it with the highest percentage values of 
measures of centrality than any other overlapping cluster node (Figure 60, Figure 61 and 
Appendix 9).  
 
Figure 88: Network Item-cluster Overlap Plot 2017Jun 
 
Figure 89: Cluster Overlap Map Showing 
Connecting Link Directions 2017Jun 
 
Although Cluster 2 has many incoming connections, it has many (9) stand-alone (outlier) 
links with the intensity values for each clustering element equal to 1 resulting in in a very 
high percentage intensity value of 63.27% (Figure 90 and Figure 75). The network item-
cluster overlap plot (Figure 88) also shows that the overlapping cluster nodes 3 and 4 are 
receiver-only (terminal) nodes; they received incoming connections and never gave any out-
going connections. The explanation above is clearer from the Cluster Overlap Map Showing 
Connecting Link Directions 2017Jun (Figure 89). This plot reveals that the overlapping 
cluster node 1 generated and distributed three out-ward connections and did not receive any 
4
1
3
2
4
1
3
2
130 
 
inward connections. Each of the three out-ward links connects to cluster node 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively. Figure 89 equally shows that the cumulative period 2017Jun has two terminal 
nodes namely cluster 3 and 4. Clearly, the main distribution axis is from cluster node 1 to 
cluster node 2 as indicated by the thick arrow-line that links them. This understanding is 
further corroborated by the high percentage intensity value of 63.27% and high percentage 
value of clustering elements (44%) recorded by cluster node 2 (Figure 75, Figure 81 and 
Table 1). The dominant role of cluster overlap node 1 leaves no doubt that it is the active 
node as it was in the preceding cumulative periods. Consequently, the removal of cluster 
overlap node 1, as in the preceding periods, dislodges the ransomware distribution network 
and controls potential threats. 
 
The intensities of the overlapping cluster nodes 2017Jun (Figure 90) further demonstrates 
the consistency of cluster overlap node 1 as the active cluster overlap. Clearly, the 
percentage of the measures of centrality, percentages of clustering elements and the values 
and percentages of the intensities of cluster node 1 are consistent with those of the node of 
the preceding cluster 1 (Appendix 5, Figure 81, Table 1 and Figure 75,). Note that cluster 
node 1 has not recorded any outlier element throughout the time series, implying that it had 
not recorded any intensity values that are equal to 1, meaning that all the objects are strongly 
linked for attack. All the intensity values of cluster node 1 consistently fall within the range 
of 0.1 to 0.9.  
 
131 
 
 
Figure 90: The Intensities of overlapping cluster nodes 2017Jun: 
Showing the intensities of objects in cluster overlap nodes 1, 2, 3, and 4 
 
 
Moreover, each successive percentage values of the cluster intensities at different stages of 
the time series appear to be consistent and similar when compare with other clusters, i.e. 
2015Jun – 43.97%; 2015Dec – 23.74%; 2016Jun – 31.03%; 2016Dec – 29.15% and 2017Jun 
– 31.57% (Figure 75). In addition, cluster node 1 shows to have the same number of 
clustering objects (elements) at every cumulative stage of the time series, 2015Jun – 31.63%; 
2015Dec – 25.20%; 2016Jun – 29.11%; 2016Dec – 27.38% and 2017Jun – 32.00%  (Table 
1 and Figure 81). Conversely, cluster overlap node 2 continues to show irregular values of 
intensity in the clustering objects. It is observed also that cluster node 2 recorded about nine 
(9) outlier elements with each outlying element having an intensity value equal to 1 (Figure 
90). On the other hand, cluster nodes 3 and 4 have few clustering objects and lack most of 
the ransomware clustering elements (variables). It is worthy to note that cluster nodes 3 and 
4 have very low-intensity values that are≤ 0.2, i.e. 2.60% and 2.56% respectively (Figure 
75). These values validate the earlier suggestions that cluster node 1 continues to be the 
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active cluster node of the ransomware network. Therefore, its removal dislodges the 
ransomware network and controls ransomware threat before it attacks. 
 
The next cumulative network item-cluster overlap plot 2017Dec and cluster overlap map 
showing connecting link directions 2017Dec (Figure 91and Figure 92) respectively, reveal 
that the period 2017Dec has 5 cluster overlaps. Looking at the network item-cluster overlap 
plot 2017Dec (Figure 91) suggests that the cluster node 1 is more densely connected with 
percentage clustering elements of 27.38% than the other cluster nodes, except the terminal 
cluster node 5, which has percentage clustering elements value of 39.29%. Cluster overlap 
nodes 2, 3, and 4 appear to be more evenly connected with few links distribution (10.71%, 
10.71% and 11.90% respectively).  
 
Figure 91: Network Item-cluster Overlap Plot 2017Dec 
 
Figure 92: Cluster Overlap Map Showing 
Connecting Link Directions 2017Dec 
 
While cluster node 5 shows many connections with high percentage number of clustering 
elements of 39.29% (Table 1 and Figure 81), it has as many as 10 outlier (stand-alone) 
elements with each outlier recording absolute intensity value that equals 1.00 (Figure 93). 
Looking at the “cluster overlap map showing connecting link directions 2017Dec” (Figure 
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92), cluster node 1, as seen in the previous periods, generates four outward connections. 
Each of these connections is connected to node 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. However, the 
major link distribution axis originates from cluster overlap node 1 to cluster overlap node 5 
as shown by the connecting thick arrow line. The percentage values of the intensities (cluster 
1 = 29.59% and cluster 5 = 62.71%) and clustering elements (cluster 1 = 27.38% and cluster 
5 = 39.29%) confirm the observation (Figure 75, Table 1 and Figure 81). While cluster node 
2 receives one incoming connection, it sends an out-ward connection to cluster node 5. 
Similarly, cluster nodes 3 and 4 receive one inward connection from cluster node 1 and send 
one outward connection to cluster node 5 respectively. Generally, cluster node 5 receives 
inward connections only and does not send out an outward connection. It is evident that 
cluster node 1 generates all the outward connections and does not receive an inward 
connection. It is also true that while further cumulative events in the network altered the 
structure of other overlapping nodes, it did not alter the structure of cluster node 1. This 
understanding is demonstrated in the percentage values of the measures of centrality of the 
various cumulative period of the time series, the percentage values of clustering intensity 
(Figure 75) and the percentage values of clustering objects (Table 1 and Figure 81). 
Therefore, the active nature of this node makes it the appropriate cluster overlap node to 
remove to dislodge the ransomware network and control threats. 
 
Further analysis of “the intensities of the (network item-cluster) overlapping cluster objects 
2017Dec” (Figure 93), shows the intensities of the overlapping objects of cluster node 1 are 
consistent with the intensities of the preceding cumulative periods of the time series. This 
shows a similar number of clustering objects as observed in the previous cumulative periods 
where the intensity values fall within the range 0.1≥Intensity≤0.9. This contrasts with the 
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irregular values of intensity recorded in cluster nodes 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Figure 75, Table 1 and 
Figure 81).  
 
Figure 93: The Intensities of overlapping cluster nodes 2017Dec: 
Showing the intensities of objects in cluster overlap nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
 
 
Evidently, nodes 2, 3, and 4 recorded intensity values, which are less than 0.2, i.e. 2.57%, 
2.57% and 2.57% and percentage values of clustering elements of 10.71%, 10.71% and 
11.90% respectively. This appears to confirm the non-link relationship between nodes 2 and 
3, and nodes 2 and 4, respectively (Figure 92). Conversely, the intensities of clustering 
elements in cluster overlap node 5 show very divergent values ranging from 0.1 to 1.00 
confirming the presence of many (10) outlier elements (Figure 93). This results in non-
representative centroid and very high error sum of squares (SSE), making the cluster node a 
dominant dispersion outlet for ransomware threat. In addition, Figure 75 shows that cluster 
node 5 recorded the highest intensity value of 62.71% for the cumulative period 2017Dec. 
This observation is evident in Table 1 and Figure 81 where cluster node 5 also recorded the 
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highest percentage value of 39.29% for the number of clustering objects. So far, the 
discussions have shown that cluster node 1 has remained the active cluster overlap node. 
Consequently, its removal effectively dislodges the entire ransomware network and prevents 
ransomware threat. 
The “Network item-cluster overlap plot 2018Jun” (Figure 94), “Cluster overlap map 
showing connecting link directions 2018Jun” (Figure 95), and “The Intensities of 
overlapping cluster nodes 2018Jun” (Figure 96) for cumulative period 2018Jun are 
technically the same as the cumulative period ending 2017Dec. It is right to conclude that 
the same discussions for the period 2017Dec apply also to the current cumulative period 
ending 2018Jun.  
 
Figure 94: Network Item-cluster Overlap Plot 2018Jun 
 
Figure 95: Cluster Overlap Map Showing 
Connecting Link Directions 2018Jun 
 
There are many links connections to cluster node 1 and 5 shown in the network item-cluster 
overlap plot 2018Jun (Figure 94). However, many (10) of the clustering elements in cluster 
node 5 are outliers having intensity values equal to 1.0 each (Figure 96). Cluster node 1 
shows to be the link-generating (outward links) node, while node 5 shows to be the link-
receiving (inward links) node. Cluster nodes 2, 3, and 4 are shown to be evenly connected 
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with intensity values 0.1 ≤ Intensity ≤0.2; i.e. 2.57%, 2.57% and 2.57% (Figure 75). This is 
further demonstrated with the percentage values of 10.71%, 10.71% and 11.90% for the 
clustering elements (Table 1 and Figure 81). Clearly, the “Cluster Overlap Map Showing 
Connecting Link Directions 2018Jun” (Figure 95) reveal the directions and magnitude of 
the connections. The plot shows that cluster overlap node 1 generated four outward 
connections with one connection each to nodes 2, 3, 4, and 5. It is shown also that the major 
connection axis is the link from cluster node 1 to node 5 suggesting it is the major 
transmission link for ransomware traffic. This is confirmed by the high percentage intensity 
values of 29.57% for cluster 1 and 62.72% for cluster 5 (Figure 75); and high percentage 
values of number of clustering elements of 27.38% for cluster 1 and 39.29% for cluster 5 
(Table 1 and Figure 81). While cluster node 2 receives one inward connection from node 1, 
it sends an outward connection to cluster node 5. Similarly, cluster nodes 3 and 4 receive 
one inward connection from cluster node 1 and send outward connections each to node 5. In 
other words, all ransomware traffic is directed to cluster node 5. This is explained by the 
even percentage distribution of the intensity values of 2.57%, 2.57% and 2.57% (Figure 75) 
and number of clustering elements of 10.71%, 10.71% and 11.90% (Table 1 and Figure 81). 
There are no connections between cluster nodes 2 and 3, and cluster nodes 2 and 4 suggesting 
there is no ransomware traffic between those nodes. 
The preceding conclusion is validated by the regularity of the intensities of the overlapping 
cluster nodes 2018Jun (Figure 96). The consistency of the values of the intensities of cluster 
overlap node 1 at the various cumulative periods of the ransomware time series (network) 
agrees with the various topological dynamics (changes) and other key performance 
parameters in the network. Consistent with the intensity values of the previous periods the 
clustering elements in cluster node 1 maintains the intensity values within the range of 0.1 
and 0.9, i.e. an average of 29.57% (Figure 75), indicating close membership (association) of 
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the objects resulting in a smaller error sum of squares (SSE), and an active source of attack. 
Cluster nodes 2, 3, and 4 have low-intensity values of 2.57%, 2.57% and 2.57% suggesting 
low ransomware traffic.  
 
Figure 96: The intensities of overlapping cluster nodes 2018Jun 
 
Conversely, cluster node 5 appears to have many connections but most (10) of them are 
outliers with intensity values equal to 1.0, thereby increasing the error sum of squares (SSE) 
and making the centroid non-representative. In addition, it received inward connections and 
did not give outward connections resulting in the highest percentage intensity value of 
62.72% thereby making it an outlet for the distribution of threat into network connected 
devices. Therefore, cluster overlap node 5 is a terminal link node.  
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6.3 The Profiling and Tracking of Active Cluster Overlap Using Intensity Maps 
 
The intensities map for the various cumulative periods of the time series (Figure 97 and 
Figure 98) are presented to show the intensities cluster maps and their respective average 
weights for different cluster overlaps. The intensities cluster map was configured to show 
the weight or degree of the cluster intensities by the size of each node circle and its color 
intensity (Figure 97). The Cluster (Intensities) Average Weight for Half Yearly Cumulative 
Periods 2015Jun - 2018Jun is to show their corresponding numerical values (Figure 98). 
With the largest node circle and darkest colour shading, cluster overlap node 1 proves to 
have the highest intensities degree and weight of 212 (26.40%) validating earlier 
observations.  
 
Figure 97: Intensity map for the various cumulative periods of the time series: showing the cluster of 
intensities of objects cluster nodes 1, 2, 3, 5, and 4 in order of magnitude 
 
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 5
Node 4Cluster objects
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Figure 98: Cluster (Intensities) Average Weight for Half Yearly Cumulative Periods 2015Jun - 2018Jun 
 
The cluster map node 1 shows there are more clustering objects in the cluster overlap node 
1 for the entire time series. Similarly, intensities cluster nodes 2, 3, 5, and 4 follows in the 
same order of degree (weight) 166 (20.67%), 151 (18.80%), 163 (20.30%) and 111 (13.82%) 
respectively (Figure 98). A further look at the map reveals that the major distribution link is 
between cluster node 1 and cluster node 5, and between cluster node 1 and cluster node 2, 
respectively. The cluster objects (elements); including Malware, URL, Registrar, IP 
Address, ASN, Country, and Status could be seen, as indicated, at the middle of the 
intensities map. In all representations in this investigation, cluster overlap node 1 proves to 
be consistent in its structure and pattern, and therefore, shows to be the active cluster overlap 
node and source of threat, and its removal results in dislodging ransomware attack. 
 
Further validation of the consistency of cluster overlap node 1, as the active overlap node, 
is the single-plot presentation of the intensity values (for cluster node 1) for all the 
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cumulative periods of the ransomware time series (Figure 99). The intensity values show 
intense similarities and closeness amongst them, this suggests a very close association thus 
making them cluster together. The intensities of the ransomware (malware) elements in 
cluster node 1 consistently peaked to approximately 0.83 during the 2016Dec, 2017Jun, 
2017Dec and 2018Jun, which were the periods when the time series (Figure 29) showed a 
phenomenal spike in the event's activities.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 99: (a) Intensity values for cluster overlap node 1 for all cumulative periods of the ransomware 
time series, (b) Scatter plot showing the degree of closeness of the intensity values across all cumulative 
periods 
 
The scatter plot showing the degree of closeness of the intensity values across all cumulative 
periods (Figure 99) further validates the consistency and similarity of the cluster overlap 
node 1 as the active cluster overlap node. Therefore, the nature and consistency of cluster 
overlap node 1 as the only ransomware traffic-generating hub, in the ransomware time 
series, make it the active cluster overlap node. Hence, the removal of the active cluster 
overlap node 1 effectively dislodges the ransomware networks and effectively disrupts any 
potential threat. 
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6.4 The Profiling and Tracking of Active Cluster Overlap Using the Objects 
(Variables) Counts  
 
The topological transformations of the various cumulative ransomware networks and cluster 
overlaps were a function of the activities of the network contents (clustering objects and 
variables). Therefore, an understanding of the impact of these contents (variables) on the 
structure of the overlaps is sought to further validate cluster node 1 as the active node. To 
achieve this objective, further tracking of cluster node 1 is conducted using the clustering 
objects (components) counts (Figure 100 to Figure 105). The frequency of the objects per 
cluster for each of the cumulative period shows different frequencies. The frequency plot 
for Cumulative Periods (a) 2015Jun and (b) 2015Dec (Figure 100) show a high and 
consistent frequency count of consisting clustering objects in cluster node 1. It consists of 
high-frequency counts of complete components of the network, ASN, Country, Host, 
IPAddress, Malware, Registrar, Status, and URL. This indicates that cluster overlap node 1 
contains all the network elements to launch a ransomware threat. These values are confirmed 
in Table 1 and Figure 81 where the number of clustering elements and their percentages are 
31 (31.63%) and 32 (25.20%) for the cumulative periods ending 2015Jun and 2015Dec.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 100: Frequency of Objects per Cluster for Cumulative Periods (a) 2015Jun and (b) 2015Dec: showing the 
consistency of cluster overlap node 1 
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Figure 101: Percentages of Clustering Items and Cluster Intensities of Cluster 1 for the Cumulative Periods 
2015Jun – 2018Jun 
 
The percentages of numbers of clustering elements stated above are confirmed in the plot of 
“Percentages of Clustering Items and Cluster Intensities of Cluster 1 for the Cumulative 
Periods 2015Jun – 2018Jun” (Figure 101). In contrast, cluster overlap nodes 2, 3, 4 and 5 
recorded irregular frequency of objects counts for the same period (a) 2015Jun and (b) 
2015Dec {(Figure 100) and (Figure 102 a-b)}.  
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 (c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 102: Percentages of Clustering Items and Cluster Intensities of Clusters 2, 3, 4 and 5 for the 
Cumulative Periods 2015Jun – 2018Jun 
 
While cluster node 2 in 2015Jun recorded a very low frequency and percentage of objects 
counts (8, 8.16%), the corresponding cluster node 2 in 2015Dec recorded higher frequencies 
(30, 23.62%) (Table 1 and Figure 81). This suggests a comparative difference in the 
formation, development, and weight of cluster node 2 for the two periods. It is concluded 
that the links traffic to cluster node 2 in 2015Jun was not as high as it was in 2015Dec, as 
cluster node 2 in 2015Jun was still forming (Figure 100a, b and Figure 102a, b). However, 
as the ransomware events activities increased, cluster node 2 in 2015Dec had more object 
similarities that clustered together resulting in higher frequency and percentage of clustering 
objects. This phenomenon was proven earlier in the preceding discussions (Figure 46a, b 
and Figure 71b, c). This is also evident in the intensity values of the overlapping cluster 
nodes 2015Jun and 2015Dec (Figure 74, Figure 75 and Figure 80). Similarly, cluster node 
3 had irregularity in the frequency and percentage counts between the two cumulative 
periods (22.45% and 26.77%) except there is a higher frequency counts in cluster node 3 in 
the cumulative period (b) 2015Dec (Figure 100a, b and Figure 102b). Like cluster node 2, 
the frequency and percentages of objects (counts) in the cumulative period (a) 2015Jun (22, 
22.45%) is lower than it was in the period (b) 2015Dec (34, 26.77%) (Table 1 and Figure 
81). The objects in Nodes 2 and 4 for the period 2015June show that there are outliers 
(single) and stand-alone, while the objects for the same nodes for the period (b) 2015Dec 
8
.1
6
2
4
.4
1
1
1
.9 1
2
1
1
.9
1
1
.9
1
1
.0
8 1
6
.1
2
.7
3
2
.5
6
2
.5
7
2
.5
7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2015Jun 2015Dec 2016Jun 2016Dec 2017Jun 2017Dec 2018Jun
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
s
Cumulative Period of Time Series
Percentages of Clustering Items and Cluster Intensities for Clust 4
Number of Clustering Items (%)
Intensities of cluster (%)
2
9
.5
9
3
9
.2
9
3
9
.2
9
3
9
.2
9
2
2
.7
8
6
3
.0
5
6
2
.7
1
6
2
.7
2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2015Jun 2015Dec 2016Jun 2016Dec 2017Jun 2017Dec 2018Jun
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
s
Cumulative Period of Time Series
Percentages of Clustering Items and Cluster Intensities for Clust 5
Number of Clustering Items (%)
Intensities of cluster (%)
144 
 
are multiple in clusters. Finally, there is a drop to four in the number of clusters in (b) 
2015Dec suggesting there are more similarities created in most of the clustering elements as 
the number events activities increased in the time series of the ransomware network.  
Conclusively, the main objective here is to show that the cluster overlap node 1 has been 
very consistent as the active cluster overlap node even when investigated using the 
frequency counts of the clustering objects. 
 
Looking further at the frequency of objects counts brings focus to the cumulative period (a) 
2016Jun and (b) 2016Dec (Figure 103a, b). As seen in the previous cumulative periods, the 
frequencies and percentages of the objects count for cluster overlap nodes 1 for the periods 
(a) 2016Jun (23, 29.11%) and (b) 2016Dec (23, 27.38%) are regular and consistent (Table 
1 and Figure 81). This means that cluster node 1 is a fully formed and developed (active) 
ransomware transmission hub. Similar irregularities recorded in the previous cumulative 
periods are also recorded in the frequency of objects counts for cluster nodes 2 and 3 for the 
period (a) 2016June (Figure 103a). It is obvious that the increased number of clustering 
objects in these nodes reduced the number of clusters from the previously recorded four to 
three.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 103: Frequency of Objects per Cluster for Cumulative Periods (a) 2016Jun and (b) 2016Dec: showing the 
consistency of cluster overlap node 1 
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The increased number of clustering objects suggests increased ransomware traffic through 
those nodes. After what seemed to be an increased (intense) activity in the period ending 
2016Jun where all the clusters appear to be fully formed, there was a release or dispersion 
of traffic (threat) to network devices in subsequent period 2016Dec (Figure 103b). The result 
was an increase in the number of clusters to 5 for the period 2016Dec. The increase to 5 in 
the number of clusters is reflected in the decrease in percentage intensities of cluster 1 = 
29.15%, cluster 2 = 2.58% and cluster 3 = 2.50%; and the appearance of cluster 4 = 2.73% 
and a high value cluster 5 = 63.05% compared to their values in 2016Jun (Figure 75). The 
same decrease in distribution pattern is shown in the number and percentages of clustering 
elements for cluster 1 = 23, 27.28%; cluster 2 = 9, 10.71%; cluster 3 = 9, 10.71%; cluster 4 
= 10, 11.90% and cluster 5 = 33, 39.29% (Table 1 and Figure 81) This agrees with the spike 
in ransomware activities recorded earlier in the time series of the ransomware network 
(Figure 29). While cluster overlap node 1 remains stable and consistent in this period, cluster 
nodes 2, 3, 4, and 5 show inconsistencies and irregular topological patterns (Figure 101 and 
Figure 102a-d). Most of these nodes not only have reduced frequency of objects counts, they 
show to have outlier (stand-alone) objects. An exception is cluster node 5, which increased 
its frequency of cluster objects counts (63.05%) and had proven earlier to be a receiver node 
with major traffic from cluster node 1. Worthy of note is the frequency transition between 
2015Dec and 2016Jun (Figure 69, Figure 100b and Figure 103a) where the number of 
clusters decreased from four to a minimum of three, which suggests the onset of ransomware 
threats and full threat, respectively. Notably, the percentage values of clustering elements 
increased from cluster 1 = 25.20%; cluster 2 = 23.62%; cluster 3 = 26.77 and cluster 4 = 
24.41% in 2015Dec to cluster 1 = 29.11%; cluster 2 = 41.77% and cluster 3 = 29.11% in 
2016Jun. These percentage decreased in values for cluster 1 = 27.38%; cluster 2 = 10.71%; 
cluster 3 = 10.71% and gained cluster 4 = 11.90% and cluster 5 = 39.29% in 2016Dec (Table 
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1 and Figure 81). At the point of minimum threshold of the number of clusters, onset of 
threat, the percentage values of intensity distribution shows that cluster 1 recorded an 
average intensity for 2016Jun = 31.03%; 2016Dec = 29.15%; 2017Jun = 31.57%; 2017Dec 
= 29.59% and 2018Jun = 29.57%. Conversely, at the point of active threat, cluster 5 recorded   
percentage intensity values as follows: 2016Dec = 63.05%, 2017Dec = 62.71% and 2018Jun 
= 62.72% while clusters 2, 3 and 4 recorded approximate value of 2.58% each. The 
exception here is cluster 2 in 2017Jun which recorded 63.27% (Figure 75). However, the 
consistency of node 1 as the traffic generating and active cluster overlap node remains valid. 
Therefore, its removal, especially at the point where the number of clusters is lowest (the 
onset), would disrupt and prevent the threat at the proceeding maximum number of clusters 
(at the spike). 
 
The results of subsequent cumulative periods are like those of the preceding periods. It is 
obvious that the frequency of the object counts of cluster overlap node 1 for the periods 
2017Jun and 2017Dec (Figure 104a, b) remains structurally regular and consistent. This 
corroborates the results of the structures of the various cumulative network clusters, the key 
performance parameters and the intensity values of the objects of the cluster overlaps. 
Therefore, this observation shows that cluster overlap node 1 continues to be the active 
cluster overlap node. The irregularities and topological differences in cluster nodes 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 are clearly visible in the frequency (counts) of the clustering objects (Figure 104a, b). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 104: Frequency of Objects per Cluster for Cumulative Periods (a) 2017Jun and (b) 2017Dec: showing the 
consistency of cluster overlap node 1 
 
While cluster node 2 in the cumulative period 2017Jun (Table 1, Figure 81 and Figure 104a) 
recorded an increased frequency count (44.00%) in the clustering objects, it contrasts with 
the frequency of objects (10.71%) for the corresponding cluster node 2 in the cumulative 
period 2017Dec. Clusters nodes 3 and 4, have similar objects frequency values of 12.00% 
and 12.00% for 2017Jun; 10.71% and 11.90% for 2017Dec and 39.29% new cluster 5 in 
2017Dec. Like the frequency of objects for cluster node 5 during the period of threat 
2016Dec (Figure 103b), the frequency of the clustering objects increased (39.29%) in the 
same pattern during the period 2017Dec. This phenomenon tends to suggest that the 
ransomware threat repeated, which implies that the system required to control the threat 
would be self-healing and cyclic (repeating in cycles). However, the interesting fact in this 
case is that the active cluster overlap will still have the same attributes, which remains cluster 
overlap node 1 making it easy for the system to target and select it for removal.  
 
Arguably, the frequencies of clustering objects for all cluster nodes in the cumulative period 
2018Jun (Figure 105a) are the same as it was in 2017Dec. Hence, without repetition, the 
discussion held for 2017Dec is adopted for 2018Jun.  
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
A
SN
C
o
u
n
tr
y
H
o
st
IP
A
d
d
re
ss
M
al
w
ar
e
R
e
gi
st
ra
r
St
at
u
s
U
R
L
A
SN
C
o
u
n
tr
y
H
o
st
IP
A
d
d
re
ss
M
al
w
ar
e
R
e
gi
st
ra
r
St
at
u
s
U
R
L
A
SN
C
o
u
n
tr
y
H
o
st
IP
A
d
d
re
ss
M
al
w
ar
e
R
e
gi
st
ra
r
St
at
u
s
U
R
L
A
SN
C
o
u
n
tr
y
H
o
st
IP
A
d
d
re
ss
M
al
w
ar
e
R
eg
is
tr
ar
St
at
u
s
U
R
L
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Fr
e
q
u
e
n
cy
 o
f 
O
b
je
ct
s 
P
e
r 
C
lu
st
e
r
Objects and Clusters Node
Number of Objects Per Cluster Cum2017Jun
No. of Objects 2017Jun
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
A
SN
H
o
st
M
al
w
ar
e
St
at
u
s
A
SN
H
o
st
M
al
w
ar
e
St
at
u
s
A
SN
H
o
st
M
al
w
ar
e
St
at
u
s
A
SN
H
o
st
M
al
w
ar
e
St
at
u
s
A
SN
H
o
st
M
al
w
ar
e
St
at
u
s
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Fr
e
q
u
e
n
cy
 o
f 
O
b
je
ct
s 
P
e
r 
C
lu
st
e
r
Objects and Clusters Node
Number of Objects Per Cluster Cum2017Dec
No. of Objects 2017Dec
148 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 105: Frequency of Objects per Cluster for (a) Cumulative Periods 2018Jun, (b) Cumulative 
Periods 2015-2018 showing various cluster periods on top, and degree of cluster objects for various 
cluster overlaps IDs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, at bottom 
 
Generally, the single plot for the frequency of objects for the clusters in all the cumulative 
periods is represented in the cumulative periods 2015-2018 (Figure 105b). The upper part 
of the plot shows the cluster of the various cumulative periods of the time series. The 
corresponding distribution frequency of cluster of objects amongst the clusters is highlighted 
in the lower part of the plot. The cluster objects frequency distribution shows the degree of 
object frequency for each node by the size and color intensity of the node circle. Like in the 
earlier observations cluster overlap node 1 has the highest frequency of cluster objects 
suggesting that it has the highest number of clustering objects and is more densely linked 
than the other nodes. This degree of connection is followed by node 2, node 3, node 4, and 
node 5, respectively. In conclusion, node 1 remains the active cluster overlap node as 
observed in earlier discussions. These results validate the understanding that cluster overlap 
node 1 is the active cluster overlap node. Consequently, its removal dislodges the 
ransomware network and controls any ransomware threat. 
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The graphical representation of the tracking of cluster overlap node 1 using frequency of 
objects counts for cluster 1, Cum2015Jan-2018Jun [(a) – (h)] (Figure 106) gives clarity on 
the consistency, pattern and structural formation of cluster overlap node 1. Looking at the 
plots (a) – (g), there is no doubt that cluster node 1 is consistently the active cluster node. 
Placing all the frequency counts for cluster node 1 in one plot (Figure 106h) shows a very 
high degree of consistency in the frequency counts for all the cumulative periods. The slight 
difference in the frequency value is seen in 2015Jun and 2015Dec prior to the onset of 
ransomware threat where the object (ASN) in the plots recorded higher frequencies. 
However, at the onset of threat in 2016Jun and 2017Jun (Figure 106c, e) the same object 
(ASN) recorded a very low frequency. Subsequently, the frequency increased slightly and 
remained at the same values when there was a full-grown threat in the period 2016Dec, 
2017Dec and 2018Jun. 
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( e ) 
 
(f) 
 
(g) 
 
(h) 
Figure 106: Tracking Cluster 1 using Number of Objects Counts for Cluster 1, Cum2015Jan-2018Jun 
[(a) – (h)]: Showing the consistency of cluster overlap node 1 
 
Convincingly, the results have proved that cluster overlap node 1 is the active cluster node 
in the entire time series of the ransomware network. The results have been validated in 
various ways using the visualization of the ransomware networks, the key performance 
parameters of the network, the overlaps clustering objects intensities, and the frequencies 
(counts) of overlaps clustering objects. Therefore, it can be concluded that the removal of 
the active cluster overlap node (1) would consequently dislodge the ransomware network 
and control ransomware threat. 
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6.5 Summary of Key Findings  
 
Various methodological approaches have been used to investigate and explore the 
clustering overlaps in a ransomware network based on the link structure and content 
relevance to build a knowledge and understanding of cluster evolution and development. 
The approaches include visualization of the clusters; exploration of the measures of 
centrality (key performance parameters), intensities of the clusters and the profiling of the 
clustering items to understand the topological evolution and development of the clusters. 
These approached were carried out to detect the dominant (active) cluster that can be 
removed to dislodge the ransomware network and prevent threat before it attacks. To give 
a summary of the findings, it is important to revisit the data in the following Figure 107, 
Table 2, Figure 108 and Figure 109. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 107: The (a) Number of Events Activities (b) Percentages of Number of Events Activities of Multiple 
time series for all variable 
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Table 2: Number of Clustering Elements and Percentages 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 108: Percentages of (a) Number of Clustering Elements and (b) Intensity Values for each Cluster for 
the Periods 2015Jun - 2018Jun 
 
Period 
Number of Clustering Elements  Percentage of Clustering Elements 
Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 Total Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 
2015Jun 31 8 22 8 29 98 31.63 8.16 22.45 8.16 29.59 
2015Dec 32 30 34 31  127 25.20 23.62 26.77 24.41  
2016Jun 23 33 23   79 29.11 41.77 29.11   
2016Dec 23 9 9 10 33 84 27.38 10.71 10.71 11.90 39.29 
2017Jun 24 33 9 9  75 32 44 12 12  
2017Dec 23 9 9 10 33 84 27.38 10.71 10.71 11.90 39.29 
2018Jun 23 9 9 10 33 84 27.38 10.71 10.71 11.90 39.29 
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Figure 109: Percentages of (blue) Number of Clustering Elements and (orange) Intensity Values for the 
Active Cluster (Cluster 1) for the Periods 2015Jun - 2018Jun 
 
Reading the data from the figures and table above, the investigation records the following 
findings regarding the formation and development of the overlapping clusters and the 
active overlapping cluster node in the ransomware network. The following findings are 
recorded: 
1) The percentage distribution of the events variables remained stationary at 0.00% - 
0.33% between 2015Jun and 2016Jun. The events variables increased to 10.19%, 
27.38% and reached a climax at 53.53% in 2016Dec before the values decreased 
drastically to 1.44%, 3.68%, 3.35% and 0.01% (Figure 107a, b) 
2) Prior to the onset of threat, the number of clusters decreased progressively until 
the onset of the threat at the lowest minimum threshold (2016Jun) where the 
clustering elements and percentage values are close to one another (29.11%, 
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41.77% and 29.11%) and the differences between them are -12.11% and 12.11% 
(Table 2 and Figure 108a).  
3) At the onset of threat (2016Jun), the percentage values of the clusters are close to 
one another and the differences between the percentages of the intensity of 
originating cluster (31.03%), the cluster with largest intensity (44.08%) and the 
intensity of the terminal cluster (24.89%) are -13.05% and 14.19% respectively 
(Table 2 and Figure 108b).  
4) At the onset of threat (2016Jun), the number of clustering objects are close to each 
other and the differences between the percentage values of the number of 
clustering objects of the originating cluster (29.11%), the cluster node with the 
largest percentage value (41.77%) and the terminal cluster node (29.11%) are -
12.66% and 12.66% respectively (Table 2 and Figure 108b). 
5) Proceeding the onset of threat is the active threat (2016Dec) where the percentage 
values of the active/originating cluster node is 27.38%, the terminal cluster node is 
39.29%, and other cluster nodes are 10.71%, 10.71% and 11.90% (Table 2 and 
Figure 108b). 
6) The active overlapping cluster is the cluster that has the most regular, consistent 
and closely distributed number of clustering objects, measures of centrality and 
intensity values in all the cumulative periods of the ransomware network time 
series (Table 2, Figure 108 and Figure 109). 
Therefore, any self-healing or cyclic system automated with the above findings will 
automatically detect and dislodge a ransomware threat before an attack occurs. The above 
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findings will help to reach a summary, conclusion, recommendations and projected future 
work in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE 
WORK 
 
The aim of this research was to study the topological evolution of clusters in a half-yearly 
cumulative period of the time series of a ransomware network. Besides the visual 
representation and understanding of the structural evolution of the ransomware network 
clusters, the study investigated the formation and development of overlapping clusters. 
Understanding the dynamics of the cluster overlaps was important to inform the creation of 
tools to control ransomware threats. The study sought to identify the active cluster overlap 
node to remove that would consequently dislodge the ransomware network and prevent 
threats before they occurred. The investigation applied different exploratory approaches to 
understand the dynamics of an attack profile, investigate, establish and validate the results, 
which found that the removal of the active cluster overlap node effectively dislodged the 
ransomware network and controlled the threats. However, the effectiveness of the practical 
application of any system based on this principle is beyond the scope of this project and 
should be investigated in future studies.   
 
7.1 Visualization of Network Cluster and Key Performance Parameters 
 
Visualization was very important to reveal hidden patterns in the network that would make 
it possible to establish the dynamics of the clustering entities. In visualizing the topological 
changes within the clusters of the ransomware network at different cumulative periods of 
the time series, it was possible to identify the key performance parameters that influenced 
the structural changes in the network clusters. Consequently, the pattern of the formation 
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and development of these clusters prior to the onset and full-grown threat of the ransomware 
was established. The network clusters revealed that while there was a period of gradual 
increase in the density of the distribution of links (connections) around the cluster nodes, as 
the activities of the ransomware increased, there was more concentration of these links on a 
specific cluster overlap node. This specific node showed to be generating all the outward 
links and never received an inward link (connection). Additionally, it was revealed there 
was a corresponding decrease in the number of clusters of the ransomware network during 
the same periods as the events’ activities and link distribution density increased. This 
suggested that the onset of the ransomware threat was at the point when the number of 
clusters was at its minimum. The full-grown threat proceeded immediately after the 
minimum number of cluster threshold by recording a maximum number of clusters. This 
indicates a period when the threat was dispersed to different target networks and devices. 
The structural dynamics of the network clusters were characterized by the values of the key 
performance parameters. In such characterizations, a high weight value revealed the 
magnitude of links (traffic) to a cluster node. Out degree centrality, weighted eigenvector 
centrality, and unweighted eigenvector centrality showed that cluster overlap node 1 had the 
highest degree of outward links and generated and distributed all the traffic to other nodes. 
Other parameters confirming the dominance of cluster overlap node 1 included the 
consistently high values of weighted and unweighted closeness centrality, and clustering 
coefficient centrality. 
 
7.2 Visualization of Network Cluster Overlaps and the Intensities of the 
Objects of Cluster Overlaps 
 
The visualization of ransomware network created an understanding of the clustering 
dynamics to motivate the analysis of the overlapping clusters of the network. Further 
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investigation used the cluster overlaps and the corresponding intensities of the clustering 
objects of the overlapping clusters to identify and track the active cluster overlap node at the 
different cumulative periods. This was to establish and ensure the consistency of the 
identified active cluster node at the various cumulative periods of the time series of the 
ransomware network. Like the network clusters, the cluster overlaps showed a period of 
gradual decrease in the number of clusters and increased connections within a few cluster 
nodes. The decrease in the number of clusters reached a minimum value (threat onset) prior 
to a sudden increase (full-grown threat) in the number of clusters. These connections showed 
that cluster node 1 was both the originator and distributor of the outward traffic and never 
received an inward traffic, thereby becoming the active source of threat. The intensity values 
of the clustering objects revealed that the weight, density, and strength of the closeness 
(association) between the intensities of the clustering objects were higher in the cluster 
overlap node 1 than it was in the other cluster nodes. This implies that the differences 
between the intensity values of the clustering objects were small and evenly distributed. It 
was also seen that the range of the values fell in the thresholds of 0.1≥Intensity≤0.9 for each 
object. Unlike the other cluster overlap nodes, cluster overlap node 1 did not have any outlier 
objects or objects with a single intensity value equal to 1.00 or less than 0.1. The intensities 
of the malware (ransomware) object was seen to record a high and consistent peak value of 
0.82 for the cumulative periods 2016Dec, 2017Jun, 2017Dec, and 2018Jun, which were the 
periods when the time series of the network recorded the highest events activities (Figure 29 
and Figure 99a, b). In other words, it was the period when the analysis showed the onset and 
full-grown ransomware threat.  The analysis using intensity values proved and validated 
cluster overlap node 1 as the active cluster overlap node as well as the links or events 
generating node. Consequently, its removal effectively dislodged the network and 
apparently controlled ransomware threat. The experimental and exploratory procedures in 
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this research shows that the concept of active cluster overlap node is potentially an 
effective/useful and new identifier that both enables an automated response and pro-actively 
controls the attack at an earlier time-point than was evidently achieved by manual processes. 
 
7.3 Frequencies (counts) of Objects of Cluster Overlaps 
 
To understand the formation and development of the cluster overlaps, further analysis and 
validation was conducted using the frequencies of each of the clustering objects. The results 
gave insight into how the objects were entering or leaving a cluster. Consistent with the 
cluster weight or distribution (link) density, the frequency counts explain why the number 
of clusters increased or decreased in the successive cumulative periods. In all the cumulative 
periods, the values of the frequencies of cluster overlap node 1 proved to be consistent and 
regular in contents than the other cluster overlaps. Like the other analysis and validation 
parameters, the frequency counts showed that cluster overlap node 1 was the active cluster 
overlap node. Therefore, the removal of the active cluster overlap node 1 dislodged the 
ransomware network and consequently controlled the ransomware threats.  
 
7.4 Characteristics of active cluster overlap node and Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for future work is built on the following characteristics of the active cluster 
overlap node in a ransomware network: 
a) The onset of threat is detected when an apparent zero (%) stationary distribution of events 
(network objects) suddenly increased to ≥8.67%≤12.91% and ≥24.96%≤30.00%; and the 
active threat is detected when the values reach the maximum of ≥51.00%≤56.77% prior to 
near zero % drop in activities. 
160 
 
b) At the point of active threat, the weighted betweenness centrality for the terminal cluster 
node recorded a value of 100% while other clusters recorded 0%. The values of all other 
measures of centrality appear to be within the same range. 
c) The active cluster overlap has no outlier objects; therefore, it does not have any object 
intensity values that are equal to 1.00. 
d) The intensity values of clustering objects in the active cluster lies between ≥0.1≤0.9. 
e) The intensity value of the ransomware object at the period of threat is maximum at 0.82.  
f) The frequency counts explain why the number of clusters increased or decreased in 
the successive cumulative periods. 
g) In all the cumulative periods, the values of the frequencies of the active cluster 
overlap node 1 proved to be consistent and regular in contents than the other cluster 
overlaps. 
 
7.5 Review of research aim, methodology, and contributions 
 
This research aimed to develop detailed knowledge and understanding of the dynamic 
emergence of network overlap clusters and how this might be detected and evaluated by 
automated processes grounded in data science principles. The automated active cluster 
overlap detection and removal model (Exploratory Machine-Learning Cluster Overlap 
System – EMCOS) to be built from this principle seeks to help industries to take a quick 
decision to counter and control ransomware threats before they attack. To achieve this and 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the research a prototype tool would be created in a future 
work. The identification of the characteristics of the dynamic active overlapping cluster in a 
ransomware network is the precursor to the creation of the prototype EMCOS. These 
characteristics are identified by profiling the ransomware network using: 
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• Visualization of the emergence and development of clusters and cluster overlaps to 
reveal hidden patterns 
• Measures of centrality of the clustering objects to identify key performance 
parameters and how they influence the distribution of the objects 
• Intensity values of the clustering objects to understand how the objects of the 
overlapping clusters fit within the clusters 
• Frequency of the clustering Objects to understand the distribution events (activities) 
within each of the clusters in the network. 
To this end, the methodology adopted in this investigation was effective in achieving the 
aim of the investigation, therefore developing the knowledge and understanding of the 
characteristics of overlapping cluster that could be applied in future work to create an 
automated EMCOS to detect and control ransomware threat.    
 
 
7.6 Conclusion and Future Works 
 
The aim of this investigation was to explore and identify the characteristics of the active 
cluster overlap to remove from a ransomware network to respond timely in the control of 
ransomware threat. In pursuit of this aim, the exploratory machine learning approach was 
applied to investigate and analyse the topological formation and evolution of the network 
clusters and cluster overlap at different cumulative periods of the ransomware time series. 
This was to identify the characteristics of the active cluster overlap to remove and at what 
stage to remove it to control a threat. The parameters that influenced the dynamics and 
structural changes were analysed and discussed. These were related to the various dynamics 
of the ransomware threat at different stages of development ranging from a period of no-
threat, on-set of threat, to full-grown threat. All the parameters used to investigate and 
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validate the consistency of the active cluster overlap node proved that the onset of the threat 
was at the cumulative period in the time series when the number of clusters was at a 
minimum prior to a phenomenal increase in the number of clusters, which was at the full-
grown threat. The threat was found to continue to persistently function within the threshold 
of this minimum and maximum number of clusters. Therefore, the removal of the active 
cluster overlap node 1 effectively dislodged the ransomware network and apparently 
controlled any intending ransomware threat. For emphasis, the experimental and exploratory 
procedures in this research shows that the concept of active cluster overlap node is 
potentially a reliable and new identifier that both enables an automated response and pro-
actively controls the attack at an earlier time-point than was evidently achieved by manual 
processes. 
 
In conclusion, the investigation has proved that a ransomware control tool built on the 
principle of the dynamics of the cluster overlap could help to bring security and relief to all 
who carry out transactions on the network.  
 
The present investigation has developed the knowledge and understanding of the formation 
and development of active overlapping cluster. The identification of the characteristics of 
the active overlapping cluster is key to the future work of developing an automated system 
to help industries to make timely decision to counter and control threat before they attack. 
Future work would focus on building an automated active cluster overlap detection and 
removal model (Exploratory Machine-Learning Cluster Overlap System – EMCOS) using 
the principles developed in the present work.  
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However, the effectiveness of the practical application of any system that is developed based 
on this principle is beyond the scope of the present study because of social, ethical, and need 
for moral network, etc.; and is left for future studies to characterize. In addition, a more 
detailed understanding of how the ransomware events join a given cluster overlap node or 
leave it to form a new one would be the focus of a future study.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: The Malware-Ransomware Timeline for the Period 1980-2017 showing names of malware 
against date of release, the dotted blue line shows the frequency for each year, while the dotted red line is 
the trend showing increased malware release over the years 
 
 
Appendix 3: Time Series Events Activities Jan2015 - May2018 
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Melissa worm 
Explore Zip
Kak worm
ILOVEYOU
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Sadmind worm 
Sircam worm
Code Red worm 
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Nimda worm 
Klez worm 
Simile virus
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Optix Pro 
SQL Slammer
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ProRat worm
Blaster 
Welchia (Nachi) 
Sobig worm 
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Sober worm 
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Mydoom
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Sasser 
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Nuclear RAT
Vundo 
Bifrost 
Santy 
Zotob
Zlob Trojan
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OSX/Leap-A 
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Storm 
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Conficker
Scareware
Macmex
Torpig
Rustock.C
Bohmini.A
Koobface
Scareware
W32.Dozer
Daprosy
MegaPanzer
Stuxnet
Waledac 
Psyb0t worm
AlureonTrojan
VBMania
Kenzero
Brian
SpyEye and Zeus
Anti-Spyware 2011
Morto worm
ZeroAccess
Duqu
Zappos
Flame
Shamoon
NGRBot
CryptoLocker
GameOver Zeus
Linux.Darlloz
Decrypt Cryptolocker
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BASHLITE
Linux.Wifatch
MEMZ
Locky
Mirai
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WannaCry 
Petya 
Xafecopy
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1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Malware-Ransomware Timeline 1980 - 2017
Period 
Time Series Events Activities Jan2015 - May2018 
Malware_N ASN_N Country_N Host_N IPAddress_N Registrar_N Status_N URL_N 
Jan2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
May2015 14 2214 306 35921 13488 2919 8 49467 
Sep2015 15 3647 504 14026 18915 1066 6 18433 
Jan2016 103 20598 3270 191934 82907 15368 51 258659 
May2016 11475 574265 62471 6052799 2155983 472868 1566 8487426 
Sep2016 22185 1538818 163316 20357444 6173588 1228925 3987 27907747 
Jan2017 48136 3033579 368912 36978444 11228061 2525873 7212 50683484 
May2017 834 24325 2697 1735947 140946 79562 334 2391980 
Sep2017 3260 189397 24273 2268704 1080715 156407 543 3079716 
Jan2018 2849 177578 23973 2132827 970512 144786 432 2918581 
May2018 14 558 102 11766 2355 445 2 16146 
Total 88885 5564979 649824 69779812 21867470 4628219 14141 95811639 
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Appendix 4: Percentages of Time Series Events Activities Jan2015 – May2018 
 
 
Appendix 5: Key Performance Parameters - General Network Item Constellation 
Plot - Node Data 2015Jun 
 
 
Appendix 6: Key Performance Parameters - General Network Item Constellation 
Plot - Node Data 2015Dec 
 
Period 
Percentages of Time Series Events Activities Jan2015 – May2018 
Malware_N ASN_N Country_N Host_N IPAddress_N Registrar_N Status_N URL_N 
Jan2015 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
May2015 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Sep2015 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Jan2016 0.12 0.37 0.50 0.28 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.27 
May2016 12.91 10.32 9.61 8.67 9.86 10.22 11.07 8.86 
Sep2016 24.96 27.65 25.13 29.17 28.23 26.55 28.19 29.13 
Jan2017 54.16 54.51 56.77 52.99 51.35 54.58 51.00 52.90 
May2017 0.94 0.44 0.42 2.49 0.64 1.72 2.36 2.50 
Sep2017 3.67 3.40 3.74 3.25 4.94 3.38 3.84 3.21 
Jan2018 3.21 3.19 3.69 3.06 4.44 3.13 3.05 3.05 
May2018 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2015Jun (Values and Percentages) 
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 Total 
Percentage (Ratio*100) 
Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 
Weight 3.10 1.00 1.83 1.00 2.00 8.93 34.70 11.19 20.52 11.19 22.39 
Out degree centrality 13.80 7.00 10.33 7.00 12.29 50.42 27.37 13.88 20.49 13.88 24.37 
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.52 0.15 0.30 0.10 0.30 1.36 37.83 11.32 21.74 7.37 21.73 
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.61 0.33 0.45 0.25 0.54 2.18 27.79 15.13 20.57 11.53 24.98 
Weighted closeness centrality 0.97 0.65 0.84 0.66 0.84 3.95 24.52 16.36 21.27 16.60 21.24 
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.67 0.57 0.61 0.57 0.63 3.04 21.97 18.62 19.95 18.62 20.83 
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 84.96 0.00 5.35 0.00 9.69 
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.08 54.91 0.00 16.34 0.00 28.75 
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.34 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.22 0.98 34.70 11.19 20.52 11.19 22.39 
Weighted influence2 centrality 4.13 2.52 3.32 1.86 3.67 15.50 26.68 16.23 21.41 12.00 23.69 
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.22 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.79 27.37 13.88 20.49 13.88 24.37 
Unweighted influence2 centrality 2.88 1.69 2.24 1.41 2.62 10.83 26.59 15.58 20.68 12.98 24.17 
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.71 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.73 4.23 16.89 23.64 18.60 23.64 17.24 
 
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2015Dec (Values and Percentages) 
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Total 
Percentages (Ratio*100) 
Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 
Weight 7.10 3.13 15.22 6.71 32.16 22.08 9.72 47.33 20.88 
Out degree centrality 15.00 13.50 21.67 17.57 67.74 22.14 19.93 31.99 25.94 
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.27 0.10 0.51 0.22 1.10 24.35 8.97 46.54 20.15 
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.54 0.49 0.74 0.65 2.42 22.38 20.42 30.58 26.62 
Weighted closeness centrality 1.83 1.40 2.49 2.08 7.80 23.51 17.92 31.90 26.67 
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.66 0.63 0.76 0.68 2.74 23.94 23.19 27.90 24.98 
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.73 0.17 99.04 0.06 
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 16.84 12.42 54.02 16.72 
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.18 0.08 0.38 0.17 0.80 22.08 9.72 47.33 20.88 
Weighted influence2 centrality 4.38 3.83 5.24 4.76 18.22 24.05 21.04 28.76 26.14 
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.24 22.14 19.93 31.99 25.94 
Unweighted influence2 centrality 1.06 0.96 1.42 1.25 4.69 22.56 20.55 30.31 26.57 
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.77 0.80 0.63 0.70 2.89 26.48 27.58 21.82 24.12 
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Appendix 7: Key Performance Parameters - General Network Item Constellation 
Plot - Node Data 2016Jun 
 
 
Appendix 8: Key Performance Parameters - General Network Item Constellation 
Plot - Node Data 2016Dec 
 
 
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data Cum 2016Jun (Values and Percentages) 
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Total 
Percentage (Ratio*100) 
Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 
Weight 440.45 359.33 304.64 1104.42 39.88 32.54 27.58 
Out degree centrality 12.55 10.50 11.27 34.32 36.56 30.60 32.85 
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.40 0.23 0.18 0.81 49.36 28.24 22.39 
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.54 0.41 0.46 1.42 38.01 29.16 32.82 
Weighted closeness centrality 144.84 122.52 116.22 383.58 37.76 31.94 30.30 
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.62 0.62 0.60 1.83 33.83 33.56 32.61 
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 94.40 5.60 
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 20.15 61.77 18.08 
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.48 42.57 31.77 25.66 
Weighted influence2 centrality 3.39 2.55 2.74 8.68 39.06 29.38 31.56 
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.56 30.60 32.85 
Unweighted influence2 centrality 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 37.53 29.18 33.29 
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.74 0.79 0.78 2.31 32.22 34.08 33.70 
 
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2016Dec (Values and Percentages) 
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 Total 
Percentage (Ratio*100) 
Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 
Weight 3360.70 2574.50 2428.50 2526.50 2984.18 13874.38 24.22 18.56 17.50 18.21 21.51 
Out degree centrality 12.50 8.00 8.00 8.50 8.00 45.00 27.78 17.78 17.78 18.89 17.78 
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.34 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.23 1.29 26.59 19.19 18.22 18.24 17.76 
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.59 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.34 2.35 25.12 19.88 19.88 20.54 14.58 
Weighted closeness centrality 1224.71 1163.85 1137.13 1144.35 1064.65 5734.70 21.36 20.29 19.83 19.95 18.57 
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.63 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.60 2.95 21.40 19.40 19.40 19.57 20.23 
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 27.28 0.65 0.65 1.65 69.76 
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.70 27.98 17.41 16.59 17.04 20.98 
Weighted influence2 centrality 3.52 3.27 3.27 3.29 2.37 15.72 22.39 20.81 20.77 20.93 15.10 
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.78 17.78 17.78 18.89 17.78 
Unweighted influence2 centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 23.34 20.59 20.59 20.96 14.51 
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.77 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.83 4.36 17.61 21.28 21.28 20.92 18.92 
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Appendix 9: Key Performance Parameters - General Network Item Constellation 
Plot - Node Data 2017Jun 
 
 
Appendix 10: Key Performance Parameters - General Network Item Constellation 
Plot - Node Data 2017Dec 
 
 
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2017Jun (Values and Percentages) 
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Total 
Percentage (Ratio*100) 
Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 
Weight 3490.73 2978.28 2706.00 2601.00 11776.01 29.64 25.29 22.98 22.09 
Out degree centrality 12.36 7.67 8.00 8.00 36.03 34.31 21.28 22.20 22.20 
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.34 0.22 0.25 0.25 1.06 32.01 21.00 23.84 23.15 
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.59 0.34 0.47 0.47 1.87 31.35 18.42 25.12 25.12 
Weighted closeness centrality 1264.08 1085.62 1205.06 1187.57 4742.33 26.66 22.89 25.41 25.04 
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.57 2.36 26.59 25.03 24.19 24.19 
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.05 27.95 70.64 0.70 0.70 
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.59 33.21 24.29 21.52 20.98 
Weighted influence2 centrality 3.52 2.40 3.30 3.30 12.53 28.12 19.18 26.36 26.34 
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.31 21.28 22.20 22.20 
Unweighted influence2 centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 29.20 18.57 26.11 26.11 
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.76 0.87 0.93 0.93 3.49 21.91 24.84 26.62 26.62 
 
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2017Dec (Values and Percentages) 
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 Total 
Percentage (Ratio*100) 
Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 
Weight 3774.80 2842.50 2775.00 2679.50 3256.88 15328.68 24.63 18.54 18.10 17.48 21.25 
Out degree centrality 12.50 8.00 8.00 8.00 7.71 44.21 28.28 18.10 18.10 18.10 17.43 
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 1.29 27.13 19.08 19.11 17.30 17.38 
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.59 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.34 2.34 25.37 20.17 20.17 19.88 14.41 
Weighted closeness centrality 1363.20 1285.83 1273.39 1241.29 1169.74 6333.45 21.52 20.30 20.11 19.60 18.47 
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.63 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.59 2.94 21.46 19.45 19.45 19.46 20.18 
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 27.33 0.65 0.65 1.77 69.61 
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.70 28.57 17.40 17.51 16.01 20.51 
Weighted influence2 centrality 3.53 3.29 3.29 3.23 2.34 15.67 22.53 20.97 20.97 20.61 14.92 
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.28 18.10 18.10 18.10 17.43 
Unweighted influence2 centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 23.49 20.88 20.88 20.38 14.36 
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.77 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.85 4.39 17.45 21.13 21.13 20.86 19.43 
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Appendix 11: Key Performance Parameters - General Network Item Constellation 
Plot - Node Data 2018Jun 
 
 
  
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2018Jun (Values and Percentages) 
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 Total 
Percentage (Ratio*100) 
Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5 
Weight 3778.30 2843.50 2781.50 2682.50 3261.12 15346.92 24.62 18.53 18.12 17.48 21.25 
Out degree centrality 12.50 8.00 8.00 8.00 7.71 44.21 28.28 18.10 18.10 18.10 17.43 
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 1.29 27.11 19.06 19.13 17.30 17.39 
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.59 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.34 2.34 25.37 20.17 20.17 19.88 14.41 
Weighted closeness centrality 1364.85 1286.86 1275.52 1242.71 1171.08 6341.01 21.52 20.29 20.12 19.60 18.47 
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.63 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.59 2.94 21.46 19.45 19.45 19.46 20.18 
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 27.33 0.65 0.65 1.77 69.61 
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.70 28.56 17.39 17.52 16.01 20.52 
Weighted influence2 centrality 3.53 3.28 3.29 3.23 2.34 15.67 22.53 20.97 20.97 20.61 14.92 
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.28 18.10 18.10 18.10 17.43 
Unweighted influence2 centrality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 23.49 20.88 20.88 20.38 14.36 
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.77 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.85 4.39 17.45 21.13 21.13 20.86 19.43 
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Appendix 12: Key Performance Parameters General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2015Jun 
 
 
Appendix 13: Key Performance Parameters General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2015Dec 
 
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2015Jun
Clusters
Parameters (Av. Values) Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5
Weight 3.1000 1.0000 1.8333 1.0000 2.0000
Out degree centrality 13.8000 7.0000 10.3333 7.0000 12.2857
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.5159 0.1544 0.2965 0.1005 0.2964
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.6056 0.3297 0.4483 0.2512 0.5443
Weighted closeness centrality 0.9686 0.6463 0.8400 0.6557 0.8389
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.6676 0.5660 0.6065 0.5660 0.6332
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.0730 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.0083
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.0437 0.0000 0.0130 0.0000 0.0229
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.3391 0.1094 0.2005 0.1094 0.2188
Weighted influence2 centrality 4.1344 2.5156 3.3177 1.8594 3.6719
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.2156 0.1094 0.1615 0.1094 0.1920
Unweighted influence2 centrality 2.8797 1.6875 2.2396 1.4063 2.6183
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.7144 1.0000 0.7869 1.0000 0.7293
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2015Dec
Clusters
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5
Weight 7.1000 3.1250 15.2222 6.7143
Out degree centrality 15.0000 13.5000 21.6667 17.5714
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.2679 0.0986 0.5121 0.2217
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.5424 0.4948 0.7409 0.6451
Weighted closeness centrality 1.8334 1.3978 2.4876 2.0804
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.6554 0.6348 0.7638 0.6840
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.0007 0.0002 0.0918 0.0001
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.0100 0.0074 0.0321 0.0099
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.1775 0.0781 0.3806 0.1679
Weighted influence2 centrality 4.3825 3.8344 5.2417 4.7643
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.0536 0.0482 0.0774 0.0628
Unweighted influence2 centrality 1.0582 0.9638 1.4218 1.2464
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.7651 0.7967 0.6304 0.6967
194 
 
Appendix 14: Key Performance Parameters General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2016Jun 
 
 
Appendix 15: Key Performance Parameters General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2016Dec 
 
 
 
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2016Jun
Clusters
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3
Weight 440.4545 359.3333 304.6364
Out degree centrality 12.5455 10.5000 11.2727
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.3998 0.2287 0.1813
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.5386 0.4132 0.4650
Weighted closeness centrality 144.8393 122.5194 116.2239
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.6207 0.6157 0.5983
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.0000 0.0754 0.0045
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.0125 0.0382 0.0112
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.2055 0.1534 0.1239
Weighted influence2 centrality 3.3921 2.5515 2.7408
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.0010 0.0008 0.0009
Unweighted influence2 centrality 0.0165 0.0128 0.0146
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.7444 0.7873 0.7786
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2016Dec
Clusters
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5
Weight 3360.7000 2574.5000 2428.5000 2526.5000 2984.1765
Out degree centrality 12.5000 8.0000 8.0000 8.5000 8.0000
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.3422 0.2471 0.2346 0.2348 0.2287
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.5899 0.4669 0.4669 0.4823 0.3423
Weighted closeness centrality 1224.7076 1163.8538 1137.1322 1144.3490 1064.6544
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.6305 0.5714 0.5714 0.5766 0.5958
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0543
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.0140 0.0003 0.0003 0.0008 0.0358
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.1966 0.1223 0.1165 0.1197 0.1474
Weighted influence2 centrality 3.5210 3.2717 3.2659 3.2909 2.3741
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Unweighted influence2 centrality 0.0019 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0012
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.7683 0.9286 0.9286 0.9127 0.8257
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Appendix 16: Key Performance Parameters General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2017Jun 
 
 
Appendix 17: General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2017Dec 
 
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2017Jun
Clusters
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4
Weight 3490.7273 2978.2778 2706.0000 2601.0000
Out degree centrality 12.3636 7.6667 8.0000 8.0000
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.3399 0.2229 0.2532 0.2458
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.5860 0.3443 0.4695 0.4695
Weighted closeness centrality 1264.0788 1085.6217 1205.0628 1187.5655
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.6280 0.5912 0.5714 0.5714
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.0000 0.0512 0.0000 0.0000
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.0134 0.0338 0.0003 0.0003
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.1944 0.1422 0.1260 0.1228
Weighted influence2 centrality 3.5249 2.4037 3.3039 3.3008
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Unweighted influence2 centrality 0.0018 0.0012 0.0016 0.0016
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.7643 0.8665 0.9286 0.9286
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2017Dec
Clusters
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5
Weight 3774.8000 2842.5000 2775.0000 2679.5000 3256.8824
Out degree centrality 12.5000 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000 7.7059
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.3499 0.2461 0.2465 0.2232 0.2243
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.5930 0.4714 0.4714 0.4648 0.3368
Weighted closeness centrality 1363.1984 1285.8315 1273.3897 1241.2872 1169.7447
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.6305 0.5714 0.5714 0.5716 0.5930
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0542
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.0142 0.0003 0.0003 0.0009 0.0361
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.2004 0.1221 0.1228 0.1123 0.1439
Weighted influence2 centrality 3.5297 3.2853 3.2860 3.2289 2.3375
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Unweighted influence2 centrality 0.0017 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0010
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.7668 0.9286 0.9286 0.9167 0.8538
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Appendix 18: General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2018Jun 
 
 
Appendix 19: The Malware-Ransomware Timeline for the Period 1980-2017 showing names of malware 
against date of release, the dotted blue line shows the frequency for each year, while the dotted red line is 
the trend showing increased malware release over the years 
  
General Network Item Constellation Plot - Node Data 2018Jun 
Clusters
Parameters Clust 1 Clust 2 Clust 3 Clust 4 Clust 5
Weight 3778.3000 2843.5000 2781.5000 2682.5000 3261.1176
Out degree centrality 12.5000 8.0000 8.0000 8.0000 7.7059
Weighted eigenvector centrality 0.3498 0.2459 0.2468 0.2232 0.2243
Unweighted eigenvector centrality 0.5930 0.4714 0.4714 0.4648 0.3368
Weighted closeness centrality 1364.8501 1286.8553 1275.5178 1242.7077 1171.0776
Unweighted closeness centrality 0.6305 0.5714 0.5714 0.5716 0.5930
Weighted betweenness centrality 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0542
Unweighted betweenness centrality 0.0142 0.0003 0.0003 0.0009 0.0361
Weighted influence1 centrality 0.2003 0.1220 0.1229 0.1123 0.1439
Weighted influence2 centrality 3.5292 3.2849 3.2859 3.2285 2.3377
Unweighted influence1 centrality 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Unweighted influence2 centrality 0.0017 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0010
Clustering coefficient centrality 0.7668 0.9286 0.9286 0.9167 0.8538
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Appendix 20: Performance of Android Forensics Data Recovery Tools 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Smart mobile devices, particularly smartphones, are increasingly popular in today's 
Internet-connected society [1–4]. For example, few years ago in 2010, shipments of 
smartphone grew by 74% to 295 million units [3,4]. Unsurprisingly, sales of smartphones 
have been increasing since then [5,6], and it has been estimated that 1.5 billion smartphones 
will be sold by 2017 and 1 billion mobile subscribers by 2022 [7–15]. 
Such devices are generally used to make phone calls, send SMS messages, web browsing, 
locate places of interests, map navigation, image and video capture, entertainment (e.g., 
gaming and lifestyle), business and economic transactions (e.g., internet banking), take 
notes, create and view documents, etc. [6,16–18]. Due to their widespread adoption in 
corporate businesses, these devices are a rich source of information (e.g., corporate data and 
intellectual property) [19–22]. The potential to target such devices for criminal activities 
(e.g., malware such as banking Trojans) or be used as an attack launch pad (e.g., used to 
gain unauthorized access to corporate data) [19,23–29], makes it important to ensure that 
we have the capability to conduct a thorough investigation of such devices [22,30,31,18,32–
35]. 
While there are a small number of forensic tools that can be used in the forensic 
investigation of smart mobile devices [36], the extent to which data can be recovered varies, 
particularly given the wide range of mobile devices and the constant evolution of mobile 
operating systems and hardware [37,38]. For example, recovering data from the internal 
memory of a smartphone remains a challenge [34,39,40]. Further to these challenges is the 
requirement to create forensically sound and effective tools and procedures [36,20,41]. 
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Therefore, it is essential that the forensic community keeps pace with forensic solutions for 
smart mobile devices [42,43,2–4]. This is the focus of this chapter. Specifically, we study 
the effectiveness of five popular mobile forensics tools, namely: Phone Image Carver, 
AccessData FTK (Forensic Tools Kit), Foremost, Recover My Files, and DiskDigger, in 
recovering evidential data from a factory-restored Samsung Galaxy Note 3 running Android 
Jelly Bean version 4.3. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 outlines 
the methodology and our experiment setup. Section 4 presents our findings, and Section 5 
concludes this chapter. 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
The present investigation is conducted based on the current acquisition method on 
smartphones and the extent of available forensic techniques and tools on the analysis of 
evidence. Smartphones have many profound sections of where and how evidence is 
collected when it is dealing with a crime occurrence [44]. Therefore with the ever- 
increasing features and utility, it becomes much more complicated to collect evidences from 
a smartphone [43,45]. Consequently, there are different acquisition methods on different 
architectures and software that a smartphone operates on [18,39]. These differences in the 
architecture make it extremely difficult to perform similar acquisition method on different 
devices and operating systems [23]. However, NIST created guidelines for Computer 
Forensics Tools Testing (CFTT) to provide for the differences in architecture [45]. 
Therefore mobile device forensics has been defined as the science of recovering digital 
evidence from a mobile device under forensically sound conditions using accepted methods. 
Notwithstanding, mobile device forensics is considered an evolving specialty in the field of 
digital forensics [23,25]. The procedures for the validation, preservation, acquisition, 
examination, analysis, and reporting of digital information had been discussed [25]. 
Although there had been an established program and guidelines, mobile device forensics, 
like any other evolving field, still has its own forensics challenges [26]. Evolvement on 
different areas of usage for mobile phones provides even further challenges in their 
investigation. For example, investigation of cloud applications on mobile phones [44,46–
48], malwares on smartphones, [49–51], and investigating mobile phones as part of botnets 
[52] and SCADA [53] systems are all challenging forensics research areas. In view of the 
evolving nature of mobile device forensics, it is suggested that forensic practitioners who 
rely primarily on general-purpose mobile forensic toolkits might find that no single forensic 
tool could recover all relevant evidence data from a device [6]. Therefore researchers are 
working to establish the best forensic tools and procedures that are reliable for mobile 
device's investigation [27,31,33,46,54]. 
Investigations conducted in the field of mobile device forensics still show variations in 
research opinions on the effectiveness and reliability of different forensic tools when applied 
to different mobile device architectures [23]. The removal of internal memories from a 
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mobile device or their mirroring procedure is evasive and complex because of difficulties 
in having direct hardware access [16]. To resolve such challenges, five mobile device 
forensic scenarios were studied; and a method to perform data acquisition of an Android 
smartphone regardless of the architecture was proposed. The method was validated using 
Motorola Milestone II A953, Sony Ericson Xperia X10 miniPro, Motorola Defy, Samsung 
Galaxy S 9000a, Motorola II, and Motorola Milestone A853 [16]. These architecture-based 
difficulties were confirmed by investigating Symbian- and Windows-based mobile devices 
[23]; which revealed that tools for forensic investigation of smartphone mobile devices 
always would pose challenges in forensic investigation because of the continual evolving 
nature of the technology [23,40]. The data recovery capabilities of EnCase, FTK, Recuva, 
R-Studio, and Stellar Phoenix from a desktop Windows XP were compared [36]. The 
comparison revealed that EnCase, FTK, Recuva, and R-Studio performed identically when 
recovering marker files from most images [36,53]. The experiment showed also that Stellar 
Phoenix corrupted two bytes in each of two text files (even when these files had not been 
deleted) and added a padding of zeroes at the end of another file that had not been deleted 
[36]. Nonetheless, the study concluded that no two tools produced identical results [36]. 
Further to this, a different study conducted on Samsung Star 3G phone used TK file Explorer 
2.2, MOBILedit 4, and Samsung PC studio for logical acquisition of different data files for 
analysis, and this was to create a framework for forensic investigation of Samsung Star 3G 
device [17]. Evidence collection and analysis conducted on a Nexus 4 phone discovered a 
flaw that allowed access to all data on the device without a device wipe that occurs when 
the bootloader is unlocked [55]. The challenges of smartphone forensics continue to expand 
even with the emergence of Linux-based Firefox OS, which has no procedure yet for 
forensic investigation [56]. 
To ensure a sound forensic investigation, care should be taken to preserve and retrieve the 
volatile data inside the memory of the mobile device [47]; hence, a backup and acquisition 
process was proposed to work on windows mobile phones, android mobile phones, and 
iPhones [47]. The recovery of information held on a Windows Mobile smartphone was 
investigated using different approaches to acquisition and decoding, accepting AccessData 
FTK and DD imagers. The investigation concluded that no one technique recovers all 
information of potential forensic interest from the device [35]. Further work on mobile 
device forensics shows that a diverse collection of smartphone forensic tools has been 
introduced; however, these studies do not guarantee data integrity, which is required for 
digital forensic investigation [48]. Therefore, Android device acquisition utilizing Recovery 
Mode was investigated to analyze the Android device Recovery Mode variables that 
compromise data integrity at the time of acquisition. Consequently, an Android data 
acquisition tool that ensures integrity of acquired data was developed [48]. It was noted 
there was not yet specific procedures or rules to collect evidence from a smartphone [7]. 
Therefore, forensic investigators use existing procedures in the acquisition of digital 
evidence [7]. Furthermore, it was suggested that the relative amount of important evidence 
that could be gathered from the smartphone differ based on different versions of software 
system that runs on the smartphone. However, nothing was done on the acquisition of 
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evidence on a formatted android device—where it was claimed that all data and applications 
were erased [7]. 
The challenges of data recovery for forensic investigation extend to cloud computing 
environment [46]. Therefore, utilizing TPM in hypervisor [42], implementing multifactor 
authentication and updating the cloud service provider policy to provide persistent storage 
devices are proposed to overcome the difficulties in Cloud forensics [51,57]; which include 
limited access to obtain evidence from the cloud, seizure of physical evidence for integrity 
validation, evidence presentation, or rulings on data saved in different locations [46]. In a 
cloud-related forensic investigation, Guidance Encase and AccessData forensic Toolkit 
were evaluated; and the tools show that they can successfully return volatile and nonvolatile 
data from the cloud [50]. Thus, a foundation is laid for the development of new acquisition 
methods for the cloud that will be trustworthy and forensically sound [50]. To ensure a 
reliable cloud-based forensic investigation, a step-by-step technique for evidence data 
collection was proposed [55]. There was a review of 7 years of research into forensic 
investigation of various smartphone mobile device platforms, data acquisition scheme and 
information recovery methods in order to provide comprehensive reference material to 
enhance future research [33]. Prior to the advancement of forensic tools, the traditional 
method of memory acquisition focused on the physical memory. This procedure most often 
requires the removal of the memory chip from the chipboard. These methods put valuable 
evidence at risk because during the removal process there might be loss or damage of 
essential evidence. 
Emphasizing on the need for accurate and reliable forensic tools and procedures, there was 
a warning against unfair application of wrong forensic techniques and evidence to secure 
conviction in fervour of the prosecution [52]. Notably, some challenging areas include 
“erroneous allegations of knowledgeable possession, misuse of time stamps and metadata, 
control and observation of the discovery process.” Other challenging areas include 
“authentication issues, deficiencies and the lack of verification for proprietary software tools, 
deliberate omission or obfuscation of exculpatory evidence and inadvertent risks resulting 
from the use of legitimate services” [52]. 
The foregoing review shows there is need to investigate the recovery performance of Phone 
Image Carver, AccessData FTK, Foremost, Recover My Files, and DiskDigger from FTK 
and DD images acquired from Android mobile smartphones. 
3. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
 
In our experiments, we used the popular Samsung Galaxy S2 i9100 as the case study device. 
The device has an internal memory of 16 GB, random access memory (RAM) of 1 GB, 
running Android Gingerbread version 2.3.4 operating system (OS) (Android OS, Ice Cream 
Sandwich version 4.0.3). The focus of our study was on the internal memory; thus, no 
memory card was inserted in the phone. Prior to the experiments, the phone was preloaded 
with Enron dataset [58–64], which is considered similar to data collected for fraud detection. 
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Therefore, it is a good dataset for the present investigation. The device was subsequently 
factory reset before taking images on the phone (see Fig. 1). The reason for factory resetting 
the phone was to wipe all preloaded data and investigate the effectiveness of the forensic 
tools in recovering the data erased from the device. 
Fig. 1 shows that two different image acquisition processes, logical and physical image 
acquisition, were conducted after the device was restored to default factory state. AFLogical 
forensic tool was used for logical Image acquisition on the formatted disk (device). The tool 
captures the call-log calls, contacts phones, MMS, MMS-Parts, and SMS, which were 
contained in the preloaded Enron dataset. It stores this information in a zip folder named 
forensics.zip within the device itself. The .zip folder contains .csv files, which hold the logs 
of the device. 
 
FIG. 1 Schematic representation of processes conducted on the case study device. 
However, when opened .cvs files show blank suggesting that logical acquisition of data is 
not executable in a reformatted device. Comparing to another investigation, analysis of 
logical image, bb file, from Blackberry PlayBook device did not produce direct data files of 
user activity. However, it produced some key files that can assist to further trace device 
usage [33,53,65]. Related studies confirm also that Encase and FTK forensic tools could not 
recover all data from NTFS-formatted logical disk partitions [34,52]. 
On the other hand, AccessData FTK Imager 3.1.3.2 and Backtrack dd Imager were used for 
physical acquisition of images. Subsequently, Phone Image (Carver v1.6.0), AccessData 
FTK, Foremost, DiskDigger, and Recover My Files (v4.7.2) were employed to analyze the 
two different physical images. 
During the image creation process using AccessData FTK Imager 3.1.3.2, the backup option 
was not selected. This was to ensure that no backup data was available. The physical 
memory of the device was imaged and analyzed using several tools. The resulting image 
revealed that the tool created only 2.227 GB image file compared to the 16 GB physical 
memory capacity of the device. This means that AccessData FTK imager recovered only 
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14% of the device memory capacity. The imager separated the physical drive into eight 
images. The size of the first seven images is 1.46 GB and the eighth image is 767 MB. This 
experiment compares with another study where AccessData FTK Imager recovered a higher 
average of 86.4% of the physical disk capacity from the various image segments [34]. 
Another image was acquired from the case study device using .dd imager in Backtrack. This 
tool converts the memory into a disk dump. Similar to the acquisition of image using 
AccessData, the dd imager used command line prompt in Backtrack dd Imager without any 
filter. The image size converted by this tool shows only 11 GB of the 16 GB memory 
capacity of the device, which translates to 68.75% recovery of the device capacity. The 
remaining memory was ignored due to slack spaces, which is the disk space between the 
end of the file content and the end of the last cluster in which the file is saved [34]. Two 
types of disk dumps were created after imaging the device. One of the disk dumps uses the 
access data FTK images, while the other uses backtrack dd image. Subsequently, several 
recovery tools were used to perform analysis on the images to determine the effectiveness 
of these tools. Prior to analysis, validation checks were conducted on the images using hash 
calculation for integrity checking [48] as shown in Table 1. Image numbers S2.001–S2.008 
in column one of Table 1 are the validation and integrity check identification numbers for 
each of the eight images acquired by AccessData FTK imager. DD, on the other hand is the 
validation and integrity check ID number for the DD image that was acquired as a single 
image. The corresponding MD5 sums and SHA1 values are given in columns two and three 
of Table 1. 
   TABLE 1 validation and Integrity Check of Images 
Image MD5 SHA1 
S2.001 df14a97ed884e959f79d718a4a3e8de0 838f1291740988d86e2b2b22625646e20e9e535a 
S2.002 334bc971671ad78a09abadd81aa2419f aa42e0269f4cb2fd53b065f0aea56823fb770d88 
S2.003 53393c41f197b08a693db24600b2eab1 35cc22977e11e6c966c569260812fde04471401e 
S2.004 4396a40fb1825166db005e39d211b5a8 fecb8eabff34ea01ad4a84cc283625af5ca0319f 
S2.005 6e9a8fc2cc1235da1d33a51d73a53c30 1b03158408ae5e567d6a7e27993ab46ecd8fe686 
S2.006 Ab49d0350af243d6d3d6df1791adb58f Eb7a722cc1b14fc8bdf06c81390df45ab34f5a50 
S2.007 35d8479c1dc29edacb33ad9dcaa07d5b Eac0ba1a3e4e8ef8b0195ab682081c4d12d9d36e 
S2.008 01a5c72710d2223d012e8e7b71e9055c C782fb92564990314de7baefa2db748ac186aa7b 
DD 1eeac023329e6d70ffcc78e7230c1ca7 76ae66d29894ae6b21f73bac87578c9dd1202c77 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Two types of image acquisition namely logical image and physical image acquisition were 
conducted. AFLogical was used to acquire the logical disk image. The tool captures the 
calllog calls, contacts phones, MMS, MMS-Parts, and SMS that were contained in the 
preloaded Enron dataset. It stores this information in a zip folder named forensics.zip within 
the device itself. The .zip folder contains .csv files that holds the logs of the device. However, 
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when opened the .cvs files show blank suggesting that logical acquisition of data is not 
executable in a reformatted device. This revelation agrees with particularly the respective 
findings of Buchanan-Wollaston and Mercuri. The blank .cvs files confirm that Encase and 
FTK were unable to recover some data from NTFS-formatted logical disk partitions, except 
by further procedure where the data acquired must be decoded [33–35,52,66]. 
Earlier on AccessData image and backtrack dd image were acquired for the physical disk 
of the device. The content of the FTK Image and BackTrack dd image of the target Samsung 
Mobile device were loaded on different forensic tools. Three different tools namely, Phone 
Image Carver v. 1.6.0, AccessData FTK (Forensic ToolKit 1.81.3), and dd Image FTK were 
used to analyze the images. 
 
TABLE 2 Recovered Files Format using Phone Image Carver 
    File Format    
FTK image DocX HTML JPG MP3 SQLite SWF Flash Text Text UTF-16 Text-Shift-JIS Zip 
Backtrack dd image DocX HTML JPG MP3 SQLite SWF Flash Text Text UTF-16 Text-Shift-JIS Zip 
 
Table 2 shows the various files format recovered from the images using Phone Image carver. 
Phone Image Carver recovered evidence of many different formats of data, confirming that 
Phone Image Carver supports over 300 file types [35]. The present experiment supports the 
finding which suggests that .docx files were the only Office documents detected. However, 
it disagrees that Phone Image Carver did not detect .jpg files [35]. This study reveals that 
utilizing Phone Image Carver tool is extremely time-consuming and not efficient; 
suggesting that it is not suitable for real investigation. Phone Image Carver tool does not list 
out the deleted files according to file formats, however the information still exists within 
the image. It was noted that Phone Image Carver does not permit addition of further file 
types to its database, meaning that a number of file types from the data set would not be 
detected [35]. An additional feature of Phone Image Carver tool is that the activities 
performed in it are recorded in a log file. This offers a great opportunity for the analyst to 
go back and review his steps each time he uses Phone Image Carver tool. 
The FTK and dd images acquired in Section 3 were analyzed using AccessData FTK. 
Analysis revealed that 12 [12] categories of files were recovered from each of the two 
images as shown in Fig. 2. 
Fig. 2 shows minor differences in the recovery function of both FTK and dd images from 
the same restored device. The recovered files in Fig. 2 reveals that different images from 
different acquisition tools give different depth of evidence recovered in the analysis [34]. 
While FTK Image recovered total file items of 926, dd Image recovered far less number of 
530 when the same FTK tool was used on both images (Tables 3 and 4). It is clear that 
entries in some of the file items are the same, some with zero entries (no recovery); however, 
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few others show significant differences between both images. Worthy of note are the entries 
under FTK Image for “Unchecked items (926), Other thumbnails (18) and Filtered in (926).” 
The analysis shows the corresponding entries for dd Image are lower, except for graphics 
and other thumbnails where dd Image and FTK Image recovered virtually equal numbers of 
files. This suggests that dd images provide negligently better recovery for graphic and 
thumbnail files. However, both images recorded similar values under File Status and File 
Category, except for Slack/free space where FTK Image had significantly higher value (869) 
than dd Image (471). The analysis suggests that in the event of recoverable evidences from 
slack spaces, FTK image gives more recovery files than dd image. In other words, slack 
spaces could contain deleted files, deleted file fragments, and hidden data [54,56]. The 
negative side of it is that recovering from it could result in a waste of time if there were no 
recoverable evidence in the slack spaces. It is worthy to note that files were not recovered 
from FTK Image 8, which contains the Slack/free spaces. On the percentage file recovery 
of FTK Image, Mercuri noted that CFTT Program tests revealed defects in the hard disk 
image preparation process on Windows XP OS [34,52]. Taken into account, the analysis 
revealed that defect might still have some drawback on the performance of FTK as an 
imager in the present study on smartphone. 
 
File formats recovered from FTK & DD images using AccessData FTK 
FIG. 2 Recovery and analysis of data from both FTK and dd images using FTK forensic 
toolkit. 
 
TABLE 3 FTk Image Result using FTk 
 
File Items No File Status No File Category No 
Total file items 926 KFF Alert Files  0 Documents   3 
Checked items   0 Bookmarked items  0 Spreadsheets   0 
Unchecked items 926 Bad extension 18 Databases   0 
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Flagged thumbnails   0 Encrypted files  0 Graphics  18 
Other thumbnails  18 From email  0 Multimedia   1 
Filtered in 926 Deleted files  2 Email messages   0 
Filtered out   0 From recycle bin  0 Executables   0 
    Duplicate items  2 Archives   0 
    OLE subitems  0 Folders  28 
    Flagged ignore  0 Slack/free space 869 
    KFF ignorable  0 Other known type   0 
    Data carved files  0 Unknown type   7 
 
 
TABLE 4 dd Image Result using FTk 
File Items No File Status No File Category No 
Total file items 530 KFF alert files   0 Documents   3 
Checked items   0 Bookmarked items   0 Spreadsheets   0 
Unchecked items 530 Bad extension 20 Databases   0 
Flagged thumbnails   0 Encrypted files   0 Graphics  20 
Other thumbnails  20 From email   0 Multimedia   1 
Filtered in 530 Deleted files   2 Email messages   0 
Filtered out   0 From recycle bin   0 Executables   0 
    Duplicate items   2 Archives   0 
    OLE subitems   0 Folders  28 
    Flagged ignore   0 Slack/free space 471 
    KFF ignorable   0 Other known type   0 
    Data carved files   0 Unknown type   7 
 
Further analysis was conducted on the FTK and Backtrack dd Images using Foremost in 
Backtrack forensic tool. The FTK Images (1–8) were analyzed in segments, the way they 
were imaged. Fig. 3 shows the numbers of various file formats recovered from the two 
images. 
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FIG. 3 Number of data files recovered from FTK and dd images using Foremost in 
Backtrack. 
 
Unlike AccessData FTK, analysis conducted using Foremost showed format-specific files 
from both images. Apparently, Foremost recovered similar types of files from the two 
images, particularly, bmp, docx/doc, gif, html, movie, pdf, ppt/pptx, wav, xls/xlsx, and zip. 
The analysis showed that both images recovered the largest number of jpeg and png files. 
While analysis in Foremost showed that FTK image recovered 6362 jpeg and 7192 png files, 
dd image on the other hand recovered 6939 and 7810, respectively. The large number of 
graphics analyzed (recovered) suggests that the slack spaces contain more deleted graphic 
files, therefore foremost performed better in recovering them [54]. However, analysis in 
Foremost revealed a higher number of files from dd Image than it did from FTK image for 
jpeg/jpg, mp4, and png. Compared to the AccessData FTK, Foremost analyzed a higher 
number of file types. The recovery of high number of file types could be a result of high-
performance of Foremost tool. The absence of slack/free spaces in the analysis suggests that 
Foremost performed better in recovering all deleted files, deleted file fragments, and hidden 
data files that were present in the slack/ free spaces of the images, which AccessData FTK 
could not recover as shown in Fig. 2 [54,56]. 
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File formats recovered from FTK & DD Images using Foremost 
FIG. 4 Data file sizes recovered from FTK and dd images using Foremost in Backtrack. 
 
The large sizes of data file shown in Fig. 4 further corroborates the suggestion that Foremost 
recovered deleted files, deleted files fragments, and perhaps hidden files that might be 
contained in the slack/free spaces which AccessData FTK could not recover as shown in 
Fig. 2 [54]. Comparing the data file sizes with the number of files recovered in Fig. 3, it is 
evident that Foremost forensic tool recovered more data from Backtrack dd Image than it 
recovered from FTK Image. This suggests also that Foremost forensic tool performs better 
in analyzing data files from Backtrack dd Image than FTK Image. The analysis reveals also 
that the zip, jpeg, mp4, png, and pdf files were the files most recovered using Foremost 
forensic tool. This result shows that Foremost performs better than AccessData FTK in 
recovering files from FTK and dd images, particularly dd image of a restored Android 
mobile smartphone device. 
The next forensic tool to use in the analysis of the two images (FTK and dd acquired images) 
was Recover My Files version 4.2.7. The result of the analysis is shown in Fig. 5. The 
number of data files recovered from the two images shows no differences in the performance 
of Recover My Files as a forensic tool. The tool recovered 16,756 files from the FTK image, 
which is comparable with 16,758 files recovered from Backtrack dd image. 
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FIG. 5 Number of data files formats recovered from FTK and dd images using Recover 
My Files. 
The results show also that jpeg, myob, png, mp3, pdf, html, and amr audio files were the 
most recovered in the order of listing. The tool has shown to recover more file formats and 
showed no slack/free space. The additional file formats it recovered include 3gp, amr audio, 
avi, chrome cache, itunes, mp3, myob, ogg, tif, spss, text UTF-16, thumbnails, and truetype. 
Similarity in the recovery function of Recover My Files on the two images is revealed 
further in Fig. 6. It is evident in Fig. 6 that the tool recovered equal sizes of data files from 
both FTK and dd images. The tool recovered 7.37 GB of data files for each file image 
confirming that mov, zip, jpeg, myob, mp3, avi, png, and pdf are among the most recovered 
files format. 
Comparing Recover My File and Foremost in Figs. 7 and 8, the results show that Foremost 
recovered 14,762 and 15,985 data files from FTK and dd images respectively while Recover 
My File recovered 16,756 and 16,758 data files respectively from the same images. This 
recovery performance is repeated in the size of data files recovered, where Foremost 
recovered 2.35 and 2.38 GB of data files from FTK and dd images. On the other hand, 
Recover My File recovered 7.37 and 7.39 GB data files respectively from the same FTK 
and dd images. 
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Data file formats recovered using Recover My Files 
FIG. 6 Sizes of data files recovered from FTK and dd images using Recover My Files. 
 
 
FIG. 7 Number of files recovered between Foremost and Recover My File. 
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FIG. 8 Size of files recovered between Foremost and Recover My File. 
 
Both the number and size of data files recovered could elaborate the huge difference in the 
recovery functions of the two forensic tools. While results show that foremost recovered 
large number of data files formats in jpeg (6939), png (7810), pdf (533), and hmtl (242) for 
FTK and dd Images, Recover my File recovered an average of jpeg (7139), myob (3179), 
png (2502), mp3 (2398), pdf (537), and html (408). Similarly, Foremost recovered an 
average size in jpeg (0.582 GB), zip (1.27 GB), mp4 (0.17 GB), pdf (0.162 GB), and png 
(0.165), while Recover My File recovered some phenomenal sizes in mov (1.98 GB), zip 
(1.75 GB), jpeg (1.6 GB), myob (1.28 GB), mp3 (0.2329 GB), and avi (0.1651 GB) for the 
two images. These analyzes reveal that Recover My File is more effective than Foremost in 
recovering data files from FTK and dd images of a restored device. 
The superior performance of Recover My File over Phone Carver image, AccessData FTK 
and Foremost was exciting. Therefore, one more analysis was conducted on the acquired 
FTK and Backtrack dd Images using DiskDigger forensic tool. The analyzes are shown in 
Fig. 9. 
Fig. 9 reveals that DiskDigger recovered also many different data files format. What is 
interesting here is that DiskDigger recovered equal number of data files from both FTK and 
DD Images. The figure shows that the largest numbers of files recovered from both images 
are from jpeg (7,178), tif (6939), png (2502), and mp3 audio (2398) files in the listed order. 
It is important to observe that DiskDigger tool did not record any slack/free space. This 
implies that the tool made deep recovery of all files in the two images. The distribution of 
the number of recovered data files (see Fig. 9) corresponds to the sizes of data files 
recovered from the images (see Fig. 10). 
As shown in Fig. 10, the zip folder recorded the largest data file sizes, while jpeg, tif, mp3, 
avi, and mp3 followed in the same order. 
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FIG. 9 FTK and DD image analysis of number of data files using DiskDigger tool. 
 
FIG. 10 FTK and DD image analysis of size of data files using DiskDigger tool. 
 
The results in Fig. 10 suggest that Recover My File and DiskDigger show better recovery 
performance than Phone Image Carver and AccessData FTK. Although DiskDigger 
recovered 15 different file formats, Recover My File recovered 25 file formats, indicating a 
better deep recovery performance. However, DiskDigger recovered a greater total number 
of files (20,145) for both Images than the total number of files (16,758) recovered by 
Recover My File as shown in Fig. 11. The greater number of data files recovered from 
DiskDigger comes from the number of .tif files (6939) for both FTK and dd Images, which 
Recover My File did not recover. 
Comparing Recover My File and DiskDigger in terms of data file size, it is clear that 
Recover My File recovered a larger file size (7.387 GB) than the data file size (4.596 GB) 
recovered by DiskDigger shown in Fig. 12. This difference is explained by the larger 
number of file formats recovered by Recover My File. These additional file formats and 
sizes (MB) include, amr audio (0.496 MB), chrome cache (2.6 MB), itunes (0.121 MB), 
mov (1980 MB),  
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FIG. 11 Comparing data file number recovered using Recover My File and DiskDigger 
 
 
FIG. 12 Comparing data file size recovered using Recover My File and DiskDigger 
 
myob (1280 MB), ogg (1.8 MB), spss (0.657 MB), text UTF-16 (7.3 MB), thumbnails (77.7 
MB), and truetype (18.3 MB). It is evident that the two additional data file formats from 
Recover My File that made major contribution to the difference are .mov and .myob. The 
results suggest that DiskDigger performs better than Recover My File only in the area of 
the number of data files, particularly the .tif files (6939), recovered by each from the two 
images. Conversely, Recover My File performs better in terms of deep search for different 
data file formats, and the size of data files recovered. 
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FIG. 13 Total number of files recovered from FTK & DD images using different forensic 
tools. 
 
The summary of the recovery performance of the five forensic tools is shown in Figs. 13 
and 14. The figures show that Phone Image Carver AccessData FTK did not perform well 
under the present experimental conditions as a forensic recovery tool. Foremost, on the hand 
recovered more file formats and appreciable large number of data files with corresponding 
data file size. However, Foremost shows to recover slightly higher number of data files (jpeg 
and png) from dd image than FTK image while the sizes of the data file recovered show no 
difference. DiskDigger appears to have performed well compared to Recover My File. It 
recovered many file formats that is still less than the number of data file formats recovered 
by Recover My File. DiskDigger proves to recover the highest number of data files but less 
than the size of data files recovered by Recover My File. Therefore, the study shows that 
Recover My File has the best recovery function as a forensic tool. It proved to have the 
deepest search penetration, recovered the highest number of data file formats, and recovered 
the largest size of data file formats, although it was less than DiskDigger in the number of 
data files recovered. 
 
 
214 
 
 
FIG. 14 Total size of data files recovered from FTK & DD images using different forensic 
tools. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
The increasing use of smartphone for various social-economic transactions led to a 
consequent increase in cybercrimes committed through smartphones. The nature of these 
devices and the variety of applications resided on them deemed challenging challenges to 
forensic investigators. To address these challenges, this paper investigated the use of 
different forensic tools for recovering data files from a restored Android mobile phone. The 
data was extracted using different forensic tools, namely AccessData FTK and Backtrack 
dd, on the physical image acquisition of the device. The focus of this paper was to 
investigate the data recovery functions of Photo Image Carver, AccessData FTK, Foremost, 
Recover My Files and DiskDigger in forensic investigation of FTK and DD images from 
smartphone mobile device. The study revealed that .dd images compare more favorably for 
android mobile forensic investigation than FTK images, judging from the size of evidence 
it holds. Moreover, the experiment revealed that Phone image carver recovered some file 
types including SQLite, SWF Flash, and Text-Shift JIS, which other tools could not recover. 
Phone Image Carver keeps log file record of activities performed in it, giving the analyst 
the opportunity to review his previous steps each time he uses the tool. Foremost proves to 
recover more number of files data than Phone Image Carver and AccessData FTK. On the 
other hand, Recover My Files and DiskDigger had greater percentage recovery performance 
than Foremost, Phone Image Carver, and AccessData FTK. Both Recover My Files and 
DiskDigger recovered many data file formats suggesting they had a deep penetration 
recovery capability. However, Recover My Files recovered more files of type mov, zip, 
JPEG, and MYOB than DiskDigger recovered. Recover My Files proves to recover the 
greatest percentage of evidence by recovering 3GP, AMR audio, avi, itunes, Myob, ogg, 
thumbnails, and truetype files, which no other tools recovered. Therefore, Recover My Files 
proves to be the best recovery tool in this study. 
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In conclusion, the analysis tools used in this experiment showed different levels of recovery 
performance. Most of the tools recovered major file formats that other tools did not recover, 
suggesting that no single forensic tool could recover all forensic evidences in a smartphone 
image. In future, further similar studies are suggested to be conducted on other mobile 
platforms such as iPhone and compare and contrast results with those presented in this paper. 
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